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Abstract
This study examines the 1951 death sentences imposed 
upon Ethel and Julius Rosenberg by Judge Irving R. Kaufman. 
The study's focus is discovering how these sentences came 
to be, rhetorically. The writer employs the dramatistic 
pentad suggested by Kenneth Burke. The scene is seen as the 
dominant, driving force behind the judge's sentences. The 
scene is labeled as "betrayal;" the name betrayal resulting 
from; (1) the Cold War; (2) McCarthyism; (3) the Korean War; 
and (4) other domestic post-World War II problems. The 
analysis pictures the American government using the Rosen­
bergs as scapegoats symbolically to cleanse away betrayal 
images. Thus, the government sought to purify itself and to 
regain some of the power and control it was perceived to 
have lost. Some of the concerns raised in the Rosenberg 
case have potential present-day relevance in America's 
handling of espionage cases.
vi
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Chapter One
Introduction
This dissertation seeks to discover the motivational 
basis of the Rosenberg trial and sentencing. In order to 
do so, the writer employs the Burkean dramatistic pentad, a 
method uniquely suited through discourse analysis, to 
reveal a complete picture of the motives of the trial and 
sentencing. This methodology not only allows a focus on 
varying aspects of the genesis of the trial and sentence, 
but provides a means to determine whether one or more of 
these aspects guided, predetermined, or greatly influenced 
other aspects; these means being the pentadic ratios.
Both the focus and method of this study are unique as 
the majority of the literature relevant to the atomic spy 
cases in general and to the Rosenberg trial and sentencing 
in specific have stressed on the rightness or wrongness, 
the goodness or badness, or on the justice or injustice of 
the case. Other literature focuses upon the national and 
international effects of the atom spies' deeds. This study 
has as its focal issue the genesis of the unique death 
sentences imposed on Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, the only 
spies in the entire post-World War II web to receive
l
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2the death penalty for their deeds.
The researcher anticipates that the results will have 
a bearing on many unresolved questions about the trial and 
sentences, and perhaps serve as a paradigmatic guide for 
the study of landmark cases of this type.
The literature studied is divided into several types: 
trial transcripts; newspaper, magazine, and book interviews; 
published secondary accounts of participants in the case; 
periodicals and books recalling events and moods of the 
Rosenberg case period; and scholarly literature arguing 
various interpretations and consequences of the case.
Statement of the Problem
The atomic bomb signaled the end to World Waf II, but 
it also spawned a new danger, one as potentially threatening 
to human life as the one it ended. Treason and espionage 
involving atomic secrets were new phenomena for the world 
and for the United States system of justice.
The unexpected defection of Igor Gouzenko, a Russian 
clerk in the Soviet Embassy, gave Canadian intelligence 
authorities their first evidence that cooperative British- 
Canadian-American atomic secrets had been compromised. Not 
until investigative agencies of all three nations exchanged 
information did the identities of those who spied for the 
Soviets become known. The trail of spies grew long and 
involved many nations.
Ethel and Julius Rosenberg were among the last in the
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3ring of World War II spies to be arrested, tried, and 
sentenced. In addition to the Rosenbergs, three other 
persons were co-defendants in the trial. They were: David 
Greenglass, Ethel Rosenberg's brother and a confessed 
state's witness against the other defendants; Morton Sobell, 
indicted for less serious offenses than the Rosenbergs; and 
Anatoli Yakovlev, a Russian envoy who had fled to Russia and 
was indicted in absentia. Because of Yakovlev's absence and 
Greenglass' cooperation with the government, only the 
Rosenbergs and Sobell were defendants at the famous trial. 
This study focuses on the Rosenbergs because of their 
unique sentences.
In addition to the evidence presented at the trial, 
several other factors allegedly contributed to the death 
sentences for the Rosenbergs, who were the only spies in 
the whole web of treasonous acts in the 1940s and 1950s to 
be executed. These factors included: (1) fear that the 
Soviets might become equal or superior to the U.S. in 
atomic weaponry; (2) fear of Soviet atomic weapon use; (3) 
belief by some that Soviet aggression in Korea was 
connected to atomic capability; (4) a rising anti-Commun- 
ism surge in the U.S.; (5) the Rosenbergs' unwillingness 
to help authorities identify and locate other spies 
before, during, and after the trial; (6) selection of a 
young, Jewish judge to preside over the case; and (7) 
intense national and international interest aroused by the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4media.
The fact that this was the world's first major atomic 
spying case tried without a confession and that this was the 
first major American atomic spy case, produced a unique 
scenario in the U.S. courts. This may well help explain, 
in part, why the Rosenbergs were the only spies put to death 
by an American court in peace-time and that they have been 
the only spies executed in the United States since 1953.
This study's purpose is to examine the milieu of 
circumstances surrounding the Rosenbergs' sentencing, not to 
judge the sentence as "good" or "bad," "right" or "wrong," 
or "just" or "unjust," but to understand the factors that 
may well have contributed to it. Such an understanding may 
aid future scholars of other spy sentences. The study may 
may also provide a better understanding of the American 
judicial system and the role public sentiment plays in 
judicial decision-making.
Most sentences receive little or no public attention. 
These sentences usually escape significant media publicity 
as well. Some sentences are of particular parochial 
concern; these are attended by local interested parties and 
are usually covered by the local press. Still other cases, 
fewer in number, are of national interest, typically paid 
attention to by many people and receiving national press 
coverage. The Rosenberg case was a truly rare type of case; 
this case attracted world-wide notoriety and was reported by 
the media of almost every nation, whether in the "free
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5world," in the Communist bloc, or unaligned nations. 
Historically, very few U.S. cases have aroused such world­
wide attention. The Sacco-Vanzetti case of the 1920s, the 
Lindbergh "baby case" of the 1930s, and the Sam Sheppard 
case of the 1960s are among the few American cases that 
received international notoriety comparable in scope to 
that of the Rosenbergs.
Wide incerest in judicial outcomes often have the 
effect of transforming judicial proceedings into political 
or even social phenomena. A vexing example was the Sam 
Sheppard case. Intense public and media interest threatened 
Sheppard's securing an impartial trial and served as the 
basis of an appeal and eventual retrial of his case.
Another example was the 1968 "Chicago Seven" trial where 
disruptive behavior by defendants, their lawyers, and court­
room spectators almost turned the event into a circus. 
Reports of these disruptions were widely reported by the 
press and these reports exacerbated the already chaotic 
images that were created. Such intense public interest can 
place judicial decisions under inordinate scrutiny and 
appraisal. This review and assessment can place heavy 
pressures on a judge who is asked to render crucial 
decisions.
The forces of public interest, scrutiny, and evaluation 
as well as the pressures these factors place on judges may, 
in some cases, impinge upon judicial decision-making 
independence. One example of this arose in the Sacco-
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6Vanzetti case where the judge has been clearly shown to be a 
victim of a wave of public sentiment and intense pressures 
by local politicians to see that the defendants were put to 
death. Many historical reviews of this case show that 
little restraint was shown by the judge, the media, and the 
public to these pressures. Later Supreme Court rulings 
relevant to defendants' rights reduced the likelihood of 
such occurrences happening again.
Such pressures could lead to poor justice. Public 
opinion swaying judicial decisions is one of the reasons
federal judges were afforded life-tenure in their posts as 
1
jurists.
Review of Relevant Literature
A wealth of literature exists relevant to the Rosenberg 
case. Most of the literature is either descriptive of the 
case or evaluative, pro or con, of the evidence, the pro- 
cedings, the jury, the judicial decisions, and/or the 
impact of the alleged offenses. Little has been written 
concerning the reasons why this case became so notorious or 
why the Rosenbergs were the only ones in the large cast of 
spy characters to be executed. By taking the few extant 
works that directly focus on these matters and gleaning from 
other tangential works which hint at these matters, one can 
come to a fairly clear understanding of why the Rosenberg 
case was unique.
Most Rosenberg case literature was written in three
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7time periods. The first period of great interest in the
case occurred after the 1951 Rosenbergs1 arrest and was
sustained until their executions in 1953. The next period
of marked interest commenced about 1964 and lasted until
1974. The third period of renewed interest in the case
began in 1985 and this latest peak in interest seems still 
2
to be active.
There appear to be four reasons why peaked public 
interest in the Rosenberg case seemed to wane after the 
executions. First, the executions were the culminating 
events for those whose interests were revenge, "justice," or 
simply resolution of the case. Second, the height of the 
McCarthy scare period was upon America, and continued 
interest in the case after its climax may have been seen as 
risky by many. Third, the Korean War absorbed substantial 
American attention and interest until its 1954 negotiated 
"resolution". Lastly, the fact that there had not been any 
evidence of further atomic spying in America may have 
dampened public concern and interest in the Rosenberg case.
Renewed attention to the Rosenberg case in 1964 after 
a ten year hiatus can be partly explained by two phenomena. 
The popularity of the "conspiracy theory" following the John 
F. Kennedy assassination in 1963 served as an invitation for 
renewed interest in matters such as the Rosenberg case. The 
decade of the "sixties" was a time when many present and 
past government acts were being questioned. It therefore
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8should be no great surprise that interest in the Rosenberg 
case was revitalized.
Interest in the case seemed to wane again in 1974.
This may partly have been due to the peaked interest in the 
Watergate affair and in the Nixon resignation. The most 
recent rise in interest in the Rosenberg case may be partly 
attributable to new revelations of spying activities by both 
Americans and non-Americans and due to highly publicized 
attempts by the U.S. government to improve its relations 
with the Soviet Union.
Much of the writing about the Rosenberg case has 
defined the trial and sentences in polar, value-laden terms 
(i.e. good-bad, right-wrong, and just-unjust). This study 
focuses on the literature that exemplifies and explains the 
motives of the Rosenberg trial and sentences. Effort has 
been made to select from the many duplicative books and 
periodicals the most thorough, the most authoritative, and 
the most often quoted items relevant to the case. This has 
resulted in a manageable, accessible selected body of 
literature for this study. Most of the works cited in this 
study will lead the reader to further works that pursue 
various topics at greater depth or which lead the reader to 
subjects tangential to this study.
The study's literature can be grouped into seven broad 
categories: (1) quotations, testimony, and media reports 
relevant to the participants in the atom spy-case drama; (2) 
press reports, arguments by spy-case scholars, and docum­
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9ented incidences relevant to various pressures on the 
American system of justice exerted by the defendants, the 
public, domestic and foreign presses, and foreign inter­
est groups; (3) questions and criticism posed by legal 
scholars relative to capital sentences and to atomic spy 
cases in other nations; (4) White House press briefings and 
published records of various judicial, appellate, and presi­
dential appeals; (5) quotations from various documents and 
letters sent to press groups and to the White House 
concerning clemency requests; (6) publicly debated views of 
Communism as an evil force; and (7) other miscellaneous 
facts relevant to this study.
Literature pertaining to the numerous actors.in the 
atom spy case drama is summarized below.
Pilat (1952) in The Atom Spies and various newspaper 
and magazine accounts provide biographical data about Judge 
Irving R. Kaufman. Pilat also sets Kaufman in the context 
of the Communist/spy setting and discusses his involvement 
in an earlier Communist spy case. Various interpretations 
and facts about Kaufman's private life and career appeared 
in the popular press. Most of this was published as the 
trial began and again at the time of sentencing, each being 
the product of journalistic curiosity, data availability, 
and assumed audience interest. Therefore, some of the 
writings seem scattered.
Pilat (1952) and Nizer (1973) in The Implosion
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Conspiracy provide insight into Irving Saypol's role as 
U.S. Attorney and chief prosecutor in the Rosenberg case. 
Pilat also argues the importance of Saypol's involvement 
in an earlier case involving Communists and spies.
Nizer (1973) characterizes the life-threatening efforts 
by Emanuel Bloch in defending Ethel and Julius Rosenberg as 
heroic and praises Bloch's taking custody of the Rosenberg 
children until his death only months after the execution.
The most notable descriptions of appeals made on behalf 
of the Rosenbergs are found in Fineberg's book, The 
Rosenberg Case: Fact and Fiction (1953) in which Judge 
Jerome N. Frank of the U.S. Court of Appeals, is argued to 
have agreed consistently with Judge Kaufman's decisions on 
questions of appeal. Opposing positions relevant'to the 
appeals are debated in the Schneirs' book, Invitation to an 
Inquest (1965, 1983). Radosh and Milton (1983) provide one 
of the most balanced and thorough examinations of the 
Rosenberg case in The Rosenberg File.
Pilat (1952) gives the earliest and most comprehensive 
Rosenberg case background and summary. Portions of several 
other books, Meeropol and Meeropol (1975, 1986) We Are Your 
Sons, Singer (1952) Gentlemen Spies, Wexley (1955) The 
Judgment of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg; Wise & Ross (1967) 
The Espionage Establishment, and Wighton (1966) The World's 
Greatest Spies among others provide insights and suggest 
interpretations that add measurably to the understanding of 
the Rosenbergs' 1940s and 1950s involvement in spying
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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activities. Newspapers and magazines are replete with both 
factual reports and with debates about the Rosenbergs 
throughout the arrest, trial, appeal, and sentencing 
periods. Much of this debating, however, was either 
undocumented or repetitious.
David Greenglass, brother of Ethel Rosenberg, and 
confessed co-conspirator who testified against the other 
defendants received much more publicity than most others 
involved in the case. Dulles (1968) in Great True Spy 
Stories; Pilat (1952); Wise & Ross (1967); and the most 
probing and informative, Wyden (1951) in "G.I. Spy Who Stole 
A-Bomb secrets" suggested an interpretation of a more major 
role for Greenglass than any other account.
Morton Sobell's involvement in espionage activities was 
not apparently covered in any in-depth or systematic way. 
This was probably due to the fact that he was charged with 
lesser offenses and was not as involved in the many channels 
in the huge spy network nor did he appear implicated in the 
most serious criminal acts. Some information about Sobell 
and his deeds appears in the popular literature of the early 
1950s.
Anatoli Yakovlev, another defendant named in the 
Rosenberg, et al. case, was indicted but not tried. He had 
been the wartime Soviet Vice Counsel in New York and had 
been the main courier between clandestine U.S. information 
collectors and Soviet Union leaders. He fled the United
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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States before he could be arrested. Since his defense was 
effectively moot, not much was said about him or his deeds 
except what had been testified to in the Rosenberg trial.
Several prominent tangental participants in the 1940s 
world-wide spy ring were widely written about in the press 
and by serious scholars since many of these figures had 
either previously been tried in other nations, had confessed 
to their crimes in America, or had fled to Russia. These 
behind the scenes figures included Klaus Fuchs, who, most 
experts agree, gave the most damaging information, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively, to the Russians. Dulles 
(1968); Grammont (1962) in The Secret War; Johnson (1951, 
a, b, c, d); Pincher (1984) in Too Secret Too Long; Spender
(1950) in The Inner Meanings of the Fuchs Case; and West
(1951) in The Terrifying Impact of the Fuchs Case, all 
provide useful detail and insight into Fuchs' role in the 
atom spy activities.
Harry Gold, a prominent witness in the Rosenberg trial, 
who was argued to be significantly involved with most of the 
Rosenbergs’ npying activities, is discussed in some depth by 
Dallin (1955) in Soviet Espionage; Grammont (1962); Wise & 
Ross (1967); and Wyden (1951).
Understanding the deeds and the interrelationships of 
other figures active in the spy ring scenario of the 1940s 
and 1950s but not directly involved in the Rosenberg case is 
pivotal to a complete understanding of how it all worked. 
Some of these other figures included: Alan Nunn May, a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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British scientist who gave the Russians highly protected 
secrets about uranium and who was sentenced to 10 years in 
prison by the British; Abraham Brothman and Miriam 
Moscowitz, two avowed Communists who aided in the Rosenberg 
spy network and who were tried by Judge Kaufman and were 
prosecuted by Irving Saypol prior to the Rosenberg case;
Max Elitcher, a minor espionage participant recruited by 
Julius Rosenberg; Bruno Pontecorvo, an Italian-born British 
scientist who fled to Russia upon learning he was under 
suspicion; Alfred Dean Slack, who was criminally involved 
with Harry Gold and more indirectly involved with Julius 
Rosenberg; and Igor Gouzenko, the Russian cipher clerk in 
the Canadian Embassy who defected and fled with the files 
that contained the initial disclosures germane to Soviet 
atomic spy activities and identities. All these indirect 
but important figures are mentioned in various newspaper 
and magazine articles of the early 1950s and are included 
in minor sections of several scholarly books.
Discussions of the many major and minor personalities 
who were part of the U.S. atomic spy ring are scattered 
widely due to conflicting agendas of government spokesmen, 
journalists, and the public (e.g. defending or assailing the 
government's case, pleading for clemency, and attempting to 
objectively report on the case) and due to numerous 
strategies employed to attain these various goals.
Arguments addressing the issue whether or not there
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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were undue pressures affecting the Rosenbergs' sentences 
are summarized below.
The Saturday Evening Post (Lehman, 1953) contained a 
forcefully presented chronology of the pressures allegedly 
placed upon Judge Kaufman, the harrassment claimed to be 
brought upon the judge by various interested parties to the 
case, and a description of the judge's personal anguish in 
arriving at his ultimate decision. Alvin Goldstein (1975) 
in The Unquiet Death of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg speak 
persuasively about the many pressures some claimed were 
placed upon the judge in his deliberative period. Anti- 
Semitism is argued as a force that may have entered into the 
arrest and trial decisions and thus indirectly into the 
capital sentence (Dawidowicz, 1952). Berger (1951) and 
White (1950) in the New York Times suggests that pressures 
were placed upon the jury. Supporters of the pressured jury 
theory used President Truman's sense of urgency in the Fuchs 
case as evidence for their position. The McCarthy era and 
its likely influence on the arrest, trial, and sentence of 
American atomic spies is discussed in Feuerlicht (1972) in 
Joe McCarthy and McCarthyism, Luthin (1965) in McCarthy as 
Demogogue, Mandelbanm (1964) in The Social Setting of 
Intolerance, and Wrong (1965) in McCarthyism as 
Totalitarianism.
Ocher justifications for the severe sentences given to 
the Rosenbergs are provided in the judge's sentencing speech 
(Baird, 1952) . Here Judge Kaufman cites his belief that the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Rosenbergs' deeds significantly contributed to the Korean 
War; that those deeds gave Russia the A-Bomb sooner than 
they could have gotten it without help; that those deeds 
contributed to the "cold war;" and that the Rosenbergs' 
actions had placed their own children in immediate and long­
term jeopardy. Various other reasons contributing to the 
judge's sentences decision are posited in several popular 
early 1950 magazines. Some of these articles were attempts 
to defend Kaufman's judgment and others were condemnations 
of his decision. Many of these periodicals contained highly 
biased and shallow accounts of the sentencing and most were 
single-issue in scope.
After the sentences, many famous personalities appealed 
to Judge Kaufman and to Presidents Truman and Eisenhower for 
clemency on behalf of the Rosenbergs. These are most 
poignantly reported in "Mercy and Justice" (1953) in Time 
which discusses an appeal by Pope Pius XII; Hayes (1952) in 
which an appeal on behalf of the Rosenbergs' sons is made; 
and Nizer (1973) in which Albert Einstein made a clemency 
appeal to President Truman. Appeals made by English,
French, Italian, and Japanese leaders, common citizens, and 
the media are chronicled in several magazines and newspapers 
and in a journalism dissertation that analyzed the Leftist 
press of European countries after the Rosenberg sentences 
(Price, 1956).
Commonweal, in an article, "Regarding the Rosenbergs,"
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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puts forth the pro-Kaufman case's strongest attack on 
Communism as an evil force requiring immediate and decisive 
responses. Time in its 1951 article, "Still Defiant" and 
Newsweek in a 1953 article, "Payment Deferred," argue the 
evils of the "Russian conspiracy".
Discussions of comparatively minor topics that alone 
have little bearing on the reasons behind the Rosenberg 
sentence appear in various sources mentioned above and in 
several other sources not yet mentioned. These discussions 
become useful and relevant when seen in the aggregate.
The use of political rhetoric to convey symbolic 
meaning and to illustrate how symbol use affects individual, 
group, and societal decision-making is suggested by Edelman 
(1964) in The Symbolic Use of Politics, (1971) in•Politics 
as Symbolic Action; by King (1976) in "The Rhetoric of Power 
Maintainance: Elites at the Precipice" and (1987) in Power 
and Communication; and by Preez (1980) in The Politics of 
Identity.
Methodology Used in the Study
This study attributes motives to the Rosenbergs' 
sentences. Motives seem most imperative to examine because 
they promulgate means, ends, and defenses for events. The 
foremost examinations of motives appear in Kenneth Burke's 
A Grammar of Motives (1950) and in A Rhetoric of Motives 
(1945). This study of the motives that contributed to the 
Rosenberg case capital sentences will employ the drama-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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tistic pentad which Burke discusses in a Grammar of Motives 
(pp. xv-xxxiii) .
This methodology is employed because it has been 
constructed to facilitate precisely the kind of analysis 
chosen for this study. The pentad allows for a given 
exigence to be examined from a variety of perspectives and 
provides guidelines to assure that these perspectives remain 
relevant to the focal issue. In addition, the use of 
Burke's dramatistic model for analyzing motives allows the 
various facets involved to be treated as "ratios." Ratios 
are the greater or lesser degrees to which various 
components of the pentad contribute to motives and the 
degree to which one or more of the components have influence 
or command over other components. This allows for the 
labeling of various components in an analysis as "major," 
"minor," or "necessary." Burke's model allows flexibility 
without losing focus on the main issue and it allows a 
concise analysis of a total situation.
Burke suggests five key terms in generating an investi­
gation into motives.
They are: Act, Scene, Agent, Agency, Purpose. In a 
rounded statement about motives, you must have some 
word that means the act (names what took place in 
thought or deed) , and another that names the scene (the 
background of the act, the situation in which it 
occurred)? also, you must indicate what person or kind
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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of person (agent) performed the act, what means or 
instruments he used (agency), and the purpose. . . . 
any complete statement about motives will offer some 
kind of answers to these five questions: what was done 
(act), when or where was it done (scene), who did it 
(agent) , how he did it (agency), and why (purpose).
(p. xv).
These five aspects of the Rosenberg case are examined indiv­
idually and then, those pentadic elements appearing to bear 
the most significant importance are shown to bear specific 
relationship to one another. The popular writings and 
formal scholarship concerning the Rosenberg case is first 
examined in the context of the divisions suggested by the 
pentad. Then, the evidence is appraised to see (1) if any 
decisions or actions were "forced," that is, was there 
truly a choice to be made or was there really little or no 
choice? (2) did any of the choices made preclude other 
options that may have taken place? and (3) were the 
components that were chosen or thrust upon the situation 
facilitative or problematic to the motives circumscribing 
the event?
The dramatistic pentad allows a given exigence to be 
examined from a thorough variety of perspectives while 
maintaining a clear focus on one main issue, that of 
attributing motives.
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Organization of Data
This dissertation is arranged in the following fashion:
Chapter One: Introduction to the Study. This chapter 
provides background information relevant to the study. The 
following matters are addressed in this section: (a) an 
overview of the study; (b) a statement of the problem being 
investigated; (c) a relevant literature review; (d) the 
methodology employed; (e) the data organization found in this 
dissertation; and (f) the significance of the study.
Chapter Two: The Scene. This section describes the 
setting of the act. The most relevant aspects of the scene, 
it is argued, are: (1) the "red scare" period, (2) the 
cold war period, (3) the onset of the Korean War, and (4) 
other U.S. domestic post-war problems. The author argues 
the scene is the dominating and controlling pentadic dim­
ension. The scene directly affected almost all decisions 
made in the Rosenberg case.
Chapter Three: The Act and the Agency. In this segment 
of the study, the author defines what was done and traces 
how the act was carried out. In this chapter, the writer 
evaluates claims and interpretations of the arrest, trial, 
and sentencing of the Rosenbergs. This chapter wieghs 
conflicting assertions relevant to the process of carrying 
out the act, namely, the F.B.I., the Justice Department 
officials, Judge Kaufman, who presided over the case and who 
sentenced the Rosenbergs, and the lengthy appeals process.
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Influences of the scene on both the act and the agency are 
suggested as is a strong link between the act and agency.
Chapter Four: The Agent. The performer of the act 
is argued to be the judge. Claims are made that Judge 
Kaufman was chosen as presiding judge due to influences 
exerted by the scene, the anticipated act, and the 
components of the agency already in place. The judge's 
background, character, and professional career are presented 
as a claim that he was the ideal agent for the Rosenberg 
case scene.
Chapter Five: The Purpose. In this section of the study 
three opposing versions of ends to be reached by the 
Rosenberg sentences are compared. These competing purposes 
were forwarded by (1) partisans of the government"and those 
who had a specific reason for wanting to see the Rosenbergs 
executed; these two broad groups are referred to as "pro­
establishment" supporters; (2) partisans of the Left and 
those who had a specific reason for wanting the Rosenbergs 
exonerated; these two broad groups are referred to as "anti- 
establishment" supporters. In addition to these two general 
partisan groups, there is a more enlightened group that has 
taken less polar, less strident, and more informed stances 
on the Rosenberg case. These are the most recent scholars 
of the case who have the benefit of the wealth of new 
information available as a consequence of the Freedom of 
Information Act.
The more recent explanations of why the Rosenbergs were
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sentenced to death seem to present a more believable and 
more utilitarian answer. These more informed views posit 
that all sides in the case made serious errors and that 
these errors need to be avoided in future spy cases.
Chapter Six: Conclusion and Implications. This last 
chapter attributes motives to the Rosenbergs' sentences.
The judge in the case, the leaders of the government, and 
the Rosenbergs themselves all offered, in symbolic ways, 
justifications for the death sentences. Other parties also 
offered motives, but these parties were not pivotal to the 
case and their suggested motives seem too biased or 
insignificant to deserve great study.
Significance of the Study
This study is significant in at least three ways.
First, many conflicting claims and interpretations regarding
the Rosenberg sentences have been forwarded and debated,
most attempting to label the result according to polar
judgments. Very few studies have specifically examined how
and why these sentences occurred. Second, our basic
understanding of the U.S. legal system includes, for many,
the notion that the judiciary is somehow immune from the
pressures of public demand and that judges are somehow
3
able to render judgements apart from those pressures. Such 
a belief is naive at best, but it holds as truth as it is 
rooted in the very foundation of civics education given our
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young school children in almost every U.S. school district. 
This study argues the fallacy of such a belief. Third, some 
insights into potential problems common to the Rosenberg 
case and to recent 1980s spy cases are offered. It is 
further argued that some of the Rosenberg case problems 
were caused by various conflicting definitions, polar 
ideological stances, and by a system of justice that became 
noticeably rigid in matters of self-criticism.
Dramatic increases in the frequency of spy case arrests 
and trials in the late 1980s provide the basis for claiming 
some similarity between the Rosenberg era and the current 
scene. National security dangers and lowering public con­
fidence in the judicial system are argued to be the most 
imperative reasons for learning from the Rosenberg case.
Conclusion
The remaining chapters of this dissertation examine the 
Rosenberg case in order to discover the motives for the 
unique death sentences imposed upon Ethel and Julius 
Rosenberg. The case is probed using the dramatistic pentad 
so that there can be the greatest range of perspectives 
used. The study will start by focusing on the scene, the 
pentadic element seen as the driving force in the Rosenberg 
affair. The scene, as it is envisioned in this study, is 
limited to the early 1950s and is set in the United States.




Jensen reports on Thomas Lloyd's notes during the 20 
November to 15 December 1787 Pennsylvania Convention in 
which the judicial independence issue was debated. This 
state convention seemed to produce a cogent argument in 
favor of judicial independence. Oswald's report shows that 
even the minority, which had fiercely debated almost every 
issue, saw judicial independence as vital (Jensen, 1976, 
p. 451 & Oswald, 1788, n.p.).
2
Examination of the circulation records of Rosenberg 
case literature at the Troy H. Middleton Library at the 
Louisiana State University, the John B. Cade Library at 
Southern University, the Chicago Public Library, and the New 
York Public Library shows a similar borrowing peak at these 
times. The geographic diversity of this demand implies a 
general thematic interest.
3
Examination of any of the state conventions in the 
constitutional ratification process will show that there was 
a common hope that this would be the case; however, in most 
such debates there were those who argued that such was not 
absolutely assured, that judges cannot be entirely insulated 
from society.
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Overview of the Scene
The scene is the background of the act, the situation 
in which it occurred (Burke, 1945, p. XV). The scene is an 
amalgam of praxes, contexts, and history relevant to an 
event. The scene is a perspective, one defined and named by 
the critic in order to provide direction and focus (Bennett, 
1979; Ling, 1980).
The writer contends that the scene was the predominant 
pent.adic element in the Rosenberg affair. The author 
argues that at times the background became the fofeground so 
that the scene appeared to mediate all other dramatistic 
elements. This idea can be briefly illustrated by showing 
how some of the behaviors in the 1951 scene seemed to become 
reversed. One background element was Senator Joseph Me 
Carthy's making wildly unsubstantiated claims in order to 
prove a point. Then, Chief United States Attorney, Myles 
Lane, accused Ethel Rosenberg of being partly responsible 
for "causing the situation in Korea" (Wexley, 1955, p. 132). 
This behavior, in many ways, was similar to McCarthy's but 
Lane's behavior was a foreground matter.
The Rosenberg sentencing scene was a complex one; it
24
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was composed of several different pieces like a mosaic.
Each piece, when seen alone, seems jagged and incomplete, 
but when put together, they form a coherent, more complete 
design. The major Rosenberg sentencing scene components 
were: (1) the cold war; (2) the red scare period which 
became known in its mature stages as McCarthyism; (3) the 
Korean War; and (4) other domestic, post-war problems.
This chapter illustrates how the scene came to be known 
as betrayal. The name betrayal resulted, in part, from the 
frustration over the failures of several other names to 
take hold as representative labels of the overall situation 
in 1951 America. Such names as fear, anger, impotence, and 
weakness were accepted, by some, to represent certain parts 
of the scene, but it was betrayal that was found to tran­
scend these other names and to adequately represent the 
emotional spectrum Americans were experiencing.
World War II had ended, but several pre-war and war­
time acts, called the cold war, were still actively c a u s i n g  
anxiety, expense, and fighting. Some of our allies did 
things we couldn't understand; such as (1) Neville Chamber­
lain's passive response to Hitler's demands (Fuchser, 1982, 
pp. 138-44); (2) Vichy France's cooperation with the Nazis 
(Paxton, 1966); and (3) acts by our "allies," the Soviets, 
such as their annexation of much of Eastern Europe; and 
their late, almost token, declaration of war with Japan 
(Karig, Harris, & Manson, 1949, p. 457). The Russians 
behaved later in ways that allowed many Americans to believe
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they were no longer our allies. Such Soviet behaviors as 
their Berlin blockade (Charles, 1959); their recalcitrance 
in ending Austria's partition; and their abrogation of the 
Czechoslovakian agreement (Root, 1963, p. 87) added to the 
perception that the Soviets were really not true allies.
Many of those responsible for these events were only 
symbolically identifiable in terms such as "the Russians," 
"our allies," or "the Left." Many of those who could be 
identified were dead or were beyond the reach of American 
sanctions. Various emotions resulting from (1) the 
perceptions that the "war" had not ended; (2) our nagging 
disagreements with some of our allies, and (3) the frequent 
uncooperative and sometimes antagonistic Soviet behaviors 
came to be interpreted as "betrayal". Betrayal demands a 
response (Tokaev, 1945, p. 142); one typical response is to 
identify the betrayers, expose them, inflict sanctions on 
them, and thus purify the system of their presence. Since 
most of the betrayers seemed beyond America's control to 
sanction, scapegoats provided a possible alternative.
The red scare period, later known as McCarthyism, was 
another set of circumstances that some Americans identified 
as betrayal ("Investigations: The Network," 1949, p. 16).
The American government was accused by some of harboring 
known Communists and Communist sympathizers (Feuerlicht, 
1972; Hunt for War," 1948, pp. 18-19; Investigations: Burden 
of Proof, 1948, pp. 15-17); with not striving hard enough to
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keep mainland China free from Communism; (Spender, 1950, p. 
13); and with giving the Soviets our atomic secrets through 
neglect, apathy, and stupidity (Johnson, 1951a; West, 1951; 
Wyden, 1951).
These events initially took on names such as "soft on 
Communism," "criminal," "weak," and "incompetent." The term 
"betrayal" came to be one that coalesced these scenic 
descriptions. Again, many of those believed to have 
betrayed the U.S. were identified in abstract categories 
such as "the military," "the government," "the Left wing," 
"socialists," or "the Communists."
The Korean War was yet another event that gave impetus 
to the betrayal theme. America had toiled hard to get an 
agreeable partition of the Korean peninsula immediately 
after the second World War (Sunoo, 1979, pp. 45-47). After 
initial, positive military encounters in Korea, Americans 
soon found themselves embroiled in a "no-win" battle (Lee, 
1984, p. 380). Many Americans felt betrayed (p. 381); the 
perceived betrayers were, in many cases, not concretely 
identified and this promoted a search for someone to blame.
In addition to these three major identifiable events, 
other less publicized events in the U.S. denied the high, 
positive expectations of many Americans after the war.
Events such as (1) high inflation ("Cities' Most Pressing," 
1946, pp. 5-6), (2) housing shortages ("Facts About 
Housing," 1946, pp. 314-15), (3) rising unemployment 
(Murray, 1945, pp. 234-38; "Senator Murray's Full," pp.
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232-34), (4) numerous union strikes (Snyder, 1946, pp. 
34-36), and (5) rising crime ("Crime," 1946, pp. 30-31);
"The Year," 1945, pp. 306-307) were the antithesis of high 
hopes raised at war's end. We had won the war, we were 
the most powerful nation in the world, and we were helping 
most of the world's nations; yet we still had many problems 
of our own. Many believed thinqs ought to be better and 
felt betrayed because they were not. Once again, the 
sources of betrayal were only vaguely symbolic; there was 
a need to identify someone to blame.
This chapter presents arguments that claim (1) the name 
"betrayal" came to be the dominant name given to the scene; 
(2) other competing names were rejected by most people; how­
ever, some alternate names were retained by certain small 
groups of people; and (3) specific images, useful to the 
government, were created by this treatment of the scene.
Naming the Scene
Most social or political scenes of any magnitude or
1
importance come to be named, some after lengthy debate or 
deliberation. Such scenes as Watergate, child labor reform, 
or the women's movement acquired their names after alternate 
names had been discarded and one dominant name seemed to 
become accepted (Conrad, 1981; Cox, 1974; Smith & Windes, 
1976). Following is a series of claims showing how the 
name "betrayal" came to be the name given to the four
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major components of the Rosenberg case scene, namely, (1) 
the cold war, (2) the red scare period, (3) the Korean War, 
and (4) other domestic, post-war American problems. The 
writer also takes the position that other names were 
suggested and rejected in favor of the name, betrayal.
The Cold War Period
The term, "cold war," was introduced by U.S. financier 
and presidential advisor, Bernard Baruch, in 1947 congress­
ional debate ("Cold war," 1985, p. 444). That same year, 
the famous, scholarly journalist, Walter Lippmann, published 
and popularized the term, "cold war" (1947).
Historians, Grob and Billias, (1982a) cite two major 
reasons why the cold war developed:
Two developments during the war established the context 
within which the cold war would be waged. One was the 
toppling of five major nations from the ranks of first- 
rate powers . . . This situation left only two super­
powers: the United States and the Soviet Union. The 
second development was . . . the atomic bomb (p. 377). 
Historian, Louis Halle (1967), saw the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union in an unusual but graphic way: ". . . a  scorpion and a 
tarantula together in a bottle, each trying tragically to 
outdo the other" (p. xiii). Ideological differences surely 
existed between the U.S. and the Soviet Union before World 
War II; however, the second World War "created the setting 
for the Soviet-American confrontation" (Grob & Billias,
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1982a, p. 378). The cold war was a time when the U.S. and 
the Soviets labeled each other in ways that identified their 
differences as virtually unsettleable.
Soviet labels and perceptions of the Americans as well 
as American interpretations of the Soviets set the climate 
for the cold war in America, one of the major facets of the 
Rosenberg case scene. Some American labels and perceptions 
of the Soviet Union came from high public officials and from 
other respected opinion leaders. At times, these leaders 
made extreme, vivid, and often sensational statements that 
exacerbated an already tense situation. These statements 
became most inflamatory when they were amplified by members 
of the press, which sharpened the focus of such statements 
and lent them greater weight than they likely would have had 
without media exposure. Some examples of such statements 
that came to be the banner for the most anti-Soviet segment 
of our population include a comment by Soviet scholar, 
Professor Hans Morgenthau: "The Kremlin was perceived as the 
headquarters of the devil on earth, causing all that was 
wrong with the world and most particularly, scheming the 
destruction of the United States" (Sivachev & Yakovlev,
1979, p. 215). Sivachev & Yakovlev attribute to Secetary of 
State, Dean Achison, another assertion about the Soviets 
that focused on differences between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R 
". . . .the Kremlin gave top priority to world domination in 
their scheme of things" (p. 215). On 4 December 1946,
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Senator Eastland is reported to have stated in the Senate 
that some American people must change their beliefs about 
the Soviets. He is reported to have said, "[Americans]
. . . must realize that Russia is a predatory aggressor 
nation and that today she follows the same fateful road of 
conquest and aggression with which Adolf Hitler set the 
. world on fire" (p. 217).
Divisive discourse also reportedly came from President 
Harry Truman's daughter, who wrote on 9 February 1946: "The 
Russian dictator made a speech . . .  It was a brutal, blunt 
rejection of any hope of peace with the West" (p. 217).
One of the most visceral attacks on the Soviets vis-a-vis 
their war with Germany was made in 1941 by Senator Harry 
Truman. He stated: "If we see that Germany is winning, we 
ought to help Russia and if Russia is winning, we ought to 
help Germany and that way let them kill as many as possible 
. . (Levering, 1982, p. 26). Roberta Feuerlicht (1972) 
attributes more divisive rhetoric to President Truman: "For 
it was Truman who had persuaded the American people that 
Russia planned to communize the world . . . that America was 
good but Russia was Godless" (p. 67).
These statements were not necessarily representative of 
the people making them nor of the time; however, coming from 
highly respected opinion leaders and being echoed in the 
press, they undoubtedly had a negative impact on the 
public's perception of the Soviets (Shapiro, 1984, p. 3).
Some public statements surely contributed to the sense
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of anxiety, worry, and gloom over the cold war, but public 
expectations and self-images also put the cold war in 
context. Grob and Billias (1982a) describe some of these 
expectations and self-images. "By 1945 the United States 
had emerged as the strongest nation on earth. Having 
triumphed over the forces of . . . totalitarianism, American 
citizens looked forward with confidence to the promise of a 
bright future. Such hopes and expectations were soon dashed 
. . . the United States found itself confronting the Soviet 
Union . . . "  (p. 377). Mandelbaum (1964) adds to that 
sentiment when he states: " . . .  the American people looked 
forward to a stable peace characterized by continued 
cooperation with the Soviet Union. This hope soon vanished 
. . . An 'iron curtain' . . . descended between Western 
Europe and the Soviet satellites" (p. 117). Large-scale, 
broad hopes for many Americans were being frustrated in 
post-war America. This frustration, when added to the focus 
of public statements concerning the Soviets as the culprits 
in these events, sowed the seeds of betrayal in the U.S.
This betrayal was not publicly stated, was not concretely 
identified, nor was it the most forceful example of 
betrayal. It was another example of betrayal that built up 
and eventually affected a majority of Americans.
Less subtle, more easily identified cold war acts by 
the Soviets, lent themselves to interpretations as forms of 
betrayal. Grob and Billias (1982a) report that "the Soviet
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
33
Union violated its agreements at Yalta" vis-a-vis Eastern 
Europe and, to a lesser extent, the role of China (p. 379). 
Soviet conduct in other arenas, too, gave rise to an 
interpretation of betrayal. Some of these interpretations 
of betrayal were relevant to their (1) formal agreement 
made to the Americans and to the allied forces; (2) role as 
as a U.S. ally; and (3) world leader role in a world just 
finished with the worst war this planet had ever seen.
The 1948 Berlin blockade "outraged the Western powers, to 
whom it seemed a breach of the agreements" that had been 
made by the Soviets (Jackson, 1956, pp. 20-21). Russian 
conduct in assuring "free [Polish] elections" "made nonsense 
of any claim that they were 'free and unfettered'" (p. 22). 
"A third shock to the Western powers" came over abrogations 
of the Potsdam agreements" (pp. 22-23). This treaty "had 
revealed an unfriendly obduracy on the part of the Russians" 
(p. 24). Jackson quotes Ernest Bevan, the British Foreign 
Secretary, as saying, "Russia's attitude augered ill for the 
policy of joint peace" (p. 24). Soviet behavior relevant to 
her agreements with the U.S., her role as an "ally" of the 
U.S., and her status as a major nation in the post-war world 
surely added impetus to the betrayal theme.
American institutions, too, were showing signs of the 
cold war. Jonathan Root (1963) seems to echo some of the 
emotions of the cold war period. "The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, which had never been anything more than an 
evidence gathering arm for the U.S. Department of Justice,
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acquired its unprecedented authority in American life
sometime immediately after World War II when the nation
finally was forced to abandon the notion that it could
conduct affairs with the Soviet Union with reason and
trust" (p. 86). Walter Lippmann (1974) also cites (1) the
"loyalty program to probe the thoughts of every government
employeee;" (2) the Civil Defense Program allowing citizens
to "take part" in U.S. defense; (3) the Civil Air Patrol,
which was given "special powers in times of crises;" and (4)
the Committee on Un-American Activities, which was granted
"unprecedented powers of investigation" as examples of U.S.
institutional changes in response to the cold war. Freedom-
loving Americans saw several American institutions being
*
manipulated or newly changed to accommodate the needs of 
various politicians reacting to the cold war. These changes 
were possibly interpreted by some as curtailing American 
freedom. Feuerlicht (1972) sees some of these changes in 
institutional practices in somewhat sinister terms: " . . .  
Communists and Communist sympathizers had to be driven out 
of government even at great cost to civil liberties" (p.
67). Mandelbaum (1964) also saw threatening implications in 
the formation of new government agencies. "According to 
old-guard leaders, these newly important institutions were a 
threat to traditional American values" (p. 119). These 
types of views likely led some Americans to believe their 
government was being betrayed from within.
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Post-war perceptions of the Soviet system, Soviet acts 
that seemed inconsistent with its promises, new institut­
ional policies in America, and unmet expectations and 
dreams all seem to have produced a climate of betrayal.
Grob & Billias (1982b) summarize their views of the 1951 
American emotional state. "The cold war reshaped America's 
image of itself . . . The United States . . . experienced 
great apprehension in countering Communist Russia lest a 
confrontation lead to a nuclear war. This sense of anxiety 
caused many Americans to develop a siege mentality and to 
become less tolerant of anyone criticizing the American way 
of life" (pp. 427-28). They also summarize their inter­
pretation of government leaders' reactions to this emotional 
climate. "At the same time, Congress became more .anxious 
about the issue of national security, and at times, passed 
repressive laws to check on the loyalty of some American 
citizens" (p. 428-29) .
The American Communist Party, partly due to the 
McCarran Act of 1942 (50 U.S.C.A. 781) and the Smith Act of 
1940 (18 U.S.C.A. 2385, 2386), was visibly different from 
the formal Soviet regime. The McCarran Act was a fairly 
specific requirement (Black, 1979, pp. 732, 883-84). "[It]
. . . required members of the Communist party and of 
"Communist fronts" to register with the Attorney General.
It also limited their travel abroad, forbade entrance into 
the United States of former Communists, and permitted the 
deportation of naturalized citizens who had joined Communist
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groups within five years of their naturalization" 
(Mandelbaum, 1964, p. 140). The Smith Act was a law that 
" . . . punishes, among other activities, the advocacy of 
the overthrow of the government by force or violence" (pp. 
723, 1246).
The American Communist groups seemed to have views very 
similar to those of the the Soviet Union and could afford, 
politically and economically, to be closer in ideology to 
the Soviet model than could the French or Italian Communist 
groups (Daily Worker, 1949; Price, 1956). The American 
Communist Party saw the American people and the U.S. system 
of government in much the same way as did the Soviet regime 
(Daily Worker, 1946; 1950). The Kremlin-based Communists 
and their followers saw the United States in a very diff­
erent different light than most Americans saw themselves. 
Schwartz (1978) claims that America was seen by these 
Communists as a system " . . .  which is basically exploit­
ive, oppressive, decadent, and crime ridden, and to pursue 
an 'imperialist' - hence aggressive, predatory, anti­
socialist and anti-Soviet foreign policy" (p. 2).
Frederick Barghoorn (1950) further argues that 
Communist propaganda characterized America as ". . . ruled 
by force and fraud. Its handful of rulers pull the strings 
to which their subjects dance like puppets. Its domestic 
policy is one of exploitation and oppression and its foreign 
policy is characterized by deception and aggression"
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(p. 277). The "obscurantist practices of the Stalin period" 
did not abate until the mid-1950s when Soviet leaders 
"instructed" the end to "dogmatic and oversimplified 
attitudes of the past" (Schwartz, 1978, p. 2).
Betrayal was not the only perception of the scene. The 
Left expressed opposing views of the scene and they offered 
their perceptions for public acceptance.
Much of the Communist rhetoric of the late 1940s and 
the early 1950s took on a "broken record" style (New York 
Times, 1952). The "same words," the "same worn phrases," 
and the "familiar vitriolic tones" kept repeating themselves 
(p. 19). This unvarying repetition probably diminished the 
Left's opportunity to make an impact with the mass American 
audience.
The Communists and many of their ardent sympathizers 
tried to define the cold war in their own terms. These 
terms, consistent with their rhetoric were: (1) the U.S. 
government and people characterized as aggressors and the 
U.S.S.R. as the would-be victim; (2) the U.S. government 
labeled as an oppressor, the American people its victims, 
and the Communists as saviors of this evil plot; and (3) the 
U.S. government and the American people portrayed as Soviet 
and Communist haters, seeking to destroy them at all costs. 
The Communists offered "aggression," "oppression," and 
"genocide" as names for the cold war period. The names 
offered by the Communists and their sympathizers seemed to 
ignore, to some extent, that America was reacting to
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conditions within. Most of the names offered by the Left 
seemed to be highly negatively charged action terms rather 
than reaction labels.
For some Americans, these names struck a familiar and 
acceptable tone. These were, for the most part, the 
Communists, the Socialists, and their sympathizers, many 
of whom were: (1) members of unions which had very little 
power to better the conditions for workers under their 
control; (2) those who were unemployed or chronically 
under-employed due to skills that were rendered less useful 
by modern equipment and changing management styles; and (3) 
those who deeply resented the higher wages and better 
working conditions of others who had better educations and 
superior working skills (Powell, 1956, pp. 132-33).
For most people, though, the names offered by the Left 
must have seemed harsh, extreme, and not matching the 
available facts. Few Americans likely believed that the 
U.S. had any intentions of ruling or of tampering with civic 
matters in the Soviet Union. Most native-born Americans and 
many immigrants probably did not conceive of America as 
being oppressive or exploitative. The mythology of America 
being the "land of opportunity" and the "land of riches" did 
not coincide with the Leftist rhetoric. Many Russian exiles 
and immigrants lived peacefully in America and this 
condition did not fit the Leftist*' genocidal paranoia. The 
names offered for the late 1940s and early 1950s scene in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
39
America seemed to be too dissonant to be accepted by most 
Americans; although there were some for whom these Leftist 
names seemed to be quite acceptable.
The Red Scare Period
The cold war period had several manifestations that,
for many people, were interpreted as "betrayal." The cold
war, however, was only one of the major events occurring in
the Rosenberg case scene. The "red scare" period following
World War II was another major event receiving a great deal
of public attention in the early 1950s. Following is an
argument that one of the most significant events in the
1950s was the red scare period which metamorphised into the
*
era known better as "McCarthyism". Included in this line of 
argument are: (1) a definition of the term, "red scare;" and 
(2) the manifestations of the post-World War II red scare 
period.
Historians, Robert K. Murray (1955, p. 4) and Eric F. 
Goldman (1956, pp 19-34), have labeled the periods of fear 
following both World War Eras as "red scares." Martin 
(1982) expands on Murray's naming of these periods. "A 
susceptibility to fear, as well as its cognitive and 
behavioral manifestations, has long been characteristic of 
the American post-war dilemma. After both World Wars I and 
II, this susceptibility, nurtured by post-war frustration, 
culminated in eras referred to . . .  as Red Scares. These 
were periods of exaggerated reactions of fear to internal
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threats posed by Communism" (p. 1). Post-World War II 
historians seem to agree that these "were frustrating times 
for the American people that seemed to stem from ill- 
conceived national desires for 'normalcy'" (p. 1). Murray 
(1955) saw the post-World War I frustrations as a loss of 
the "old pattern of life" and the burden of "new post-war 
responsibilities" (p. 4). Goldman (1956) saw the post-World 
War II frustrations as the American inability to deal with 
domestic and international affairs that seemed to undermine 
"their most deeply cherished attitudes" (p. 22). After each 
World War there appeared "political leaders who recognized" 
the general masses' "psychological vulnerabilities and who 
possessed the oratorical skills needed to manipulate them" 
(Martin, 1982, p. 3).
Martin summarized the focal thrust of the red scare 
period as follows:
During the post-World Wars I and II eras, these 
political leaders furnished the masses an ideological 
scapegoat upon which the discontented could vent their 
frustrations. This was the internal threat posed by 
Communism to the basic ideals that are a part of 
traditional American thought. During each of these 
post-war eras, this scapegoat, rather than the changing 
social, political, and economic conditions, was blamed 
for the nation's inability to return to "normalcy"
(p. 4).
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After World War I, the best known political leader who 
championed the anti-Communist cause was Attorney General A. 
Mitchell Palmer. His notoriety at the time made his name 
well known; however, his name no longer strikes a familiar 
chord with most Americans (Mandelbaum, 1964). In contrast, 
after World War II, the best known political leader who 
championed the anti-Communist cause was Senator Joseph R. 
McCarthy, whose name strikes some familiarity to most living 
Americans (Feuerlicht, 1972). The deeds of McCarthy were so 
strident, so pervasive, and so ingrained in the American 
consciousness that a famous World War II cartoonists Herbert 
Lawrence Block, also known as Herblock, coined the term, 
"McCarthyism," which is still used widely to refer to the 
later stages of the post-World War II red scare period 
(Feuerlicht, 1972, p. 63).
The post-World War II red scare period really represents 
two distinct phases; like the famous comedy-tragedy masks of 
classical theater, what appeared to be opposites were really 
very much related to each other. On one side, were the 
external worries and fears of the cold war. On the other 
side, were the worries and fears of Communists within the 
U.S. system of government and society.
Some of the manifestations of cold war worries and 
fears have been addressed earlier; however, those aspects 
that appear to have been most directly relevant to the 
Rosenberg case scene are discussed here. These facets 
include the; (1) loss of mainland China to the Communists in
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1949; (2) revelations of several U.S. and international 
spying activities during and after the war; (3) Soviet's 
possessing of and testing the A-bomb; and (4) searches for 
alleged Communists in America.
America had recognized China as a nation holding great 
influence in the stability of Asia, as a valuable trading 
partner, and as a feared potential enemy in war ever since 
it decided to assist the revolution of Sun Yat-sen in 1911 
(Spence, 1969). America's influence, according to Yale 
historian, Jonathan Spence, remained at a low but memorable 
level until late 1937 when China was defending itself 
against a major invasion by the Japanese. At that time, 
Claire L. Chennault, a retired U.S. Army pilot, was asked to 
take over the command of the Chinese air defense and to be 
an advisor to Generallisimo Chiang Kai-shek (p. 229).
General Chennault discovered Chinese resources, 
manpower, and strategic and tactical abilities to be less 
than needed to overcome the Japanese invasion. He also 
observed an internal struggle in China itself and frequent 
inside fighting among Chiang's own staff. Chennault greatly 
admired Chiang and repeatedly requested the U.S. government 
to increase its aid to the Generallisimo. U.S. military 
leaders in other parts of the Pacific war zone believed that 
Chiang Kai-shek was an ineffective and potentially corrupt 
leader and that any added aid in the war ought not be spent 
on the defense of China (Blum, 1967, Vol. 2; Spence, 1969,
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pp. 229-52). Chennault ardently defended Chiang Kai-shek's 
need for added help and publicly stated that it was the U.S. 
government refusals to increase aid to China that kept 
Chiang from being successful in his endeavors to defeat the 
Japanese (Chennault, 1949). General Chennault did not win 
his case and the Chinese were being overrun by superior 
forces. He was replaced in command by General Joseph W. 
Stillwell in 1942 (Spence, p. 243). General Stillwell's 
assessments of Chiang Kai-shek, after a brief period in 
China, were scathing. Some of Stillwell's comments that 
were sent to various U.S. officials were very negative. He 
described Chiang as ". . . coolie class, arrogant, untrust­
worthy, and absolutely impossible to get along with" 
(Wedemeyer, p. 202). Stillwell also wrote about-Chiang in 
messages to President Roosevelt "He's a vacillating, tricky, 
undependable old scoundrel, who never keeps his word" 
(Spence, p. 236). Stillwell believed Chiang Kai-shek to be 
petty, corrupt, and ill-informed (Blum, 1967; Craven & Cate, 
1958; White, 1948). In addition, he accused Chiang of 
undermining his efforts on China's behalf. Stillwell added 
a rather fatalistic comment at the end of his tenure as the 
U.S.'s top military man in China ". . . the hell with it; it 
is patently impossible for me to compete with the swarms of 
parasites and sycophants that surround him" (Spence, 
p. 245).
Stillwell not only thought negatively of Chiang, but he 
also believed most of the Chinese generals and soldiers to
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be less than exemplary. He wrote to top U.S. officials that 
they "had committed basic military errors: neglect of 
fundamental principles of strategy and tactics? improper use 
of supporting weapons; indifference to military intelligence; 
inability to adopt sound command and staff procedures; 
failure to establish a communications net; and failure to 
keep vehicles and weapons in operating condition" (Spence 
p. 241). Stillwell's last comment as U.S. commander in 
China, as reported by Jonathan Spence, summarized his great 
frustration: "With the U.S. on his side and backing him, the 
stupid little ass fails to grasp the big opportunity of his 
life . . . The Chinese government is a structure based on 
fear and favor, in the hands of an ignorant, arbitrary, 
stubborn man . . . Only outside influence can do anything 
for China - either enemy action will smash her or some 
regenerative idea must be formed and put into effect at 
once" (p. 247) .
Although two successive commanders had been unsuccess­
ful in getting Chiang's forces to improve their standing in 
the defense of China despite massive monies, equipment, and 
support forces from the U.S., the leaders in America still 
seemed to support the Generallisimo. His detractors had not 
been persuasive in their efforts to force Chiang Kai-shek to 
change his ways or to be replaced.
Stillwell's successor, General Albert Wedemeyer, too, 
came to have a very low professional and personal opinion of
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Generallisimo Chiang Kai-shek (Spence, pp. 267-68). General 
Wedemeyer described Chinese conscription patterns as a 
"ravaging disease, a corrupt and vicious human cattle market 
whose victims 'their skin [the] shabby cover of an emaciated 
body which has no other value than to turn rice into dung1 - 
were nevertheless fulfilling the most important function of 
a citizen of free China I to be a source of income for 
officials" (p. 277).
Chinese army hospitals were compared to "German exterm­
ination camps at Buchenwald" (p. 277) . Most of the major 
foreign advisors who worked with Chiang or his troops seemed 
to come to the same conclusion: that victory under his lead­
ership was impossible (Blum, 1967; Craven & Cate, 1958; 
Spence, 1969; White, 1948).
Romanus and Sunderland (1956) seem to support that view 
by revealing "Finally, new evidence came to suggest that in 
China itself, Chiang Kai-shek was keeping desperately needed 
supplies from his own Army commanders who were trying to 
halt Japanese advances, and that other commanders were 
abandoning key positions to the Japanese without attempting 
to fight" (pp. 322-326).
The American people were receiving glowing reports 
about Chiang and his army, not the damning reports that 
were received by select high U.S, officials. Since 
Chennault, Stillwell, and Wedemeyer were career military 
men, they were not in a position to disclose openly what 
they knew nor to discuss freely what they believed relevant
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to China or to Chiang. Even after their retirements, much 
of what was known was not openly revealed until after the 
deaths of the commanders gave others, not restricted by 
government rules and traditions, access to their diaries 
and memoirs (Spence, 1969).
The American public was presented with a series of 
articles and essays depicting Chiang Kai-shek as a hero, a 
valiant ally, and a champion of a free China. Time ran ten 
cover stories about Chiang and his regime in rather glowing 
terms (Time, 4 April 1927; 26 November 1931; 11 December 
1933; 24 February 1936; 9 November 1936; 3 January 1938; 1 
June 1942; 3 September 1945; 6 December 1948; and 18 April 
1955). Time also ran an article on the Chiang family in 
the "Man ot the year" issue in 1937. In all these pieces 
written about Chiang and his followers, almost all argued 
positively about his leadership, his character, and the 
promise for a successful free China defense.
Senator Joseph McCarthy did not have access to 
sensitive intelligence reports on China nor was he privy to 
the views of high-ranking Americans who worked in China and 
who reported directly to the president of the United States. 
Without such data at his disposal, McCarthy publicly 
expressed the view "that the Chinese ought to be winning 
handily" and that it had to be a waning of U.S. support that 
blunted rapid success in China (Spence, 1969, p. 277) . Such 
was apparently not the case. Partly because of positive
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press accounts of the situation in China due to and the 
glowing praise of Chiang, the U.S. public came to feel that 
China ought to win the battle with the Communists (Spence, 
1969, White, 1948) .
Because the American public had only partial infor­
mation, arguments suggesting a quick and easy victory for 
the Chinese Nationals over the Communists seemed possible, 
likely, and perhaps even imminent. Americans likely felt 
betrayed when China fell to the Communists in 1949. It was 
not until several years after the Rosenberg case was over 
that the other half of the story concerning Chiang's 
corruptness became publicly accessible and well known.
Betrayal, for the American public, was well established 
by the cold war and by the disappointment over the fall of 
China. These events, however, seemed to be somewhat remote 
from the treacherous misdeeds of the Rosenbergs. There were 
other betrayals that seemed much more directly relevant to 
the Rosenberg case. These included the building number of 
spies, both foreign and domestic, that were discovered in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s. Following is a discussion 
of some of the more notorious domestic spies that likely 
gave many average Americans a further sense of betrayal.
In 1948, events had shaken "all but the most blindly 
tenacious fellow travelers from the folds of Soviet 
friendship" (Root, 1963, p. 87). Also, "appropriations to 
the House Un-American Activities Committee flowed freely"
(p. 87). This pro-Committee trend was by no means the only
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view. Root (1963) points out an alternative interpretation: 
Americans were, at the same time, alarmed over the 
spectacles created by the House on Un-American 
Activities [Committee] to which, because they were 
committed in the sacred cause of preserving the nation, 
nobody could be totally indifferent. Nor could anyone 
safely guess at what point popular sentiment was 
divided. Some Americans thought the Committee was the 
only way to protect the common security; that it was 
time to recognize that Communism was not politics, but 
a criminal movement; that the moonstruck radical of the 
depression era may well have become a traitor, and it 
was better to destroy a few doubtful ones than to 
allow a real one to survive. All other Americans saw 
in this approach the seeds of self-destruction, with 
the encroaching abridgement of our most cherished, even 
our most abstract freedoms - the reckless public 
pilloring of reputations good and bad, and the often 
incredible impulse to confuse suspicion with guilt. 
Public opinion - or the fear of it - pulverized more 
lives than the grinding wheels of justice (my emphases; 
pp. 83-84).
This interpretation seemed to defy the idealistic result 
that some Americans attributed to World War II. The 
American people, as a whole, seemed to believe that they 
would now be safe in the strongest nation in the world.
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Some people's safety, it seemed, was being threatened by
(1) past membership in organizations formally labeled as 
subversive; (2) personal acquaintances with suspected or 
known subversives; and (3) past deeds, many of which had 
been performed naively or through idealistic motivation.
A growing list of American spies added to the worries 
and fears of Americans. Judith Coplon, a U.S. Defense 
Department employee who had access to sensitive documents, 
was convicted of passing information along to the Soviets 
after the war ("Espionage: Baby Face," 1949, p. 28; "Spies: 
The Girl," 1949, p. 19). Elizabeth Bentley, a prominent 
Washington D.C. woman with high level friends; Harry White, 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury; Lauchlin Currie, a 
close Roosevelt advisor; William Remington, a member of the 
War Production Board during the war; and Gregory 
Silvermaster, a Board of Economic Warfare specialist, all 
were convicted of spying activities that benefitted the 
Soviets during the war ("Investigations: The Network," 1948, 
pp. 14-15). Alger Hiss and Whittaker Chambers were also 
implicated in Soviet spying ("Investigations: Burden," 1948, 
pp. 15-17; "Investigations: The Accused," 1948, pp. 15-16).
The arrests and convictions of these spies did not 
quell the unrest in the nation. True, many - and some 
thought and hoped most - of the traitors had been 
apprehended.
Yet, by the summer of 1950, the legal - and, one
assumes, the just - conviction of an array of
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Communist spies and traitors of varying importance was 
an indication if not an index of serious national 
trouble. Ironically, their punishment did nothing to 
mitigate the climate of fear that misted all our 
thoughts. Some of us were afraid the evidence of deep- 
rooted treason was the harbinger of the holocaust, the 
rest of us were afraid that our fear would drive us to 
burning witches. A few voices were raised in pleas for 
dispassion, but who heard them? Exposure of evil soon 
gathers an irresistable and unselective momentum. We 
called it a spy scare and we were scared (emphases 
mine; Root, 1963, p. 84).
Root argues that the F.B.I. became pervasively involved in 
the hunt for Communists: ". . . the F.B.I. got an edict, 
whether tacit or in writing, to stay on top of the Communist 
conspiracy. In scrutinizing the loyalty of all government 
employees, it probed into the pasts of too many people, 
catalogued the gossip and strange confidences of their 
friends and neighbors and categorized them by the most 
tenuous associations” (p. 87). Not only were ordinary 
Americans being investigated along with many government 
employees, but also "The Republican rallying-cry during the 
1948 Presidential election was that the Truman Administra­
tion, if not riddled with Communists in key places, was 
criminally soft toward Communism'1 (p. 87).
The Communist hunt was on and perhaps this could have
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rallied many Americans to the cause and eased the minds of 
others that our government, though weakened, still was able 
to fight the problems that had beset it. But "the most 
unfortunate part of it was that by 1948 a good many Leftists 
had stopped calling themselves Communists while in no way 
abandoning either their beliefs or their devotion. The task 
of identifying Communists became increasingly difficult, 
multiplying our anxieties and leading to distrust of all 
indications of dissidence" (p. 88). It was Alistaire 
Cooke's judgement (1950) that "Americans immediately start 
looking for someone to blame" when something goes wrong.
"It is a process not far from scapegoating . . .  it was all 
a witch hunt" (pp. 103-05).
In addition to the domestic spying that captured the 
attention of most Americans, there were several foreign 
spies whose deeds caused many to be fearful and worrisome. 
These foreign spying activities were closely related to (1) 
the Soviet possession of the A-bomb - discussed briefly in 
the next section of this chapter and (2) the connection to 
the Rosenberg affair - discussed in the next chapter of this 
study.
Klaus Fuchs, a British atomic scientist, was convicted 
in early 1950 of atomic spying for the Soviets. Bruno 
Pontecorvo, an Italian atomic scientist, was charged with 
similar crimes but fled to the Soviet Union before he could 
be arrested in 1949. Alan Nunn May, a Canadian atomic 
scientist, was convicted in 1950 by the British of atomic
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spying. Revelations concerning a networking of atomic spies 
in and out of America surely caused worry and fear for many 
Americans (Root, 1963). Suspicions, charges, and arrests 
for spying added to the public perception of betrayal. Some 
came to believe that the strongest nation in the world, was 
at risk from within from some of its own citizens.
The Soviet Union detonated their first A-bomb in 1949. 
For many years Americans had been assured that the Soviets 
were a long way from being able to deploy atomic weapons. 
Now, Russia had the bomb and the U.S.'s security of being a 
monopoply holder on atomic weapons was gone. Many Americans 
likely were worried and wanted to know how this came about.
The building of the atomic bomb was performed under a 
cloak of secrecy that has been unparalleled in American 
history. The facilities at Oak Ridge, the University of 
Chicago, the University of California, and Los Alamos were 
unheard of by most Americans during the time of the bomb's 
design and construction (Groueff, 1967; Hawkins, 1983). 
Project Trinity at Los Alamos has been labeled one of the 
best kept national secrets of all time (Groueff, pp. xi-xii; 
Hawkins, pp. 37-38). Johnson (1951d) discovered, after the 
war, however, that there was a fatal flaw in the web of 
secrecy at Los Alamos. ''Less than a hundred Americans 
outside the sprawling atomic bomb assembly plant at Los 
Alamos knew in June of 1944 what was being done th^re. But 
the Russians knew'' (Johnson, 1951d, p. 8) .
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Not only did the Russians seem to know many of our top 
secrets after the bomb's use in Japan, it appears, according 
to Johnson, that the Soviets were intimately aware of our 
progress at a much earlier date" (Johnson, 1951a, 1951b, 
1951c, 1951d). In fact, the Russians knew at Potsdam, when 
Roosevelt told Stalin, of the bomb's existence. Secretary 
of State, James Byrnes, couldn't understand Stalin's non­
chalant attitude at being informed about the A-bomb. Now 
it is clear why - it seems he knew all along (Johnson,
1951a, p. 1). Not only did Stalin seem to know what he was 
told at Potsdam by Roosevelt, "it is very likely that he 
knew even more than most of the top U.S. officials did" 
(Johnson, 1951d, pp. 1, 4). This situation was deemed 
grave by some U.S. political leaders. The Joint Committee 
on Atomic Energy (1951) declared: "The extent of espionage 
damage known to have been inflicted upon the atomic energy 
position of the United States is indisputably severe" 
p. 19).
Many Americans were concerned about the Russians' 
having the bomb, the process by which they got it, and 
the fear that Russia's possession of the bomb may lead to 
more Russian aggression. Luthin (1965) discusses this 
concern: "The revelation . . . that a Soviet atomic spy ring 
. . . had successfully stolen and handed over to Moscow 
American atom bomb secrets shocked and frightened the 
American people" (p. 6). Some Americans believed there were 
alleged subversives in their midst and in their government.
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They perceived that they had an adversary who possessed 
atomic weapons.
America might reason that she had been very generous to 
many highly talented, foreign-born scientists in terms of 
top quality educational opportunities, access to top-secret 
information needed to competently work with their American 
colleagues, and in freedom of mobility while in our country. 
Most of these scientists had served themselves, their 
profession, America, and the cause of freedom in World War II 
with distinction; however, a noted few, some possessing our 
most highly guarded and sensitive secrets had turned on us 
and gave these secrets to the Soviets. Some Americans 
asked, "How could they do such a thing?" (New York Times,
May 24, 1951, p. 1).
Perhaps the most venal aspect of the red scare period 
contributing to the Rosenberg case scene was McCarthyism. 
Joseph McCarthy was, in reality, a symptom of the red scare 
period. The red scare dynamics had started and formed 
before he came on the scene. The time was ripe for a 
demogogue to take advantage of the circumstances of fear, 
doubt, and reticence that pervaded the American scene 
(Luthin, 1965; Martin, 1982).
Joseph McCarthy seemed to be operating in a scene that 
had a need for a spokesman, and it seems that he chose to be 
that rhetor. His audience seemed ready and willing to listen 
to things that may have seemed silly or outrageous at
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another time. A "rhetorical situation" had emerged (Bitzer, 
1968).
There were surely problems in America when McCarthy 
entered the scene. These were problems with subversives in 
some government posts, problems concerning Communists and 
their sympathizers, and other cold war dilemmas. There were 
also some honest efforts - some said not enough - to cleanse 
the system of these worries. Rather than offering to help 
constructively aid the cleansing process, McCarthy chose 
instead to invent phoney problems that tragically added to 
and exacerbated the existing problems (Feuerlicht, 1972; 
Mandelbaum, 1964; Martin, 1982; Wrong, 1965). McCarthy 
claimed to know of many Communists, their sympathizers, and 
other less than patriotic officials in the U.S. government; 
however, not one record exists that shows he ever gave a 
court or Congressional panel a shred of evidence that led to 
the conviction of a single person of any crime against the 
U.S.!
McCarthy's wild, extreme, and vocal claims caused a 
level of worry that "bordered on hysteria" (Wrong, 1965, 
p. 16). Wrong describes the emotional climate in America: 
"McCarthyism . . . has created a national climate in which 
departures from the most elementary decencies of a 
democratic society are imperceptibly becoming the norm"
(p. 17). Many "committed Communist hunters" were ashamed 
of the harsh newcomer and feared he would "disgrace the 
profession" (Feuerlicht, 1972, p. 61). Some U.S. government
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officials knew what a "scoundrel" McCarthy was and others 
suspected the worst, but fear of his successes and of his 
vicious attacks kept many of them silent (Feuerlicht, 1972, 
pp. 61-64? Mandelbaum, 1964, pp. 140-42).
There was a regular cadre of reporters who covered 
McCarthy. This group of journalists was not composed of 
"typical reporters." Many of them came to know what a 
"fraud," a "hoax," and a downright liar he was (Feuerlicht, 
1972, pp. 61-62, 74? Luthin, 1965, p. 7). Unfortunately, 
none of that small group of reporters closest to McCarthy on 
a day-to-day basis chose to expose him for what he was.
The real close-to-home fear for the average American 
was just building. The Rosenberg case ended before the 
worst of McCarthyism came to the forefront. The wild 
charges that McCarthy did make prior to the Rosenberg trial 
and sentencing surely exacerbated the fears and sense of 
betrayal already discussed earlier. With McCarthy's 
"circus" going non-stop every day, the public could not 
forget the worries and fears that they had ("Regarding the 
Rosenbergs," 1953, p. 344).
The red scare, like the cold war, had alternative names 
that were offered and rejected by the majority of Americans. 
The Socialists tried to picture America as a nation trying 
to dominate the world (American Friends, 1949, p. 13? 
Barghoorn, 1950, p. 114). Barghoorn maintains that "the 
Soviet line . . . was that there . . . was the tendency
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toward world domination and the hatching of a new war."
This line of reasoning by the Russians, posits Barghoorn, 
was a result of the "ill-fated London Conference and the 
"disappointing" Teheran Conference, both held in 1945 
(pp. 112-114). Barghoorn summarizes a "typical" Soviet 
press release by saying, "Its major theme has been that the 
North Atlantic treaty is the chief instrument of an Anglo- 
American drive for world domination" (p. 190). Most 
Americans saw the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, the 
Berlin airlift, the reconstruction programs in Germany and 
in Japan, and the generous aid offered to other nations as 
signs of strength, caring, and sharing, relegating the Left 
and far right scenic definitions as extreme and not at all 
representative.
The Communists offered the term "weak" to describe many 
of the problems Americans were experiencing. Other groups 
tried to depict the American government as inept (Schwartz, 
1978). "Weakness," as used by the Soviets in their 1940s 
and 1950s propaganda, seemed to mean "having problems." 
America did have her share of domestic problems and the 
Russians claimed these as examples of American "weakness." 
Barghoorn (1950) gives some examples of Soviet claims about 
the U.S.: "Gloomy pictures of capitalist realities appear 
before one's eyes . . . the standard of living of the 
toilers is deteriorating. It is a calamity if a worker 
becomes ill. He loses all possibility of receiving any 
means of existence, for there is no social insurance in the
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United States." Other Soviet articles (Blocknot Agitatora, 
1949) are reputed to have pictured most American city 
dwellers as "living in slums" (p. 3). Racial discrimination 
and mistreatment of the American Indian are other issues 
raised by the Russians (Barghoorn, p. 212). These were some 
of the issues raised to show the American system as "weak," 
"uncaring," and "inept" (p. 215). Most Americans recognized 
that they had problems but most seemed unwilling to accept 
"weak" and "inept" as apt descriptions of the American 
system. The Left had offered alternative views of America 
that were very pejorative? and these views of America really 
had little chance of success with most Americans. Although 
there were alternative names offered, the name, betrayal, 
seemed to be the most accepted and understood for the 
period.
The Korean War Period
The cold war and the red scare periods were two major 
events that came to be known for betrayal in the Rosenberg 
case scene. A third such major event was the outbreak of 
the Korean War.
In some respects, the Korean War could be considered an 
extension of the cold war; however, many of its dynamics, 
the rhetoric surrounding it, and the singular importance 
attached to it by the judge in the Rosenberg case attributed 
to it the status of a separate, but related event.
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The combat in Korea was, for many, the most current, 
the most worrisome, and the most negative of the many 
problems facing The U.S. The cold war lingered, but it 
couldn't be seen as an immediate, direct threat to American 
lives. McCarthyism still swept through the land, and 
although it destroyed lives, it had not yet, in 1951, 
reached the massive numbers of people it would reach shortly 
after the Rosenberg sentencing. The war in Korea, on the 
other hand, killed young Americans daily; the news of their 
deaths was released each day in the newspapers, on the 
radio, and on television. American families who had friends 
and relatives fighting in Korea prayed the death toll would 
not include their loved ones.
Not all reactions to Korea were completely negative. 
Root (1963) reveals some less negative responses to the war: 
"The news [of Korea] came to most Americans as justification 
for four post-war years of leaden anxiety about the Soviet 
Union toward which they now felt only fear and its common 
corollary, hatred (in addition to a sheepish regret that the 
vicissitudes of World War II had thrust the two countries 
together in a warm alliance)" (p. 83). President Harry S 
Truman (1969), on 27 June 1950, two days after the armed 
conflict in Korea had erupted, delivered a speech in which 
he identified the Korean War as an event related to the red 
scare: " . . .  The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond 
all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of 
subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use
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armed invasion and war" (p. 79).
The initial American public reaction toward the war was
"a surge of support for President Truman" (Feuerlicht, 1972,
p. 71). This support was "more than the usual rally-round-
the-flag reflex of a nation at war" (p. 71). Feuerlicht
argues there were some positive reactions to the war:
The unbearable tension of the cold war had suddenly
been relieved by the recognizable action of a hot war.
At last, America's accursed group was being faced on a
battle-field. Since God had to be on America's side,
the other side being godless, as Americans were so
often reminded - the Communists would be whipped.
"Korea has been a blessing," said an American general
[not identified]. "There had to be a Korea either
here or some-place in the world" (p. 71).
Any elation over Korea soon turned to despair as the
rapid early victories by American forces soon transformed
into losses and long-term stalemate (p. 71). Americans had
fought the biggest war ever only a few years earlier and had
had a stunning victory. America's strength and reputation
were supposed to keep her out of wars; and if the U.S. got
into a war with a tiny nation, she ought to be able to
crush it in rapid defeat. Many Americans must have felt
betrayed; the U.S.'s strength appeared either non-existent
or untapped. The U.S. seemed to be fighting someone else's 
2
war.
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General Douglas MacArthur planned and began to execute
maneuvers designed and publicly announced to get at the
source of the problem in Korea. President Truman halted
those plans, reversed many of them, and recalled MacArthur
from his command in Korea (Feuerlicht, 1972, pp. 71-72;
Karruth, 1962, p. 579).
President Truman's dismissal of General MacArthur met
a storm of nationwide protest. There was even a huge
demonstration in Washington, D.C. where some fanatic
3
protesters attempted to burn down the White House. When 
MacArthur toured the nation shortly after his release from 
command in April 1951, he was received by huge, approving 
crowds (Karruth, 1962, p. 580).
Concern over Truman's handling of MacArthur's plans to 
"win" raised other troublesome issues. Feuerlicht (1972) 
argues that some of the vague, more difficult to pin-point 
questions seemed to be nagging many Americans;
Truman chose to fight a limited war in Korea to show 
the Communists that they could go no farther, but he 
also chose not to take on the whole Communist world. 
This decision caught him in a trap of his own making; 
since his policy of military restraint clashed with his 
Cold War rhetoric. For years he had been giving the 
American people simple-minded answers: now they 
responded with simple-minded questions. If communism 
threatened America's survival, why let it survive? If
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it was godless, why wasn't America resisting it with 
all her might? How could she compromise with evil? 
Wasn't it better to be dead than Red? (p. 72).
The dissonance that resulted in the minds of some Americans 
undoubtedly caused them to feel that they had been betrayed 
by their government leaders. Mandelbaum (1964) focuses on 
the vacillating nature of the war and its relation to 
America's emotions: "The fluctuations of the war - defeat, 
victory, defeat, resurgence, and finally stalemate - 
symbolized the frustration of hopes for world peace and 
American prestige" (p. 118).
Korea figured as another betrayal for Americans. The 
war was an ongoing event at the time of the Rosenberg trial 
and sentencing, so emotions seemed more surfaced there than 
in the issues of the cold war or with the red scare. Since 
the issues of the cold war and the red scare had been un­
folding for a greater length of time, many people had time 
to form less emotional opinions and reactions to those 
issues. Emotion surely played a part in all issues, but it 
appears that at the time of the Rosenberg case, Korea was 
potentially the most volatile problem in many people's 
minds.
Day after day, in 1951, the Daily Worker chose to label 
the U.S. role in Korea as unprovoked aggression. They main­
tained over and over that the U.S. was aggressive and 
belligerent, trying to take over a small, defenseless
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nation. However, most Americans did not see North Korea as 
defenseless having full Soviet support and substantial 
Chinese support. Nor was America's role there seen as un­
provoked. The North Korean invasion was labeled by the 
American government as the reason for U.S. military involve­
ment (Sunoo, 1979, p. 78). The American public was not, at
that time, privy to the fact that the South Koreans had
instigated the invasion (p. 1-6).
Most Americans could not come to agree with the 
Communist definition of the Korean conflict. They saw 
events in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic nations, 
where the U.S. may well have had great domestic support for 
armed aggression, and our reluctance to invade as reason to 
doubt that we would be aggressive. After all, we had no 
significant immigrant and second generation population 
supporting an invasion of Korea. The Communist line just 
did not fit with the self-image of most Americans.
Other Post-War Problems
The cold war, the red scare, and Korea were seen as a 
series of international betrayals by many Americans. These 
events had names, heroes, villains, and perceived causes, 
although they were vague. In post-world War II America, 
another series of events, few well defined, most without 
heroes and without easily identifiable villains, directly 
affected the lives of some Americans or tneir faimilies on 
a daily basis.
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A general state of "malaise" prevailed in America in 
the early 1950s. Several domestic conditions contributed 
to this state (Milwaukee Journal, 1950). None were major 
in scope, but the accumulation of added difficulties 
sorely exacerbated an already severe domestic climate.
The end of World War II was supposed to portend a progres­
sive and prosperous period; however, it turned out, for 
many, to be the beginning of a very "bleak period" (p. 7).
High levels of unemployment in the post-World War II 
years were especially hard to accept for the returning 
veterans (Murray, 1945, 234-38; "Senator Murray's Full,"
1945, pp. 232-34; "Should the U.S.," 1945, p. 227); severe 
housing shortages which were especially hard on young 
families in America ("Facts About Housing," 1946, pp. 314- 
15); frequent and strident union strikes (Snyder, 1946, pp. 
34-36) ; rising crime, which impacted the poor, the elderly, 
and the weak; significantly less pay for women now that the 
war effort, which paid them high wages, was over; and rising 
inflation ("Cities' Most Pressing," 1946, pp. 5-6; "Crime,"
1946, pp. 30-31; "The Year," 1945, 1946, pp. 306-307) were 
among the added burdens for an already overburdened American 
public.
None but the very fortunate escaped all these added 
problems. Many promises of "better times," "prosperity," 
and "peace" were made, that some Americans may have felt 
betrayed since they could not see these promises being
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fulfilled in their lives.
The Left tried to label this malaise as "greed" and 
"insensitivity" (Daily Worker. 1951, p. 2). Most Americans 
saw this as an unacceptable and inappropriate definition. 
They saw the great generosity of America and they saw 
themselves as entitled to some tangible rewards for the 
sacrifices and efforts put forth to keep much of the world 
safe and free.
The cold war, the red scare, Korea, and the many other 
domestic post-war problems did not all directly affect most 
Americans; however, a range of possible betrayals Americans 
could identify with were offered.
Images Created By the Scene
Images frame acts. Some Americans' images were fairly 
accurate reflections of occurrences; some images were 
hopeful wishes; and still others were wistful echoes of past 
events (DuPreez, 1980, pp. 110-150). The images in the 
Rosenberg case scene selected, interpreted, and evaluated, 
for the most part, the acts of government rather than 
individual or societal acts. There is a constant interplay 
between images and acts. Acts influence images which affect 
other acts. The exigences of the 1950s and the images of 
these problems seemed intertwined. Edelman (1971) sees one 
such relationship: "Governmental actions inevitably affect 
what people want and how they think as well as how they are 
coerced to behave" (p. 179). This does not mean that
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"political motivations and behaviors are fated and pre­
programmed" or that they can't be changed, but that they 
are influenced by public responses.
The American people, it seems, came to know they were 
in trouble before most government officials did. The 
government soon caught up, however. The troubles the 
country experienced were not the type that individuals were 
expected or able to solve, so the government formulated 
policies to help people cope with these problems.
America was perceived by a nagging minority as weak, 
sympathetic to the left, subverted by spies, and intimi­
dated by the Soviet Union. While these perceptions were 
held primarily by a minority, that minority was vocal and 
it was feared by some high placed officials in the govern­
ment that these perceptions, if left unchallenged, could
4
spread and may well become a major force to contend with. 
Government leaders decided to seek a way to challenge the 
left's positions before they became too plausible for 
plausible for more Americans. The U.S. Justice Department 
had in its grasp a married couple who embodied many of 
America's ills and who could be used, if done right, to 
show that America was strong, non-sympathetic to the left, 
ridding itself of any subversion, and certainly not 
intimidated by the Soviets. This couple was Julius and 
Ethel Rosenberg.
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The Scene As the Dominating Element
Murray Edelman (1964) in The Symbolic Uses of Politics, 
argues the relationship between settings and other drama- 
tistic components. " . . .  settings have a vital bearing 
upon actors, upon responses to acts, and especially upon 
the evocation of feeling [of those in the scene]" (p. 96). 
Edelman, in this same book, further claims that settings 
legitimize "a series of future acts (whose content is still 
unknown) and thereby maximize the chance of acquiescence in 
them" (p. 98). As Hugh Duncan (1953) put it, "There are no 
neutral scenes" (p. 98). Edelman expands on this by 
asserting "As soon as a setting becomes a conscious object 
of attention it sets the stage for some general type of 
action, offering or reinforcing suggestions of its 
motivation" (pp. 101-102). Edelman also suggests in this 
regard: "The settings of political acts help "prove" the 
integrity and legitimacy of the acts they frame, creating a 
semblance of reality from which counterevidence is excluded. 
Settings can also help leaders find the roles and ident­
ifications that may be significant to followers" (p. 190).
The cold war, the red scare, Korea, and U.S. domestic 
problems were not directly the fault of government leaders; 
however, U.S. leaders were blamed, at least in part, for 
how they reacted to these problems. That so many problems 
happened together was partly coincidental and those workers 
who were trying to solve any one of these problems likely
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had too much to do to contemplate connections with other 
problems. The scene in 1951 America presented leaders with 
several problems that affected most Americans. Government 
leaders needed to find a way to convince Americans that 
they were in charge and that they could eventually solve the 
nation's problems.
Conclusion
The following chapter argues that the scene placed 
limits on how the government could go about solving its 
problems. A claim is made that only the government could 
resolve the nation's ills and that the best prepared govern­
ment agency was the Justice Department. Once the means to 
attack its problems was chosen, the government decided on 
specific actions designed to both bolster public confidence 
and provide the American public with adequate scapegoats.




Especially scenes that are composed of or result from 
movements. See Matlon (1987, p. 547) for a lengthy list of 
movements (scenes).
2
Personal communication with several Korean War 
veterans who belong to the Baton Rouge American Legion,
1987.
3
Based upon personal recollection of the event being 
reported.
4
Personal communication with the author's father before 
his death. He worked for the Department of Justice after the 
war.
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Chapter Three
The Act and Agency
The act represents "what was done," it "names what took 
place, in thought or deed" (Burke, 1945, p. xv). The act in 
the Rosenberg case is not one deed but a longitudinal series 
of related deeds. The focal deeds in this study are the 
death sentences imposed on Ethel and Julius Rosenberg. In 
order to understand the act, one must first understand the 
varied events that preceded and led up to those sentences.
The agency represents how the act was done; "what means 
or instruments" were used (Burke, 1945, p. xv). The means 
used to arraign, arrest, try, and sentence the Rosenbergs 
was the U.S. system of justice. This system included: (1) 
the F.B.I., (2) Justice Department investigators, (3) the 
court of Judge Irving R. Kaufman, and (4) the senior U.S. 
prosecutor and his staff.
It seems that the Rosenberg case act and agency were 
inextricably linked. Edelman (1964) comments on the linkage 
issue: "Kenneth Burke's insight that there is a rigid ratio 
between a dramatic setting and the quality of the acts that 
can take place within it and be regarded as appropriate 
offers a useful basis for the analysis of the tie between
70
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background and action" (p. 98). Kenneth Burke (1945) also 
writes regarding the link between scene, act, and agents:
"It is a principle of drama that the nature of acts and 
agents should be consistent with the nature of the scene 
. . . " (p. 3). Burke describes balance between pentadic 
constituents: "From the motivational point of view, there is 
implied in the quality of a scene the quality of the action 
that can take place within it. This would be another way 
of saying that the act will be consistent with the scene" 
(pp. 6-7).
Overview of the Act/Agency
Given the scene, betrayal, there were a limited number 
of responses (acts) that would have made any sense at all. 
Because of the (1) nature of the scene; (2) complexity of 
the scene, and (3) pervasiveness of the difficulties caused 
by the scene, the U.S. government seemed the most likely 
source of relief from the scene's consequences. Betrayal 
demanded that the betrayers be identified and punished, 
thus purifying the system. It has been argued earlier that 
readily identifiable betrayers were not available and that 
the American public was reacting to anonymous betrayal.
Some public reactions were mass responses such as fear, 
Communist "witch hunts," and malaise. The U.S. government 
sought ways to (1) identify betrayers symbolically; (2) 
replace the symbols Americans were reacting to; and (3) get 
Americans to rally around a common, central issue thus
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providing the government a way of appearing to be cleansing 
betrayal from the system.
The government needed to offer some symbol or set of 
related symbols that the American public could interact with 
and understand. Edelman (1964) posits that the public 
reacts well to symbols. "The basic thesis is that mass 
publics respond to currently conspicuous political symbols: 
not to 'facts' and not to moral codes embedded in the 
character or soul, but to the gestures and speeches that 
make up the drama of the state" (p. 172). Edelman amplifies 
his discussion of the use of symbols and the mass public:
Changes in mass responses . . . are, of course, neither 
instantaneous nor unanimous. They entail struggle and 
resistance among people with different interests. . . . 
The political symbols that bring about the change do 
so, in one sense, by changing the tensions associated 
with the old and new as they suggest altered possibil­
ities (p. 174).
The U.S. government chose not to pursue other possible 
courses of action or inaction. One such potential course of 
action that was not taken was to maintain the status quo and 
hope the prevailing exigencies would at least partially 
subside. This alternative was probably not chosen due to 
the extent of the problems facing the nation and the fact 
that national elections were upcoming. Another possible 
path that was dismissed was for the government to overtly
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mandate solutions to many of its problems. This choice 
was probably not made because it could have been seen as 
confirming many of the Left's claims vis-a-vis the U.S. 
as an aggressor and a power-hungry state. A third possible 
course of action that could have been followed but was not 
was that of segmenting America's many problems and then 
concentrating mass efforts to solve these fragments one-at- 
a-time. This approach was not selected probably due to (1) 
the enormous amount of time that would likely be involved;
(2) the negative perception that one failure might have on 
the rest of the series of problem solutions; and (3) the 
fear that the Left would so exacerbate other problems, the 
positive impact of achieved successes would be minimized. 
The decision to try to find a single, high-profile symbolic 
representation of the combined problems and then to try to 
mobilize public sentiment and energy on that focused symbol 
became the apparent choice made by the American government.
The symbolic representation that the U.S. government 
chose required a division that would place good, sensible, 
rational Americans on one side and the opponents of this 
approach, especially the Communists, the Socialists, and 
their sympathizers on the other side. Edelman points out 
that there is a reason to employ this strategy:
When, on the issue that arouses men emotionally, there 
is a bimodal value structuring, threat and insecurity 
are maximized. Those who hold the other value become 
the enemy. Under these circumstances condensation
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symbolism and mental rigidity become key factors in 
social interaction . . . and it becomes relatively 
easy to shift men's assumptions about the future and 
therefore their responses to present conditions 
(p. 175).
The concentrated set of symbols that the U.S. govern­
ment chose to offer the American public were embodied in 
the couple, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. They were to be the 
scapegoats for the many problems besetting America.
This chapter focuses on how Americans were provided 
plausible scapegoat images for their personal and national 
ills and how these images were presented. A chronology of 
the entire scenario provides the backdrop. The chronology 
is divided into five time intervals: the (1) pre-arrest 
investigations; (2) arrest and arraignment; (3) trial; (4) 
sentencing; and (5) post-sentencing period commentary. An 
historical overview of World War II period spying 
activities is presented to establish how the Rosenbergs 
became the U.S. government's focal betrayal symbols.
Overview Of Atomic Spying In the 1940's
Many people were involved in the complex atomic spy 
activities of the 1940's. Many books and articles have 
been written relevant to (1) each of the major individuals 
involved in the atom spy cases; (2) various in-depth 
stories about one or more atom spy plots; and (3) overviews
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of large segments of the major atom spy story events. This 
study limits its cited sources to those books and articles 
that (1) provide clear explanations of what happened; (2) 
take a stance in reporting the issues in the atom spy cases; 
and (3) provide insight as to how the "networking" of 
participants occurred.
Substantial summaries of 1940s atom spy activities 
include: Dallin (1955), Franklin (1969), Pilat (1968),
Seth (1974, 1972), Wexley (1955), and Wise & Ross (1967). 
These overviews point their readers to several detailed 
sources containing descriptions and evaluations of most 
events in the atom spy story.
The spying network that developed from 1943 to 1945 
relevant to atomic matters was quite complex and was 
disturbingly pervasive (Dallin, 1955; Seth, 1974; Wexley, 
1955; Wise & Ross, 1967). Dallin provides insight into 
the spying activities' pervasiveness in the scientific 
community: "During the war about ten physicists at various 
scientific institutions in the United States, Britain, and 
Canada were regularly or sporadically sending information to 
Moscow" (p, 461). Seth (1974) argues even greater spying 
breadth in his descriptions of several Soviet espionage 
networks in the United States and Canada (pp. 596-601).
There were many Canadian spying activities and many 
important espionage connections were made with the British 
atomic research community as well (Seth, pp. 599-601;
Wexley, 1955, pp. 35-36. Due, in part, to frequent
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provincial secrecy between the members of the U.S.-Britain- 
Canada atomic alliance, and due, in part, to the sporadic 
revelations of uncovered activities in these nations,
"eleven of the twenty accused members of the [overall] spy 
ring were sentenced to prison" (Wise & Ross, 1967, p. 69).
Notwithstanding all these active Western spying net­
works, their activities remained little known to American, 
British, and Canadian intelligence authorities. Root (1963) 
and Wighton (1966) both tell of the various minor parts of 
Soviet spying activities that were known in America,
Canada, and Britain. Some important spying activity details 
were known by Western intelligence agencies and other 
activities were strongly suspected. But it was not until 5 
September 1945 that many more "pieces of the puzzle" became 
really evident and meaningful (Franklin, 1969; Pilat, 1968; 
Wighton, 1966). A young Soviet cipher clerk, Igor Gouzenko, 
had decided to defect to Canada. He took with him a large 
number of highly secret and sensitive documents which he had 
access to from the Russian embassy in Ottawa, Canada, as 
collateral for his defection (Franklin, pp. 172-73).
The documents that Gouzenko took were from the private 
safe of Soviet Military Attache, Colonel Nikolai Zarobin. 
Gouzenko worked closely with the top embassy officials, 
belonged to the G.R.U., had top security clearance, and 
had access to most embassy papers. The documents that 
Gouzenko had stolen from the embassy revealed to Canadian
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officials the shocking truth that their highest military and
scientific secrets were no longer secret. The entire story
was not available in clear form; it took many months and
much painstaking work to decipher and interpret the data.
Zarobin's papers paved the way to the arrests, trials, and
sentences of Alan Nunn May and Emil Klaus Fuchs (Franklin,
1969; Payne & Dobson, 1984; Seth, 1972)
May had supplied the Soviets, through Colonel Zarobin,
secrets relevant to "heavy water" and had given the Soviets
various types of uranium samples being used in secret
experiments (Payne & Dobson, 1984, pp. 117-18). Other
secrets concerning the Canadian Chalk River atomic research
site were also suspected of being released (Seth, 1972).
Dr. May was sentenced by a British court to a jail term of 
1
twenty years but he only served seven years imprisonment
before he was released.
Canadian authorities discovered that Zarobin had
espionage connections in Britain as well as in Canada. When
the British authorities finally received this information in
1949, they soon discovered Klaus Fuchs' deeds. "Fuchs had
supplied the Soviets with construction details of the atomic
and plutonium bombs" (Payne & Dobson, 1984, p. 54). Klaus
Fuchs was sentenced in Britain to a fourteen year jail 
2
sentence, but served only nine years of that sentence 
before being released. It was said about Fuchs that "he 
was, without doubt, the most important of the atom spies" 
(Johnson, 1951b; Payne & Dobson, 1984; Spender, 1950;
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West, 1951).
Fuchs, in his confession, stated that he had had an 
American confederate, a confederate whose name he did not 
know. British authorities then gave this information to 
U.S. intelligence authorities who deduced that it likely was 
Harry Gold. U.S. intelligence officials came to Britain to 
show him some pictures. This photograph session with Fuchs, 
it was hoped, would lead to Fuchs' being able to identify 
clearly his American accomplice. Fuchs identified Gold as 
his confederate from these photographs as well as supplying 
other descriptive features of Gold (Payne & Dobson, pp. 54- 
55, 61). Harry Gold was Fuchs' courier under Anatoli 
Yakovlev's direction (p. 61). Yakovlev, the New York Soviet 
Consul, headed the local spy network (Grammont, 1962; Seth, 
1972; Wexley, 1955; Wyden, 1951). Gold, in his role as 
courier, gave Yakovlev "minutely detailed eyewitness 
accounts of top secret conferences at which America's most 
brilliant scientific brains considered how to build the A- 
bomb . . . and the workings of an inevitably intricate 
process never before tried - producing of the bomb's 
critical explosive . . ." (Wyden, p. 3). Harry Gold was 
never tried as such; he was sentenced by a U.S. District 
Court judge, but without the formal proceedings of a 
trial (Wexley, 1955, p. 77). Gold received a thirty year 
prison sentence but he was released sixteen years later.
The Soviets desperately wanted added data and they
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wanted more sophisticated, detailed information on American 
atomic activities, so Yakovlev arranged for Gold to visit 
a technician who built A-bomb parts. This technician was 
David Greenglass. Yakovlev knew about David Greenglass 
through one of his workers, Julius Rosenberg. Julius had 
recruited his brother-in-law, David Greenglass, for Soviet 
espionage when he visited David in New Mexico. Greenglass 
gave Harry Gold detailed data on bomb sighting devices.
Gold was to give this data to Julius Rosenberg who would 
then relay it to Yakovlev (Franklin, 1969, pp. 181-84; 
Grammont, 1984, pp. 54-55, 61; Wyden, 1951, p. 3). David 
Greenglass, who willingly became a state's witness, received 
a fifteen year prison sentence. He was released after he 
served seven years of his sentence.
Morton Sobell, who received a thirty year sentence;
Max Elitcher, who was never tried; Abraham Brothman, who 
received a seven year sentence; Miriam Moscowitz, who 
received a two year sentence; and Dean Slack, who was 
sentenced to fifteen years in prison were all recruited by 
Anatoli Yakovlev and Julius Rosenberg. They did not 
directly gather data for the Soviets; they did, however, 
willingly assist the Rosenbergs' information transmission 
within the spying network (Wexley, 1955) .
This brief historical overview does not show the 
Rosenbergs to be at the center of the spying activities nor 
does it show them to be the most venal criminals in the 
1940s spying networks. It seems that Alan Nunn May and
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Klaus Fuchs were the ones in the spy web who most deserved 
to be put to death for their crimes. After all, it was 
these scientists who were labeled the "most dangerous".
Then, too, Harry Gold and Anatoli Yakovlev surely emerge as 
highly central figures in the spy ring organization. These 
relationships are accurate as far as the formal, written 
record is concerned; however, another factor that needs to 
be considered is that May, Fuchs, and Gold had confessed to 
their crimes and they had willingly given the authorities 
considerable help. Neither Yakovlev nor Pontecorvo were 
ever brought to justice for their crimes. They both had 
fled to the Soviet Union. Greenglass became a witness 
against the Rosenbergs for the promise of a reduced 
sentence.
The only significant spies left unpunished were Ethel 
and Julius Rosenberg. They were American and thus could be 
tried in the U.S.; they were avowed Communists; and high 
officials believed they could be successfully convicted in 
court. Symbolically, there was another major factor that 
made the Rosenbergs seem valuable to U.S. authorities; they 
were believed to possess vital information concerning 
additional spy ring participants and it was hoped that they 
could be persuaded to give Justice Department officials the 
names of other spies. The Justice Department hoped that the 
Rosenbergs would reveal their accomplices. If they did not 
cooperate with officials, they would be severely punished
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for their deeds as well as for their lack of cooperation. 
Following are relevant events that occurred in the Rosenberg 
case from the time shortly preceding their arrest until the 
time of their sentencing.
The Case of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg
Arguments and responses changed as the Rosenberg case 
went through different stages from the arrest of Ethel and 
Julius, to the arraignment of the two, through the lengthy 
trial, culminating in the sentencing.
Some arguments and responses in this period were 
strategic on the parts of the government and the defendants 
and others were public and media reactions to the long and 
complicated process of American justice that was on display 
in 1951. These rhetorical responses give insight into what 
happened and help explain why events happened the way that 
they did in the Rosenberg case. These rhetorical acts help 
explain the motives for the acts of the U.S. government vis- 
a-vis the Rosenbergs.
The scene appears to be so dominant in this Rosenberg 
case analysis that most facets in the discussion seem to 
have scenic overtones. The actions, speeches, judgments, 
and interpretations discussed in this chapter that were 
offered by the defendants, the defense, the government, the 
press, and the public are characterized as act/agency 
elements but all are subordinated to the extraordinarily 
vivid and panoramic scene.
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Rhetoric of the Pre-Arrest Period
Prior to the arrests of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, 
very little was said publicly by government officials or 
the press about them or their deeds. A survey of 1950-1951 
popular literature shows that only a few small, general 
articles appeared that were relevant to the Rosenbergs or 
their deeds. There are at least two plausible explanations 
for this apparent lack of public information about the 
Rosenbergs. First, the government was able to protect its 
evidence from public disclosure. Second, there were, at 
the beginning of the Rosenberg matter, several other well- 
defined and publicly important issues which demanded the 
attention of the press and the public. Such matters as the 
Korean War, McCarthyism, frequent strikes, inflation, and 
unemployment supplied a full agenda for national attention. 
These issues competing for daily media coverage may have 
reduced the gatekeepers' search for more detailed 
information on the Rosenberg case.
The Rosenberg case was the first public disclosure of 
U.S. atomic spying. Alan Nunn May and Klaus Fuchs had 
been tried in Britain. Harry Gold, although sentenced in 
the U.S. for atomic spy charges, never really had a public 
trial (Wexley, 1955, p. 77n). The American people had 
little upon which to judge the few items that were written 
or spoken about the Rosenberg case in its early stages.
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Using J. Edgar Hoover's testimony before an unnamed 
congressional committee, Alvin Goldstein (1975) argues Hoover 
has shown his very conservative view of the Left. "Their 
[the Communists] goal is the overthrow of our government. 
There is no doubt as to where a real Communist's loyalty 
rests. Their allegiance is to Russia, not the United States" 
(p. 25). Here, it appears, Mr. Hoover, as a leader of the 
U.S. judicial system's investigative body, was setting the 
stage in Congress for future Communist trials.
Goldstein, who apparently believes there were few, if 
any, real "secrets" to stolen and given to the Soviets, 
provides a stinging rationale for J. Edgar Hoover's open 
and strident reaction. Goldstein's analysis also seems 
appropriate if there were indeed vital secrets that were 
given to the Soviets. Goldstein's characterization of 
Hoover's motives were: "The comforting illusion of an atomic 
secret disappears in a mushroom cloud over Siberia. It is 
replaced with the concept of atomic theft. And to J. Edgar 
Hoover, finding the thieves is both a political necessity 
and a personal crusade . . . For if the so-called secret of 
the atomic bomb has been stolen, then it has to have been 
stolen from under the nose of the FBI" (p. 27). Goldstein, 
it appears, believes that some of Hoover's eagerness to 
cooperate in the Rosenberg case was based upon personal 
embarrassment and embarrassment to the F.B.I. as an 
institution, one with which Mr. Hoover had a very patern­
alistic attachment. Goldstein also seems to believe there
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were few real secrets to be stolen; that Hoover and the 
F.B.I. were protecting illusions of secrets.
Richard Brennan, a former F.B.I. agent, is quoted by 
Goldstein as observing great pressure in government at the 
time of the Rosenberg arrests. "The pressure was almost 
unbelievable in some ways. Not only from the Bureau of the 
F.B.I. were we getting it. Mr. Hoover was getting it from 
outside. He was getting it from Congress. He was getting 
it in the daily press. Ah - the people of the United States 
had had a rude awakening. And they wanted something done 
about it" (p. 28). It seems clear, if Brennan's perception 
is accurate, that there was a concerted set of efforts to 
actively do something to change the mood of the American 
people.
In November 1950, just prior to the Rosenberg arrests, 
eleven Communists were convicted of violating the Smith Act, 
advocating the overthrow of the government and failure to 
register with the Justice Department as Communists. One of 
the defendants in this case was Abraham Brothman, among 
those alleged to have worked with Soviet spy-ring leader 
Anatoli Yakovlev and also alleged to have had dealings with 
Julius Rosenberg (Wexley, 1955, pp. 39-45). One of the 
prosecution's witnesses in the Brothman case was Harry Gold, 
who worked with the Rosenbergs (p. 44). Wexley claims in 
his book, The Judgment of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, that 
the Brothman trial was a "try out" for the upcoming
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Rosenberg trial (p. 44). Wexley claims prosecutor Irving 
Saypol had thought about the Rosenberg case before it ever 
formally started. "Saypol [the prosecutor in both the 
Brothman case and the Rosenberg case] and the F.B.I. used 
the Brothman trial to build up the atmosphere with advance 
publicity" (p. 217). Root (1963) also suggests: "There was 
no doubt that America was relieving its frustrated fury over 
the Cold War in the tangible prosecution of Communists at 
nome. The Smith Act, after all, had been in force for nine 
years and the evidence, the defendants' devotion to Marxism- 
Leninism, had been available all that time" (p. 97). These 
arguments seem to strongly suggest that the Communist trials 
prior to the Rosenberg case were not coincidental, but were, 
at least in part, well orchestrated scenarios intended to 
strongly influence American public opinion.
On 29 May 1950, Harry Gold was arrested. He confessed 
to his part in the spying network [even to this day, his 
entire confession is not a matter of public record]. On 16 
June 1950, David Greenglass, Ethel Rosenberg's brother, was 
arrested. Greenglass eventually agreed to be a witness 
against his sister and brother-in-law (Goldstein, 1975, pp. 
30-31). This sequence of events - the Brothman case, in 
which a basic framework of using the U.S. legal system 
against Communists seemed to be put into full force; the 
Gold case, in which a secretive confession apparently led 
to Greenglass; and the Greenglass case, in which the 
defendant agreed to bear witness against the Rosenbergs -
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seem sufficiently sequenced and timed to suggest a well 
planned chain of events by the U.S. judicial system.
On the day that David Greenglass was arrested, Julius 
Rosenberg read a front-page story in the New York Times 
about his brother-in-law. The paper had a large, front page 
photo of Greenglass. Also, on the front page, was another 
"F.B.I. release," announcing the arrest of a "Russian-born 
physicist in California" (Wexley, 1955, pp. 112-13; New York 
Times, 15 June 1950, p.l).
The scientist was Dr. Sidney Weinbaum and the charges 
were "that he had concealed membership in the Communist 
Party". It was evident to anyone why the FBI had 
"timed" these two arrests for the same day. Here were 
the perfect stereotyped requirements for the scapegoats 
of 1950: "Russian-born," "scientist," "Red," "Y.C.L. 
member," "A-secrets passed," all coupled together with 
the Jewish names "Weinbaum," "Greenglass," and "Gold." 
It made a rather neat package, and a frightening one, 
for every paper contained the ominous phrase: 
"Greenglass, if convicted, faces a maximum penalty of 
death" (Wexley, p. 113).
This appears to show further suspicion, according to Wexley, 
that there was a series of planned, well-organized events 
preceding the Rosenberg case that had strong image 
producing results.
Late in 1950, there was another matter of prime concern
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for many Americans/ their safety. Atomic attack fears were 
pervasive and took on various behavioral manifestations. On
8 August 1950, a headline in the New York Times read: "Atom 
bomb shelters for city at cost of $450,000,000 urged"
(p. 129). On 8 August 1950, the headline in the New York
Sun read: "Search of Batory [the Polish motorship] yields no 
[atomic] bomb - ship detained 4 hours in bay" (p. 129). On
9 August 1950, the New York Times headline read: "[Truman] 
Warns against hysteria - demands registration of any trained 
spies" (p. 129).
The Rosenberg pre-arrest scene did not seem to be one 
of calm, reason, understanding, and forgiveness. It seemed, 
instead, to be a time when Communists were being hunted and, 
when caught, severely punished. As Wexley (1955) put it, 
"[Another] step toward finding a suitable 'Red scapegoat'
was about to be taken" (p. 20).
If the entire Rosenberg case is seen as an opera, the 
pre-arrest period can be thought of as the overture. In 
many operas, the overture portends what is to come. Clues 
to future events are often short, out of sequence, and 
ethereal. The U.S. government's judicial system had begun 
to focus and organize its activities in preparation for the 
Rosenbergs' arrests. In retrospect, it can be seen that 
investigations into the Rosenbergs' activities began after 
Gold's confession and intensified after Greenglass' 
interrogations and arrest (Franklin, 1969? Pilat, 1968?
Root, 1963? Wexley, 1955). The agencies that eventually
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became greatly involved in the Rosenberg case all had, it 
appears, a small role in the pre-arrest stage. Those 
involved in the government pre-arrest activities included: 
the F.B.I.; both the prosecutor and the judge in the 
Rosenberg case [they also were involved in the Brothman 
case; and the press.
Government acts in the pre-arrest period were: (1) 
formal investigations into the Rosenbergs' activities; (2) 
alleged manipulation of the people's mood by way of the 
press, public officials' comments, and the fortuitous 
timing of various Justice Department announcements; and 
(3) formal legal proceedings.
Rhetoric of the Arrest and Arraignment Period
The Rosenbergs had reason to be worried that the 
government would look into their activities. The arrests 
and confessions of Fuchs, Gold, and the Greenglasses surely 
should have warned them of impending investigations into 
their own activities. Government actions and officials' 
statements warned those who carefully monitored such
clues that investigations, arrests, and a trial in the near
future were likely. To the untrained and unaware public, 
the hints of such action were vague; but to the Rosenbergs, 
who surely could recall and interpret what they did, the 
signs were likely vivid. Indeed as Root (1963) points out,
there were signs that could be read by those who knew what
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was going on. "[David] Greenglass had been identified 
publicly by the FBI as the man who gave Harry Gold the 
plans for the Nagasaki-type atomic bomb. No mention was 
made of Rosenberg in the FBI press releases. There was only 
the recurring intimations by the Justice Department that 
Greenglass' arrest had carried the search for spies into new 
and fruitful territory" (p. 102). The Rosenbergs reportedly 
were "surprised" at the government's investigation and their 
arrests and trial (Radosh & Milton, 1983, pp. 96-97, 101; 
Root, 1963, p. 92; Schneir, 1965, pp. 79, 84; Wexley, 1955, 
pp. 120-21, 131) . There appear to be two plausible reasons 
why the Rosenbergs might have been surprised at the invest­
igations and the eventual trial. First, the Rosenbergs were 
so ideologically committed to the "Russian cause" that their 
reasoning may have been impaired. They may have believed 
that others would eventually see them as having supported a 
"just cause". Second, they may have believed they would 
somehow be forgiven their deeds as a result of their 
commitment (Powell, 1981, pp. 42-44).
Pilat (1952), Root (1963), and Wexley (1955) all relate 
the fact that there was frequent communication between the 
Rosenbergs and Ruth Greenglass concerning what she and her 
husband were telling the authorities. This rather dramatic 
increase in and frantic nature of the added communication 
between the Rosenbergs and Mrs. Greenglass can be inter­
preted as a concern by the Rosenbergs that the Green­
glasses were talking openly with the authorities. If that
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had been the case, surely the Rosenbergs had seen some 
danger in their circumstances.
Eventually, the F.B.I. came to see Julius Rosenberg. 
The discussion between the F.B.I. and Mr. Rosenberg, as 
documented by former F.B.I. agents and as discovered in 
F.B.I. records by Franklin (1969); Goldstein, (1975); Pilat 
(1952); Root, (1963); Wexley, (1955); and Wyden, (1951a, 
1951b), is consistently reported as friendly and non­
threatening at first, but more pointed, specific, and 
increasingly threatening in nature later on. Julius, it is 
reported by Root (1963), got badly shaken and called his 
lawyer who advised him to say nothing and to leave the 
interrogation if the F.B.I. would let him go (p. 101). He 
was not held in custody by the F.B.I.
Julius Rosenberg arranged a meeting with his lawyer in 
a public place. It seems very unlikely that a lawyer with 
many Communist clients would be trying to hide the fact 
that he had one more. If Julius Rosenberg believed that his 
past Communist connections were the basis of a government 
investigation, he may well have been prudent in seeking a 
less conspicuous meeting with a lawyer of Bloch's back­
ground. Root (1963) describes the meeting between Emanuel 
Bloch and Julius Rosenberg as one in which Julius was told 
that any interest the government was showing in him was a 
temporary and not too serious matter. Bloch is reported to 
have told Julius, "a Grand Jury summons was the worst that
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would likely happen." Bloch also reportedly advised Julius 
that if there came a time when he was called to the Grand 
jury, he was to take advantage of his Fifth Ammendment 
rights (p. 102). "The espionage business Bloch discounted 
as a bluff" (p. 102) . A later comment was attributed to 
Bloch that suggests his statements to Julius were sincere 
and not just consoling comments made to a nervous client. 
"Bloch said later he described the matter to his father 
[another eminent lawyer] as "just another Fifth Ammendment 
case," and he discussed Rosenberg as "a soft, sweet 
intellectual sort of fellow" (p. 103). It would appear from 
these statements that Mr. Bloch was not told the whole truth 
or that he greatly misjudged the entire situation.
Julius Rosenberg, it turned out, did have something to 
be worried about. The Justice Department had learned of 
some of his activities from David Greenglass and, 
presumably, from Harry Gold. On 17 July 1950, the F.B.I. 
arrested Julius Rosenberg in his home in clear sight of his 
wife and two small sons. No attempt was made, according to 
numerous reports of the arrest, to hide this action from his 
children (Goldstein, 1975, p. 31; Root, 1963, pp. 106-108; 
Wexley, 1955, pp. 120-21). At the time of the arrest, J. 
Edgar Hoover is reported by Goldstein (1975) to have said; 
"Rosenberg is another link in the Soviet espionage apparatus 
which includes Dr. Klaus Fuchs, Harry Gold, [and] David 
Greenglass" (p. 31). Julius Rosenberg termed this charge 
as "fantastic" and "something like kids hear on television"
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(p. 31).
Immediately after Julius' arrest, his wife, Ethel, 
telephoned Mr. Bloch. She excitedly told him the news 
(Wexley, 1955, p. 120). He calmly told her he would meet 
Julius at the courthouse. Bloch was quickly faced with 
another problem after talking with Ethel.
It was a special announcement from Washington made 
jointly by Attorney General J. Howard Me Grath and 
F.B.I. Director, J. Edgar Hoover . . . Today, the 
F.B.I. had seized one Julius Rosenberg "as another 
important link to the Soviet espionage apparatus." 
According to Mr. Hoover, Rosenberg had recruited his 
brother-in-law, David Greenglass to steal "atomic 
data," and for some years had made himself "available 
to Soviet espionage agents" so that he could do "the 
work he was fated for . . . "  (p. 121).
Mr. Bloch recognized the "careful timing" of the announce­
ment and Julius' arrest. When Bloch arrived at the U.S. 
Courthouse to see his client, reporters, who had been 
alerted in advance, were already there (Root, 1963, p. 104).
Federal Judge John F. X. McGohey "swiftly set the bail 
for Julius at $100,000. It was, of course, a prohibitive 
one, and therefore, tantamount to no bail at all" (Wexley, 
p. 121). It is unusual, at night, for a senior jurist to 
be on duty but this was no ordinary circumstance (p. 121). 
The government was giving more clues about its motives
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and actions that were available to the keen observer.
These clues included: messages from Hoover that were timed 
with Justice Department actions, other high officials' 
announcements on television that were timed with arrests, 
and senior judges performing routine legal chores.
Ethel Rosenberg was called before the Grand Jury on 7 
August 1950, two weeks after Julius' arrest. Mr. Bloch and 
Ethel believed "it was to intimidate her and her husband" 
(Wexley, 1955, pp. 127-29). They believed it was a "trap," 
one designed to "get her to make some damaging statement 
against David [Greenglass]" (p. 127).
In the Grand Jury hearing, Ethel reportedly admitted to 
signing a Communist party nominating petition, a fairly 
innocuous event in normal times, but a very charged act in 
these troubled times. "Her answer, of course, in the view­
point of the Grand Jury, made her immediately into an 
unrepentant member of the Communist 'international 
conspiracy.' Thus, she was damned if she answered and 
damned if she didn't" (p. 128).
The prosecution attorney made several other "damaging 
accusations. These were made in the form of questions 
designed to elicit Fifth Amendment responses" (p. 129). 
Wexley clearly labels these questions asked of Ethel 
Rosenberg as "malicious intent" (p. 109n). Mr. Bloch and 
Ethel Rosenberg were aware of the assumptions made as a 
result of the Fifth Amendment use, but "what they did not 
realize was that her taking of the Fifth Amendment was
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later to become the 'overwhelming' evidence of her guilt at 
the trial" (p. 129).
When her Grand Jury testimony was completed, Ethel 
talked to waiting reporters. "Neither my husband nor I have 
ever been Communists, . . . and we don't know any Communists. 
The whole thing . . .  is a lot of lies. My brother is 
innocent and so is my husband" (Root, 1963, p. 106). Both 
the government and Ethel Rosenberg, it seems, were making 
public attempts at impression management.
Through unanswered questions and through innuendo, the 
government had defined Ethel and Julius Rosenberg as risks 
to society, as Communists, and as ghastly wrongdoers. "And 
the power to define is the most important power we have.
That was made clear in the McCarthy period" (King, 1987, 
p. 60). The government's defining power was heightened by 
the fact that it was taking cunning advantage of defendants' 
exercising their constitutional right of non-self­
discrimination.
Not only did the government, the prime agency in the 
Rosenberg case before the trial, use definition to manip­
ulate its position, it used the "leak" of selective parts of 
its case as well (Root, 1963, p. 106). As Root observed:
"Bit by bit, the Justice Department fed the details of its 
case to the press. David [Greenglass] had stolen essential 
secrets of the atomic bomb . . . because he had been 
mesmerized into doing it by his brother-in-law . . . This
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thesis drove Ethel to alter her attitude" (p. 106). Ethel 
now claimed David Greenglass and Julius Rosenberg never 
liked each other and that David was jealous of Julius. She 
solely blamed David for "family business failings" (p. 106).
The government had decided to arrest Ethel Rosenberg on 
12 August 1950. They likely could have found her at home 
on that day, but they decided, instead, to request that she 
return to the Grand Jury where they asked her the same 
questions that she had refused to answer the previous time. 
When she left the courthouse after this second session, she 
was arrested on the courthouse steps (p. 106-107). She, 
too, was held on a $100,000 bond (Goldstein, 1975, p. 31).
The strategies that the government was employing were 
not tame ploys, they were very serious matters indeed. "In 
communication, strategy is thought of as a message that 
serves as a symbolic substitute for violence" (King, 1987, 
p. 27). The government employed another scurrilous 
strategy. Chief Assistant United States Attorney Myles Lane 
held a press interview at which he stated: "There is ample 
evidence that Mrs. Rosenberg and her husband have been 
affiliated with Communist activities for a long period of 
time" (Wexley, 1955, p. 132). Mr. Lane then "added to her 
burden of guilt" with this "fantastic charge": "If the crime 
with which she is charged had not occurred, perhaps we would 
not have the present situation in Korea" (p. 132). This was 
"conviction by public opinion" (p. 132). Two years later, 
after the Rosenbergs' executions, in Dellaney v. United
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States (199 F.2nd 107), the U.S. Court of Appeals ruled that 
such pronouncements by government officials or spokesmen 
violated a defendant's rights (p. 132n).
The government was not the only agency using question­
able tactics to influence the American people. The powerful 
non-Socialist press also attempted to define the situation; 
it accepted government "leaks," made many unsubstantiated 
inferences, and produced terse, headline-form announcements 
to support their claims (Root, 1963, pp. 117-119). Root 
makes a specific point of this in the following:
The words "espionage" and "treason" and "spying" were 
regarded as sufficient identification for the crimes of 
the Rosenbergs, particularly by headline writers, whose 
precisions are limited by lack of space. Whether the 
American press generally was aware of the important 
distinctions between treason and espionage, and between 
an alleged act and an alleged conspiracy to commit an 
act, it apparently viewed them as distinctions thin in 
spirit, however large in law (p. 118).
It seemed that the press, in its eagerness to sell its 
product, cooperated with and was fed by the government. The 
government was likely eager to have such an ally.
The statute that the Rosenbergs were charged with did 
not distinguish between friend and foe, but Rabinowitz 
charges, "There can be little doubt that, in the minds of 
the judge, the jury, and the public at large, the fact that
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the Soviet Union was, in 1950, generally classified as an 
enemy, totally obscured the fact that it had been an ally 
when the offense is alleged to have taken place" (p. 68).
It is implied here that the more current, negative image 
would inhibit the older, more positive image from being 
recalled. If that inference were true, the defendants in
the Rosenberg case would likely suffer.
Some "suffering" is real, some is not; some "suffering" 
is unavoidable, some is not. The Rosenbergs, their lawyers, 
and numerous Socialists made claims that excessive bail 
caused Ethel and Julius Rosenberg to suffer "injustice" and 
"indignity" as a result of being held in jail (Rosenberg, 
1954, p. 82). Fineberg (1953) relates how the Rosenbergs 
may have had their misery lightened.
Had the required bail bond of $100,000 each been posted 
for them, the Rosenbergs would not have been jailed 
during the seven months between their arrest and the 
trial. The Civil Rights Congress, a Communist- 
dominated organization which posted tremendous sums of 
bail for other Communists, some of whom fled the
country, made no effort to help. Eighteen months after
the Rosenbergs' arrest (and long after their con­
viction) the Civil Rights Congress was screaming that 
they were totally innocent and Communist propagandists 
raised many hundreds of thousands of dollars to exploit 
the case.. None of these "friends" furnished any help 
at the time of their arrest (p. 134).
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The American judicial system was working very hard as a 
result of public feelings of betrayal and here were the 
Rosenbergs, the symbols of U.S. betrayal, being betrayed by 
the group that they ardently served.
Pilat (1952) states: "The sharp propaganda tone on both 
sides before the trial suggested the magnitude of the 
stakes" (p. 275). The stakes were great - for the 
Rosenbergs, it was their lives; for the U.S. government, it 
was a vital set of images such as safety, power, control, 
and action? and for the U.S. public, it was the belief that 
their government was able to regain control of the secrets 
that were being stolen, could correct the problems that were 
striking the nation, and could raise the spirits of its 
citizens again. The loser would be in a terrible position; 
and the U.S. government was determined that it would not be 
the loser.
The Rosenberg case jury selection has been a topic of 
great debate and concern to trial analysts who are disposed 
to take positions on the rightness or wrongness of the 
verdict and/or the procedures in the case (Goldstein, 1975? 
Glynn, 1955? Franklin, 1969; Pilat, 1952; Root, 1963; 
Schneir, 1983; Wexley, 1955; Wyden, 1951a). Some authors, 
such as Goldstein, Meeropol & Meeropol (1975), Pilat, and 
Schneir advance the theory that the Rosenberg case jury 
selection somehow placed the defendants at a disadvantage.
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Louis Nizer, one of the nation's most capable and well known 
trial lawyers and one of the best jury analysts, wrote in 
The Implosion Conspiracy (1973) , that he thought the jury 
selection in the case was in the better interests of the 
defendants. It may never be known what effect jury 
selection had in the final outcome. With the jury selected 
for the case, the stage was set for the trial to begin.
Rhetoric of the Trial Period
The rhetoric of the trial period, it seems, contributed 
heavily to the decision to impose the death sentence on the 
Rosenbergs. Much of this rhetoric stemmed from direct 
courtroom testimony. The press, it appears, contributed 
some of the trial period rhetoric that may well have been 
influential in the final outcome of the Rosenberg case. 
Public officials' statements may also have influenced the 
sentence. This segment of the study focuses on those 
rhetorical acts that seemed most likely to have influenced 
the sentence imposed on Ethel and Julius Rosenberg. The 
discussions of rhetorical acts by trial participants, by 
members of the press, and by public officials will be 
developed chronologically. This approach will enable the 
reader to better focus on the timing of various acts and to 
be aware of the cumulative effect of numerous rhetorical 
acts on the final Rosenberg case outcome.
When direct trial testimony references are made, these 
references will be taken from Wexley's work (1955). His is
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the only work on the trial and appeals that has been found
to have cited a version of the trial transcript. There
are at least three reasonable explanations for the omission
of citations in other works: (1) Each time an appeal is
granted, the court record is forwarded to the new court of
jurisdiction where it is amended to reflect the appellate
court's decision; (2) the Atomic Energy Commission, the
Defense Department, and the Justice Department had, for
varying lengths of time, kept portions of the court record
hidden from public view; and (3) the 1967 Freedom of
Information Act opened more of the court record to public
scrutiny. There are many versions of the court record
obstensibly available to people in the region where they are 
3
located.
The Justice Department was more openly arresting and 
trying spies in the U.S. This openness by the Justice 
Department was likely due to a need to quell images put 
forth by the Left. This openness also gave the Justice 
Department a chance to create new, positive images of their 
own. Root (1963) provides a clear picture of problems faced 
by the Justice Department as a result of their decision to 
go after spies openly.
The national security gains little and may even be 
endangered, for the battle against espionage is fraught 
with practical, if unprincipled, considerations. Once 
a spy is arrested, the attendant notoriety forces his
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network to disband and anything we may have learned 
about it is of no further use. Further, to obtain a 
conviction in court before a jury, the FBI may be 
forced to reveal to a ruinous extent the nature and 
techniques of its counterespionage system. It alerts 
the enemy, and espionage is a two-way street. It is 
equally important to us to give a spy the wrong 
information, as it is for him to get the facts (p.
116) .
Root has addressed some of the dilemmas facing the 
Justice Department as they proceeded with arrests and trials 
in spy cases. Root also provides a perceptive view of pros­
ecutor Irving Saypol's Rosenberg trial strategy:
Armed with a Harry Gold, an Elizabeth Bentley, a 
David Greenglass, and a national climate of anxiety, 
the Justice Department could gamble with odds in its 
favor on a conviction in the national necessity of 
setting a grand and terrible example of what dilettante 
traitors could expect. And it could do it without 
having to put any of its agents or their informers on 
the stand.
Saypol's strategy, which obviously he developed 
once he had confessions from Gold, Greenglass, and 
Elitcher and the knowledge that he could never get a 
confession from the Rosenbergs, was to utilize the 
anxious mood of the times and seek a maximum penalty 
under a minimum charge. He decided not to charge the
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Rosenbergs with espionage, which would be hard to prove 
and which was threatened by the statute of limitations, 
but with a conspiracy to commit espionage (pp. 116-17). 
In order to secure a treason conviction, the government 
had to prove that a defendant was "levying war against them, 
or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid or comfort" 
and "No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the 
testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on 
confession in open court" (United States Constitution, Art. 
Ill, Sec. 3). In most, if not all instances of alleged 
treasonous acts in the Rosenberg case, the only available 
witnesses were other members of the spy ring, so securing a 
witness who would testify to treason was almost impossible. 
The precise charge against the Rosenbergs was based on a 
violation of Sub-section (a) of Section 32 of the Espionage 
Act of 1917 (50 U.S.C. 32). This act states: "Whoever, with 
intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the 
injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign 
nation communicates, delivers, or transmits . . .  to any 
foreign government . . . "  (Wexley, p. 272) . The formal 
Rosenberg indictments state: "On or about 6 June 1944 . . . 
Julius Rosenberg [et al.] . . . did conspire . . . with 
intent and reason to believe that it would be used to the 
advantage of a foreign nation, to wit, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics . . . "  (p. 272). The "crucial clause - 
to the injury of the United States - has been omitted"
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(p. 272). Wexley makes the assertion that there was no 
direct claim that the Rosenbergs ever intended to injure the 
United States. Wexley also claims that the government 
omitted this clause due to the fact that the U.S.S.R. was 
not an enemy but an ally to the U.S. in 1944-1945. (p. 272). 
Wexley further claims that "hence, there did not exist, even 
by the government's charge, the slightest suggestion of 
betrayal. The central concept of treason is betrayal of 
allegiance" (p. 273).
Charging a defendant with conspiracy is not universally 
accepted as good practice in the law. Root (1963) discusses 
why conspiracy cnarges cause some people to have doubts 
about their application. Legal literature widely discusses 
the risks that are inherent in a system that allows second­
hand testimony and testimony of a meeting between two 
individuals with only the word of one of these participants. 
"A judge may rule out hearsay testimony if it is not shown 
clearly to be germane, but by the time he does it has 
homogenized in the jury's mind with all the other testimony" 
(p. 117). The conspiracy charge, it seems, was the most 
expedient way to prosecute the Rosenbergs. It also appears 
to have minimized the release of security information for 
the government.
Before discussing individual rhetorical acts which took 
place contemporaneously with the trial, it seems prudent to 
give a brief overview of the trial. Glynn (1955, pp. 499- 
501) provides a clear trial summary.
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Julius Rosenberg had belonged to Communist organizations 
for several years. His wife Ethel, had participated in 
Communist rallies, marches, and protests during the same 
period. Over a short period of time in the mid 1940s,
Julius Rosenberg terminated active membership and activity 
in all Communist organizations. The Rosenbergs ceased their 
public participation in Socialist movement activities and 
they even dropped their subscription to the Daily Worker. 
Julius Rosenberg stole a proximity fuse from an Army Signal 
Corps project where he worked. Julius also obtained secret 
military information from Morton Sobell. Julius Rosenberg 
was alleged to have passed this information on to Soviet 
Vice-Consul Anatoli Yakovlev (p. 499).
David Greenglass, Ethel Rosenberg's brother, got a 
sensitive technician's job at the Los Alamos Atomic Experi­
mental Station. Julius Rosenberg obtained secret inform­
ation from David through Ruth Greenglass. Greenglass 
provided additional and more in-depth information when he 
came home on Christmas leave in December, 1944. "David 
dictated twelve pages of notes to Ethel Rosenberg who typed 
the notes and he also drew an sketch of the explosive lense 
used to detonate the A-bomb" (p. 500) . This data allegedly 
was sent to Yakovlev. David Greenglass and Julius Rosenberg 
also arranged for a future meeting with an unnamed person by 
exchanging Jello box top halves for identification.
Harry Gold had confessed to being a Soviet courier. At
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the Rosenberg trial, Gold testified he had gotten one half 
of the Jello box top from Yakovlev and had been sent to see 
David Greenglass in New Mexico (p. 500).
Julius Rosenberg had counseled Sobell and the Green- 
glasses to escape to Mexico after Fuchs was arrested and 
Gold was taken into custody. Rosenberg gave Greenglass 
$5,000 for the flight. Just prior to their own arrests, the 
Rosenbergs had secured passport photos for their own 
departure (p. 501).
Most of this trial evidence was corroborated by other 
witnesses' testimony, other physical evidence, or by other 
circumstantial evidence. The only response by the defense 
was denials. The Rosenbergs refused to answer questions 
relevant to their Communist affiliations by invoking their 
constitutional rights.
The Rosenberg case "had all the elements that made for 
high courtroom drama: Defendants who staunchly maintained 
their innocence, the possibilities of appearances by 
celebrated atomic scientists, the notorious 'Red Spy Queen' 
Elizabeth Bentley, and the public airing of a family feud, 
already familiar in outline form to readers of the Jewish 
Daily Forward, which had published a series of articles on 
the Greenglasses" (Radosh & Milton, 1983, p. 170).
There was also the fact the case was being prosecuted 
by U.S. Attorney Irving Saypol, "whose reputation as the 
nemisis of 'Red' defendants had made him the favorite of 
right-wing journalists and aroused the professional
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jealousy of J. Edgar Hoover" (p. 170).
Most of Saypol's reputation rested on "his prosecution 
of suspected Communists, including Alger Hiss and the eleven 
Smith Act defendants." This record, "topped off by his role 
as prosecutor of the Rosenbergs, would result in Saypol 
being hailed as 'the nation's number one legal hunter of top 
Communists'" (p. 171).
Saypol is alleged to have thought of the Rosenbergs and 
their counsel as "little better than agents of the devil"
(p. 171). Saypol is quoted as having "menacingly" warned 
the Rosenberg defense counsel, "If your clients don't 
confess they are doomed" (p. 171). If this quote is 
accurate, the Rosenberg trial surely began inauspiciously. 
Radosh and Milton (1983) further maintain that "From that 
point on, the prosecutor barely observed minimal formal­
ities of courtroom manners. Saypol's opponents were rarely 
accorded a courteous word and certainly never conceded a 
request, however small" (p. 171). This attitude, it seems, 
signaled events to come.
On the first day of the trial, which was reserved for 
jury selection, the courtroom was "filled with a crush of 
curious trial buffs, reporters, and semi-official obser­
vers." "Most of the spectators had come in the hope and 
expectation of seeing the atom spies convicted, but there 
was also a tiny coterie of Rosenberg sympathizers, mostly 
women, who made occasional attempts to gain the ear of the
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members of the jury pool as they passed in the corridor. In 
spite of the crowding, the atmosphere inside was anything 
but circuslike” (p. 172). The New York Times (1951, March 
7) noted "an indefinable tenseness pervaded the courtroom .
. . The silence was extraordinary" (p. 1). Presiding judge, 
Irving R. Kaufman conducted the voir dire himself (in 
accordance with common practice in federal trials). The 
jury selection process only took a day and a half (Radosh & 
Milton, p. 172) .
The Rosenberg trial began, as most jury trials do, with 
opening statements. Prosecutor Saypol gave the first 
opening statement. Very quickly, the tone of the defense, 
the prosecution, and the judicial handling of the case 
became evident. Saypol began to describe the facts of the 
case as he wanted the jury to see them. This seemed fairly 
ordinary when he stated, "The evidence will show that the 
loyalty and the allegiance of the Rosenbergs and Sobell 
were not to our own country, but that it was to communism, 
communism in this country and communism throughout the 
world" (Nizer, 1973, p. 48; Wexley, 1955, p. 274). Defense 
counsel, Emanuel Bloch, immediately interrupted with: "It 
the Court pleases, I object to those remarks as irrelevant 
to the charges before this Court and jury and I ask the 
Court to instruct the District Attorney to desist from 
making any remarks about communism, because communism is not 
on trial here. These defendants are charged with espionage 
[my emphasis]" (Nizer, p. 48; Wexley, p. 274). Judge
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Kaufman's decision on this first skirmish between Saypol and 
Bloch was to open the way for Communism to be made an 
"unindicted charge" in the trial. The judge's ruling was: 
"The charge here is espionage [my emphasis]. It is not that 
the defendants are members of the Communist Party or that 
they had any interest in Communism. However, if the govern­
ment intends to establish that they did have an interest in 
Communism, for the purpose of establishing a motive for what 
they were doing, I will, in due course, when that question 
arises, rule on that point" (Wexley, p. 275). The judge 
realized that he had made an error in his comments and he 
immediately corrected himself: " . . .  I think I said to the 
jury before that the charge was espionage. I want to 
correct that. The charge is conspiracy to commit espionage" 
(p. 275n). It should also be remarked that chief defense 
counsel, Bloch, in his objection, made the same error and 
did not appear to have noticed it; or if he had noticed it, 
he did not try to correct it. Even though the formal charge 
was conspiracy, the terms "treason," "espionage," "traitor," 
and "spying" would be used many times in the course of the 
trial by the prosecutor, defense counsel, witnesses, and the 
press in its reports of the case. There were very few 
formal objections over the use of these terms during the 
trial. It was formally a conspiracy trial; but informally, 
judging by the language used, it was being presented by the 
prosecution and was being reflected by the press as an
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
109
espionage or a treason case. The use of the wrong term by 
the chief defense counsel, the presiding judge (even though 
corrected), and by the prosecutor may have planted in the 
minds of some jurors the idea that there was little or no 
difference in these terms. After the judge's "green light" 
the "charge of treason dominated the entire trial and 'guilt, 
by association' became the keynote of the prosecution's 
summation" (p. 275). King (1987) discusses this rhetorical 
strategy; he comments: " . . .  a general strategy which is 
ethically questionable but highly effective is sometimes 
called 'guilt by association' or, still more commonly,
'birds of a feather flock together.' Mere physical 
proximity is taken for ideological identity" (p. 28). This 
strategy was potent in the Rosenberg case. The weight of 
such a strategy is discussed by King: "The effectiveness of 
this message would be determined by the nature of the 
viewing audience, the moral and political climate of the 
time, recent events, the credibility of the message source 
. . . " (p. 28). King's general description of this 
strategy and of its effectiveness appears to fit the 
Rosenberg case quite well.
The New York Times front page headline of 8 March 1951 
read "Theft of atom bomb secrets in war stressed at spy 
trial." These words were displayed in large, bold letters. 
Wexley illustrates how the terms, "traitor," and "spy" 
became common in the Rosenberg case press reports (pp. 280- 
83). Since most Americans were not in the courtroom, many
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of them could have believed the Rosenbergs were being tried 
for treason or espionage (Radosh & Milton, 1983, p. 173).
Intimidation was another strategy Saypol apparently
chose to employ against the defense. It is a matter of
protocol to announce to the court, the opposing lawyers, and
the jury the list of expected witnesses. Technically, this
list does not bind either side to calling all those listed
nor does it inhibit either side from calling an occasional
"surprise witness." However, if deviation from such a list
occurs too frequently or if the deviations appear too
flagrant, the presiding judge has the right [which is
frequently exercised in federal courts] to openly rebuke the
offending counsel. Because such an admonishment could
adversely affect the jury in a case, few lawyers abuse this 
4
protocol. Mr. Saypol, the prosecutor, announced that there 
would be 102 prosecution witnesses called to testify 
(Wexley, p. 284). The list contained such names as J.
Robert Oppenheimer, Harold C. Urey, and General Leslie 
Groves, "the three Americans most responsible for the Los 
Alamos project" (p. 284). When the trial ended, only 23 of 
the 102 declared witnesses had been called upon to testify. 
Judge Kaufman never commented in open court about the 
uncalled witnesses. Wexley maintains that this witness list 
had a profound effect on the trial.
The witness list included Sobell's mother and father, 
his aunt and uncle, and his sister-in-law and brother-in-
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law. There were also several intimate friends of the 
Rosenbergs on the list. The were also the names of some of 
those prominent in atomic research as well as F.B.I. agents. 
Wexley maintains that the positive image of the F.B.I. and 
the scientists' reputation could have caused some members of 
the jury to be favorably impressed with the prosecution's 
case (p. 284). Wexley also suggests that some members of 
the jury may have asked themselves the following question 
regarding close relatives and friends on the witness list: 
"Would they be aiding the prosecution if the accused were 
really innocent?" (p. 284). The jury may well have been 
disposed to believe that the prosecution had a sounder case 
than it did. The defense counsel and the defendants were 
likely startled, confused, and distracted by the magnitude 
and the quality of the prosecution's witness list. Saypol's 
strategies of listing many more witnesses than he intended 
to call and of naming famous people that would not really 
appear before the jury could have lessened the prosecution's 
case. When it finally became evident to the jury that some 
well known witnesses were not to be called and there would 
be a severely abbreviated witness list, the prosecution 
needed to show or have shown that such changes were due to a 
desire for parsimony and not due to falsehood by the 
prosecution or due to weaknesses in the prosecution's case.
The first government witness was Max Elitcher. He 
testified openly and "freely" on the "advice of his 
attorney, 0. John Rogge" (Pilat, 1952, p. 278). Elitcher
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"described the defendants' social and trade union careerism 
inside the Communist movement as well as their efforts to 
entice him into espionage" (p. 279). Elitcher had been one 
of Julius Rosenberg's "friends," but now he was to betray 
that friendship in the eyes of the Rosenberg supporters 
(Meeropol & Meeropol, 1975, p. 388).
A summary of Elitcher's testimony, as it appeared in 
the Columbia Law Review (1954), is used to describe his 
testimony because: "(1) It is concise, (2) it is unbiased 
and reasonably accurate, (3) it is from a highly respected 
legal periodical, and (4) it is assurance that every 
important point in the government's case is fully presented" 
(Wexley, 1955, p. 286).
[Max Elitcher] reported that in June 1944, and 
September 1945, Julius Rosenberg had solicited his 
services for espionage activities. Later in 1945, 
Rosenberg asked Elitcher to continue his employment in 
the Navy Department because of its fertility as a field 
for espionage. Elitcher also testified that in July of 
1945 [sic!] he had communicated his suspicion to Morton 
Sobell that he, Elitcher, was being followed. That 
night, according to Elitcher, Sobell went on what he 
said was a visit to Julius Rosenberg in order to 
deliver a 35-millimeter film can puportedly containing 
secret information (the inference being that Sobell 
feared apprehension and confiscation of the can because
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of Elitcher's suspicion of being followed). Elitcher, 
although he accompanied Sobell, did not see Rosenberg 
(Columbia Law Review, 1954, p. 121).
Court testimony also showed that Elitcher's wife had 
accompanied him to the meeting with Rosenberg when alleged 
overtures to join in Communist groups were made. The record 
does indicate that Mrs Elitcher was asked "to leave the 
room" during their conversation (Wexley, pp. 288-90).
Elitcher's testimony had started the prosecution's case 
by (1) connecting Julius Rosenberg and Morton Sobell; (2) 
connecting both Julius Rosenberg and Sobell with espionage- 
type activities; and (3) connecting the defendants with 
Communism. Radosh and Milton (1983) argue that the defense 
could gain nothing from a cross-examination of Elitcher. 
After all this, the defense lawyers found nothing in 
Elitcher's statements that would make it worth their 
while to summon him back to the stand. . . the story 
did not contradict anything he had said earlier (to the 
F.B.I.], so reopening the issue would most likely only 
result in a rehashing of his already damaging 
testimony, impressing it still further on the minds of 
the jury [and judge!] (Radosh & Milton, 1983, p. 178). 
Elitcher had received an annonymous note warning him 
to "watch out for the time bomb" (Wexley, p. 179). Radosh 
and Milton argue the importance of such an act:
The incident, coming as it did so early in the trial, 
was a serious embarrassment to Manny Bloch. As he
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pointed out to the judge, the defendants had all been 
imprisoned for months and could hardly be personally 
responsible for sending the letter to Elitcher. Never­
theless, the threat did nothing to enhance the picture 
Bloch was trying to present of his clients as innocent 
people, . . . The jury, naturally, knew nothing about 
the letter and would not be influenced; but Bloch could 
not be sure that the same could be said for Judge 
Kaufman, who would have the ultimate power to press 
sentence in the event of conviction (p. 179).
The "annonymous threats against Elitcher's life confirmed 
the public's impression that the first of . . .[the] 
government's witnesses had riddled the defense" (Pilat,
1952, p. 279).
The next major witness to take the stand was David 
Greenglass. "Among the spectators there was a ripple of 
excitement and a craning of necks to see better the plump, 
wavy-haired prisoner take the stand" (Wexley, 1955, p. 325). 
"The great court chamber was so silent that the clock tick 
seemed audible in the brief pauses" (New York Times, 10 
March 1951). David Greenglass' testimony lasted for the 
better part of two full days. Ruth Greenglass followed her 
husband, David, on the witness stand and she basically 
echoed his testimony (Radosh & Milton, 1983, p. 197). 
Following is a brief summary of the major points in the 
Greenglass couple's testimony that seemed to have had some
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influence on the eventual sentence given to the Rosenbergs.
Julius Rosenberg recruited both David and Ruth Green­
glass into espionage activities. David secured "names of 
important scientists" and gave "information concerning 
security measures [at Los Alamos] and the nature of his work 
to Rosenberg. Greenglass, while on leave in New York, drew 
a sketch of the explosive device used in the A-bomb" and 
supplied Rosenberg with a list of "potential spy recruits." 
Ethel Rosenberg was alleged to have typed the dictated 
notes. The Greenglasses testified about details of the 
"Jello-box" identification technique set up to allow further 
spying activities. David Greenglass, again on leave in New 
York, gave the Rosenbergs further details of the A-bomb 
which were forwarded to the Soviets. Julius Rosenberg 
admitted to Greenglass that "he'd stolen a fuse and had 
transmitted it to the Russians". The Rosenbergs had helped 
the Greenglasses make plans to go to Russia. According to 
the Greenglasses, Ethel and Julius Rosenberg were Communists 
(Wexley, 1955, pp. 326-29).
"David Greenglass' story, told in an undertone, gripped 
the courtroom in dramatic silence. His sister, Ethel 
Rosenberg, grew pale; once she covered her eyes with her 
hands" (New York Times, 11 March 1951, p. 2). Nizer (1973) 
makes the point that jurors are keenly alert to nonverbal 
signals in the courtroom and that these cues often take on 
substantial meaning to a jury (pp. 7-8).
Some of the decisions made by the attorneys likely were
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influential in determining the outcome of the trial. The 
Atomic Energy Commission was greatly concerned about the 
release of sensitive information in open court. They 
expressed to Saypol their concern relevant to potential 
testimony from highly respected scientists on the witness 
list. After lengthy and heated negotiations concerning this 
matter, the A.E.C. and the prosecutor's team agreed to let a 
low ranking A.E.C. member testify about minimal technical 
information (Radosh & Milton, 1983, pp. 182-86). After 
Walter Koski, the A.E.C.'s representative, testified to 
several items favorable to the prosecution's case and 
relevant to the harmful nature of the secrets Rosenberg gave 
to the Soviets, chief defense counsel, Bloch, presented no 
objections (even though it clearly appears the judge 
"invited" him to do so). "The court: 'Counsel [for the 
defense] doesn't take issue with that statement?' Bloch: 
'No, not at all. I read about it in the newspapers . . .'" 
(p. 186). "Whether he knew it or not, Emanuel Bloch, in his 
lack of rebuttal, had more or less conceded that the 
implosion-lens sketches were important enough to merit 
classified status . . . the battle was half lost" (p. 186). 
The witness had not been challenged as to the technical data 
nor "had he been asked to substantiate his statements about 
the value of the sketches to a 'foreign power' by describing 
the state of Soviet atomic research" (p. 187).
This "small victory" was far less than the surprising
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
117
events that came next (p. 187). Mr. Bloch demanded that 
Greenglass' sketch be impounded "so that it remain secret 
from the court, the jury, and counsel" (p. 188) . Prosecutor 
Saypol was "flabbergasted by the move" (p. 188). As Radosh 
and Milton point out, "With a few words, Manny Bloch had 
managed to do more than the prosecution could ever hope to 
do to convince the jury that what it was about to hear 
really was 'the secret of the atomic bomb.' Why else would 
it be necessary to exclude the press and the public?" (pp. 
188-89).
Mr. Bloch had stated after the Greenglass testimony: "I 
would like to stipulate as an American citizen and as a 
person who owes his allegiance to this country [sic]. I 
would like to stipulate it [the highly sensitive nature of 
the material that Rosenberg had received] first to save the 
expense. I understand it would save quite an expense to the 
government to bring all these people here" (p. 189). The 
suggestion that it would be "unpatriotic to require the 
state to set forth the full evidence against defendants 
charged with a capital crime is simply incredible" (p. 189). 
Radosh and Milton saw Bloch's action as a last hope gesture. 
The kindest interpretation of Bloch's admission is that 
he felt a need for a patriotic gesture at this juncture 
in the trial and that he believed his clients' case was 
already lost and he was looking for a chance to win the 
sympathy of the judge and avert the death penalty he 
saw in store, at least for Julius Rosenberg (pp.
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191-92).
The next major witness to take the stand was Harry 
Gold. "Harry Gold's whole account meshed nicely with the 
Rosenberg-Greenglass history presented by the prosecution" 
(Pilat, 1952, p. 280). Although Gold's testimony was 
damaging,
tangling with Harry Gold on the witness stand was like 
questioning an encyclopedia: it could only provoke a 
spate of coldly accurate facts. Having read the 
Brothman trial record and having reached the obvious 
conclusion, Emanuel Bloch merely waved his hand when 
Gold finished testifying. "The defense has no cross- 
examination of this witness,' he said" (p. 281).
Failure to cross-examine may well mean that the accused 
accepts the testimony and cannot contradict it. To 
forfeit cross-examination is a dangerous tactic . . . 
(Nizer, 1973, p. 162).
We do not know how the jury interpreted Bloch's decision, 
but it may have been a damaging interpretation.
The last major witness for the prosecution was 
Elizabeth Bentley, a self-admitted Communist and an indicted 
spy conspirator who had escaped prison by agreeing to 
testify in various cases for the prosecution ("Investig­
ation: Probers", 1948, pp. 19-20; "Investigations: The 
network", 1948, pp. 15-17). In her testimony, Mrs. Bentley 
"reported several telephone conversations with a man called
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Julius" and further stated that she had accompanied another 
spy courier to the place where Julius Rosenberg resided 
(Columbia Law Review, 1954, p. 222). Bentley also painted a 
picture of local Communists being obedient to superiors' 
demands and making "threats of expulsion for failure to 
comply with . . . orders" (p. 222).
After a series of "minor witnesses," the prosecution 
announced it had concluded its case (Radosh & Milton, 1983, 
p. 222). Now it was up to the defense to decide whether or 
not the defendants would testify on their own behalf.
Defendants are not required to testify; however, if 
they do speak on their own behalf, they are not immune from 
cross-examination. "Morton Sobell never did take the stand, 
or call any witnesses in his own behalf" (Pilat, 1952, p.
287). "Not only did Sobell fail to present his own account 
. . . he waived his right to present any defense whatever" 
(Radosh & Milton, 1983, p. 255).
The Rosenbergs, however, did take the stand in their 
own behalf. The decision to let Ethel and Julius Rosenberg 
testify was a long and arduous one (Nizer, 1973, pp. 195-99) . 
It was finally decided that despite some real risks, the 
Rosenbergs' desire to speak on their own behalf would 
prevail (p. 198). Glynn (1955) summarizes the testimony of 
the Rosenbergs; "The Rosenbergs categorically denied the 
testimony of the prosecution witnesses. . . .  In cross- 
examination, the Rosenbergs invoked their constitutional 
rights to silence when asked about Communism" (pp. 500-501).
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Fineberg (1953) offers another view of the Rosenberg 
testimony and he also comments on the perception of some of 
the Left that there was a similarity between the Rosenberg 
and Dreyfus cases. The Rosenberg defense did not offer any 
rebuttal testimony in response to the prosecution's case.
The defense chose to use "argumentation" rather than 
evidence to refute government witnesses (p. 139). Fineberg 
did not see the Rosenberg defense as very logical and he 
argues that the "Rosenberg defense crumbled under the lash 
of truth" (p. 139). In the streets, however, the need for 
truth and logic was lessened. Fineberg claims that there 
were several unsubstantiated but repeated assertions of 
similarities between the Dreyfus and Rosenberg cases. 
Fineberg maintains that in open court it would have been a 
"simple matter" of asking the judge whether there were any 
documents given to the jury that were not known to the 
defense (p. 140) . Since neither the defense counsel nor the 
press apparently had reason to believe that there were any 
similarities between the Dreyfus and Rosenberg cases, the 
question was never raised in court.
Fineberg argues that the Rosenbergs were found guilty 
because they were not credible witnesses. "They were hard 
to believe because their tongues were tied by their resolve 
to insist that they were totally innocent" (p. 140). The 
Rosenbergs further damaged their own credibility by refusing 
to answer questions "about a highly important phase of their
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lives [Communism]" (p. 140).
Julius Rosenberg, at times, seemed to actively join in 
an adversarial position with prosecutor Saypol. His naive 
and argumentative responses betrayed a weakness that Saypol 
was to exploit to the fullest. Even the most innocent of 
witnesses is well advised not to try to score debating 
points against his interrogators. But Julius simply could 
not resist (Radosh & Milton, p. 245).
Julius Rosenberg tried to use the Fifth Amendment 
provision to selectively shield himself from damaging 
testimony. He was given some latitude in this matter at the 
start of his testimony, but eventually the judge and the 
prosecutor began to lose their patience. Julius Rosenberg 
seemed to regard the use of the Fifth Ammendment as a 
personal weapon that he could use to fend off hostile 
questions asked by prosecutor Saypol (p. 245). Saypol was 
aware of Julius' strategy and made as much use of 
Rosenberg's maneuvers as he could. Saypol asked questions 
in such a manner that Julius' responses made it apparent 
that he was using the constitutional right to silence 
selectively (p. 246). Radosh and Milton argue that Julius 
Rosenberg discovered that he had made an error in "resorting 
to the Fifth Amendment too quickly," but by then there was 
little he could do to correct the error he had made (p.
246). Julius did not make a sympathetic impression. ". . . 
An innocent man in his situation might be expected to show 
fear, confusion, or anger. Julius impressed the jurors as
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'stony'" (p. 248).
Ethel Rosenberg's testimony in her own defense did not 
reveal anything new. Ethel seemed concerned that the 
prosecution not be given a chance to "drive a wedge between 
the testimony of husband and wife" (Radosh & Milton, p. 259). 
Her testimony consisted entirely of terse denials of lengthy 
paraphrases of the Greenglasses' testimony (p. 259).
Radosh and Milton argue that Ethel, like Julius, came 
across in court in a way that likely hurt rather than helped 
their cause. They argue that while Ethel maintained a 
willingness to "stand by" her brother in "obvious contrast" 
to David Greenglass' behavior toward her, she lost much of 
that statement's impact due to a lack of any display of 
emotion (p. 260). Radosh and Milton claim that Ethel 
"barely concealed contempt for the whole proceedings," which 
likely did not impress the jury when it came time for them 
to assess her testimony (p. 260).
It is suggested by Radosh and Milton that the jury may 
have felt sorry for her, a woman "dragged into a serious 
crime out of loyalty to her husband" (p. 260). It is also 
claimed that Ethel's behavior on the witness stand and the 
reaction to her testimony by the press and the courtroom 
spectators was to be the beginning of "a theory that she, 
and not Julius, was the moving force behind their espionage"
(p. 260).
Neither Ethel nor Julius Rosenberg did very much to
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refute the evidence produced by the prosecution. The Rosen­
bergs also failed to supply reasonable sounding explanations 
for their actions. Both Ethel and Julius seemed to hope the 
jury would believe their denials of the vast amount of 
evidence against them and they seemed to hope that the jury 
would either forgive or excuse them in their refusals to 
reveal anything concerning their Communist affiliations or 
ideology. Several jurors stated in later interviews that 
they were not convinced by the Rosenberg's testimony 
(Goldstein, 1975, pp. 30-35).
With the end of the Rosenbergs' testimony, the defense 
rested its case. The prosecution's case was not yet over. 
Saypol called a few minor rebuttal witnesses to challenge 
some points made in the defense. Then Saypol called to the 
stand Ben Schneider, the photographer that the Rosenbergs 
went to get passport photographs. He testified that they 
had ordered passport pictures just prior to the time of 
their arrests (Nizer, 1973, pp. 278-82; Radosh & Milton, 
1983, pp. 264-66; Wexley, 1955, pp 561-72). Once Schneider 
had finished testifying, both sides rested their cases.
In his summation speech, Bloch thanked Judge Kaufman 
for his "utmost courtesy" and Saypol's staff for the "many, 
many courtesies" it had extended. "Bloch's kind words for 
the judge and the prosecution . . . seemed especially odd in 
view of the fact that just minutes earlier . . . his father 
had moved for a mistrial on the grounds that Kaufman's 
frequent interruptions to interrogate witnesses . . . made
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it impossible . . .  to receive a fair trial" (Radosh & 
Milton, 1983, p. 267).
Bloch's summation came from a lawyer who knew he had a 
losing case. Bloch's appeal was to emotion rather than to 
reason. Bloch was aware that the Rosenbergs faced death 
sentences if they were convicted.
Saypol's summation was not striking (p. 269). He 
charged that "Communist ideology had brought the defendants 
to a 'worship and devotion' of the Soviet Union and given 
them the motive to do the 'terrible things' with which they 
had been charged" (p. 269).
The jury, according to interviews with several jurors, 
agreed from the start of the jury deliberations that Morton 
Sobell and Julius Rosenberg were guilty as charged. They 
also had voted on the first ballot 11-1 that Ethel Rosenberg 
was also guilty as charged. The lone juror was reportedly 
reluctant on religious grounds to allow a woman to be put to 
death. This reluctance soon reportedly changed. It was 
also reported that the jurors were reluctant to announce a 
verdict too quickly in fear of being accused of not having 
considering the matter sufficiently (Goldstein, 1975, pp. 
31-34; Nizer, 1973, pp. 334-36; Radosh & Milton, 1983, pp. 
272-74; Wexley, 1955, pp. 593-97).
The 30 March 1951 editions of the Chicago Tribune, the 
Milwaukee Journal, the New York Times, and the St. Louis 
Post Dispatch all had front-page banners that told of the
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guilt of "spies," "traitors," and people who had committed 
"treason." These terms were, of course, inaccurate as they 
referred to either the formal charges against the defendants 
or the jury's verdict of guilt; however, they were the terms 
that F. Lee Baily and Louis Nizer would later characterize 
as "pervasive" on various talk-shows in the 1970s. These 
famous trial lawyers had commented on several occasions that 
the press in this case lead the public astray with erroneous 
or sloppy reporting. They blamed the press, in part, for 
the public's incorrect perception of the charges and of the 
verdict's meaning in the Rosenberg case. Even until the 
execution of the Rosenbergs, the majority of the press 
accounts of the Rosenberg charges still referred to acts of 
treason and spying rather than to espionage.
Rhetoric of the Sentencing Period
Sentencing of those found guilty in court is an 
integral part of the trial process. The sentence is 
entered into the court record. Unlike the rest of the 
court record, however, the sentence in a federal case is 
not subject to judicial review. The sentence may only be 
overturned if there are errors discovered in the pre­
sentencing portion of the trial that would preclude it 
from having taken place. In many lengthy, complex, and 
highly publicized trials, the sentence becomes temporarily 
deferred, set aside from the rest of the trial proceedings. 
Such was the procedure in the Rosenberg case. The jury's
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verdict was rendered on 29 March 1951 and the sentence was 
imposed on 5 April 1951. This time interval along with 
wide media coverage likely gave impetus to the belief, by 
some, that these were somehow separate events.
Many people were moved to express their opinions on 
what the verdict ought to be by writing to the judge in the 
case. The New York Times of 5 April 1951 reported: "Judge 
Kaufman has received hundreds of letters. Most of them 
urged the death sentence" (p. 6). It seems doubtful that 
these public letters influenced, to any great extent, the 
sentencing decision made by Judge Kaufman; however, it was 
a reflection of the mood of the time, which most likely did 
contribute to the judge's decision.
Immediately prior to the sentence being delivered, each 
side in the case was afforded an opportunity to address the 
court. The judge had already prepared his decision to be 
read in open court, so none really expected any statement to 
sway his decision; it was a pro-forma courtesy to the legal 
staffs. Saypol, for the prosecution, did not, directly 
advocate the death penalty for the Rosenbergc in his speech. 
However, his "interpretation of the gravity of their crime 
left little doubt as to his sentiments: 'I have hesitated to 
translate these matters into a direct issue of life and 
death. It would be delusion indeed to believe that the war 
in Korea is anything but a war inspired by Russia. It is 
not an ad hominem appeal to suggest that it is inferable
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that young American lives are being daily sacrificed in 
Korea in defense of our way of life. These defendants gave 
their allegiance to forces . . . allied to the real enemy in 
that fight . . . "  (Schneir, 1965, p. 168).
Saypol reiterated a connection that Assistant U.S. 
Attorney Myles Lane had made at the arraignment of Ethel 
Rosenberg (Wexley, 1955, p. 132) - that the Rosenbergs1 
deeds were inextricably linked with the loss of American 
lives in Korea (Schneir, p. 168). King (1987) points out 
relevant to this issue: " . . .  one can change the 
persuasiveness of an argument or appeal by expanding . . . 
the context in which a group of listeners thinks about it" 
(p. 29). Lane and Saypol, it seems, chose not to limit the 
Rosenbergs' deeds to conspiracy or to implied treason or 
espionage, but they attempted to magnify the sphere of these 
deeds to the Korean War. "By doing what Kenneth Burke has 
called 'expanding the circumference' (Keith, 1979, pp. 130- 
36) one may make a [relatively] small event seem far more 
critical than it ordinarily appears" (King, p. 29). This 
expansion of the Rosenberg deeds was also part of the 
judge's reasoning, as we shall see, for imposing the 
death sentence.
Bloch, speaking for the defense, told the judge that 
the defendants still maintained their innocence and he 
commented that the fact that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were 
allies during the time of the alleged offenses should 
mitigate the circumstances in determining the sentence
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(Schneir, p. 169).
An eminent scholar of American rhetors, A. Craig Baird 
(1952), characterized Judge Kaufman as being "mentally 
acute" and "judicially balanced" during the trial (p. 55) . 
Following is a discussion of the reasoning Judge Kaufman 
gave in support of his sentence. Included here are the 
direct, trial-related and scene-driven reasons given by the 
judge. Although there are allusions to other, more 
indirect, personal reasons likely contributing to the 
sentence, these are addressed in the chapter relevant to the 
"agent."
This discussion of the judge's reasons for his decision 
on the sentence imposed on the Rosenbergs come from his 
sentencing speech (Congressional Record, 1951, 97: A1903-4). 
Judge Kaufman labeled espionage as "a rather sordid and 
dirty work" and characterized the Rosenbergs' actions as 
"espionage" in his prepared sentencing speech despite the 
charge and conviction of conspiracy! Kaufman, further 
characterizes the Rosenbergs' acts as "however idealistic 
are the rationalizations of the persons who engage in it 
[presumably espionage is meant here?] - with but one 
paramount theme, the betrayal of one's own country"
[emphases mine]. The judge went on to say "The punishment 
to be meted out in this case must therefore serve the 
maximum interest for the preservation of our society against 
these traitors in our midst" [emphasis mine]. In these
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
129
passages of the sentencing speech, the judge seems to have 
ignored the narrowness of the charges against the Rosenbergs 
and appears to be addressing the American public on the same 
level that the press had covered during the trial. An 
appellate Court cannot change a sentence, even if the 
wording of such a decision is inflamatory. Only if the 
interpretation of or the application of the law was deemed 
to be in error can the judgment be overturned.
Kaufman referred to the Rosenbergs' offenses as "worse 
than murder." He alluded to the link of the defendants' 
deeds to the Korean War as Lane and Saypol had done earlier. 
Kaufman extended the Rosenbergs' deeds much further than 
even Lane and Saypol did when he asserted "you undoubtedly 
have altered the course of history to the disadvantage of 
our country." The judge's final reason offered in support 
of his sentence linked religious and security matters. "I 
feel I must pass such sentence upon the principals in this 
diabolical conspiracy to destroy a God-fearing nation, which 
will demonstrate with finality that this nation's security 
must remain inviolate." In his explication of the reasons 
for this sentence, Judge Kaufman used some highly charged 
emotive language. His address seemed predominantly directed 
toward the general American public rather than to the 
courtroom audience, the defendants, the press, or to the 
Left. There were, however, specific passages that could be 
interpreted to be addressed to each of these other 
audiences.
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The judge did, in his speech, acknowledge a difference 
in the culpability of Julius Rosenberg and his wife, Ethel. 
He referred to Julius as the "prime mover" and to Ethel as 
one who "encouraged and assisted with the cause." Kaufman's 
address concluded with the pronouncement of death to both 
the Rosenbergs.
The judge's sentencing speech seemed to be an overt 
link to the scene: appeals to fear and betrayal; and 
allusions to spying and national security. Images of 
national strength, renewed security, and retribution for 
horrible deeds were evidenced in the speech. The sentencing 
was an act driven by the scene; it was justified by scenic 
references and was cloaked in images designed to show that 
the old scene of betrayal had been cleansed and a new 
purified scene had emerged through the act. Thus 
sentencing was an act obligatory for national redemption 
(Burke, 1950, pp. 31-32).
Rhetoric of the Post-Sentencing Period
Before the formal sentencing, several U.S. newspapers 
surmised "that the Department of Justice might recommend the 
death penalty for the convicted spies as a means of 
persuading them to div- ge information [emphasis mine]" 
(Schneir & Scneir, p. 175). Schneir quotes an uncited
item in the New York Journal-American by Howard Rushmore as 
saying: "capital punishment was being "carefully considered
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. . . because . . .  A few months in the death house might 
loosen the tongues of one or more of the . . . traitors and 
lead to the arrest of . . . other Americans who were part of 
the espionage apparatus [emphasis mine]" (p. 175). Many 
Americans viewed the Rosenberg affair in the context of 
treason and spying. The press helped to reinforce that 
perception.
One day after the sentence, Leonard Lyons, New York 
Post reporter, wrote: "The Rosenbergs still have a chance 
to save their necks by making full disclosure about their 
spy-ring - for Judge Kaufman . . . has the right to alter 
his death sentence" (p. 175). "A few days later,
[according to the Schneirs] Lyons added: "Their lives . . . 
remain in their own hands - if they talk, they still can 
save themselves" (p. 175). This was the beginning of a 
"theme" that went on until the executions: "confess or 
die" (p. 175).
Most of the American press "unreservedly approved the 
death penalty" (p. 175) . Approving phrases were used such 
as the St. Louis Post Dispatch (1951, April 6, p. 1) calling 
the sentences "completely justified" The Atlanta 
Constitution (1951, April 6, p. 1) stated: "[the] sentencing 
of Ethel and julius Rosenberg to die for stealing atomic 
secrets for transmission to Russia marks the end of our soft 
treatment of those who are disloyal." "Throughout the United 
States during . . . 1951, no publication expressed the view 
that the Rosenbergs . . . might conceivably be innocent"
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(Schneir, p. 176) .'
Solomon Fineberg, author of The Rosenberg Case, admits 
that he once had doubts concerning the Rosenbergs' guilt, 
states in relation to one of Mrs. Sobell's post-sentence 
speeches: "One thing she said . . . that ended all doubt I 
might ever have as to whether her husband and the Rosenbergs 
were members of a conspiracy [was] . Julie and Ethel
could save their own skins by talking, but Julie and Ethel 
will never betray their friends . . Mrs. Sobell 
confirmed my feeling that the Rosenbergs were shielding 
accomplices" (p. 44).
There were, eventually, dissident voices to be heard. 
Lucy Davidowicz (1952) recalls the response of the Left. 
"Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were convicted of atomic 
espionage [sic], and it was thought that our society had 
dealt justly with a case of high treason [emphasis mine]. 
This did not reckon with the Communists who, after a period 
of absolute silence, suddenly discovered that the trial was 
nothing less than part of a nefarious anti-Semitic plot by 
the American government!" (p. 41). Fineberg (1953) 
discusses the Left's position: "American journalists were 
fully cognizant of the tremendous propaganda campaign on 
behalf of the Rosenbergs, for while it raged principally in 
European cities, it kept appearing as well on the doorstep 
of every American newspaper. The appeals of many foreigners 
. . . would have had greater effect on American public
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opinion had those outcries been entirely spontaneous"
(p. viii). "It is paradoxical that had America kept the 
Rosenbergs in 'agonized suspense' for only eighteen months,
. . . scarcely any impression would have been made on 
European public opinion" (Glynn, 1955, p. 503).
The verdict was rendered, the sentence imposed; "from 
this time on, the air was full of appeals . . . Twenty-five 
different points of law were raised by the Rosenberg 
attorneys (see United States v. Rosenberg 195 F 2nd 583 for 
a listing of all the points raised in appeal) in seeking to 
overturn the verdict. The sentence was reviewed and upheld 
seven times by the United States Court of Appeals (see 
Rosenberg v. United states 10 FRD 521, 108 FS 798, 109 FS 
108, 194 F.2nd 583, and 200 F.2nd 666). The case was 
brought to the Supreme Court seven times (see Rosenberg v. 
United States 344 US 850, 344 US 889, 345 US 965, 345 US 
989, 345 US 1003, 346 US 273, and Rosenberg v. Denno). Two 
appeals to the President of the United States were also 
made" (Glynn, 1955, p. 502).
An Appellate Court will not reverse a jury verdict on 
a question of fact . . . The Appellate Court . . . confines 
itself to errors of law . . . The law is the end result of 
logic . . . moral standards . . . prevalent mores, religious 
precepts . . . Therefore, our judicial system is at best an 
approximation of Justice, not an absolute edict" (Nizer, 
1953, pp. 17-19). Therefore, "Do you think the Rosenbergs 
were guilty" is the wrong question and can only result in a
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wrong answer. The question should be: "Do you think there 
was sufficient evidence warranting the jury . . .  to decide 
[they] were guilty?" (p. 19).
The first appeal of the case (195 F 2nd 583) 
effectively ended any real hope of a reversal. Not only 
was there not a single item of substance or procedure 
questioned by the defense ruled upon in their favor, the 
chief appellate judge, Jerome Frank stated: "Since two of 
the defendants must be put to death if the judgment 
stands, we have scrutinized the record with extraordinary 
care to see whether it contains any of the errors asserted 
in the appeal" (Fineberg, 1953, p. 137). The appellate 
judgment was that not a single motion in the appellants' 
petition was granted.
In January 1952, "when the first Rosenberg appeal was 
argued . . . there was small public interest" (Glynn, 1955, 
p. 503). The appeals process was a long and involved one, 
but that constitutes another drama, one beyond the scope of 
this study. It was played in a different scene, with 
different actors, and for a different purpose. The 
execution seems more attached to the appeals drama than to 
the drama described in this study.
Conclusion
The scene described in chapter two of this study, one 
of fear, insecurity, and distrust, which came to be known as
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betrayal, drove the government, through its legal apparatus, 
the agency, to locate, label, arrest, try, and punish 
someone who could satisfy the need of a scapegoat (Burke, 
1950, p. 32). A scapegoat sufficient to embody the evils 
attributed to the scene and a trial in which these evils 
could be driven from the system and smashed was sought 
(p. 32-34). The scapegoats were the Rosenbergs and the 
culminating acts of purification were the death sentences 
(pp. 32).
The act could not have been carried out without the 
agency and the agency would not have succeeded in accom­
plishing the government's goals. There was a symbiotic 
relationship between the act and agency.
The act was chosen by government leaders. The.Justice 
Department was selected as the means to get the Rosenbergs 
to trial. The remaining factor that was needed to sentence 
the Rosenbergs was the agent, the judge who would legitimize 
all the other planning in the case. The next chapter 
presents arguments that suggest Judge Irving R. Kaufman was 
the ideal man for the role as agent; he was the right man at 
the right time.




Britain had no death penalty during the period of the 
atomic spy trials. The twenty year sentence imposed on Alan 
Nunn May was the maximum sentence that could be imposed for 
the crimes that May was charged with.
2
The fourteen year sentence imposed on Klaus Fuchs was 
the maximum sentence that could be imposed for the crimes 
that Fuchs was charges with.
3
This information was obtained from the head legal 
reference librarian, Lance Dickson, at the Hebert Law Center 
at Louisiana State University; Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
4
Based on discussions with trial lawyer, Bernard L. 
Goldstein, who was informally familiar with the Rosenberg 
case.
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Chapter Four
The Agent
The agent, according to Kenneth Burke, "is the person 
or the kind of person who performed the act" (1945, p. xv). 
"Agent" is the name for the kind of actor groups seek to 
carry out significant functions for them. The kind of 
person who is chosen discloses much about the group or 
society making that choice. Those who are barred from 
performing particular roles reveal nearly as much. In the 
Rosenberg event, the style in which the role of agent was 
played and the characteristics of the individual playing 
the role were heavily, although not exclusively, determined 
by the conditions (scene) under which the act took place.
The Rosenberg case scene of national betrayal demanded a 
response. The scene's nature required that the government 
find a symbol of betrayal that could be identified by all 
(p. xiv). This betrayal symbol needed to be purged from 
the American public's consciousness, leaving the country's 
situation cleansed and purified, what Burke calls redemption 
(Burke, 1941) . To accomplish this, a means publicly seen 
as workable and acceptable needed to be found. Most 
government officials believed the U.S. Justice Department
137
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was the government agency most capable of accomplishing 
this symbolic act. The Justice Department appeared strong 
and seemed relatively immune to the numerous slanderous 
attacks made by McCarthy and his followers.
A plan was settled upon to arrest and try Ethel and 
Julius Rosenberg. A conviction, it was hoped, would be the 
symbolic vanquishing of the American betrayal and would 
represent the country's being cleansed and purified, again, 
what Burke calls redemption (Golden, Berquist, & Coleman, 
1983, p. 325). The proper legitimization means, through a 
trial, would restore the authority and integrity of the 
government.
The government sought an able and willing judge to 
preside over such an important and highly publicized case, 
one who could be counted upon to render a verdict at the 
successful conclusion of the case that would justify the 
tremendous security and national image costs and political 
risks taken by the government. According to Burke, social 
conditions are said to demand an actor who fits the scene. 
In a given scene, people do not simply act, but are called 
upon to perform certain actions (Burke, 1945, pp. 3-7) .
Such a jurist, the government believed, was Irving R. 
Kaufman, a judge in the Southern District Federal Court of 
New York. This chapter discusses: (1) how Judge Kaufman's 
upbringing and education made him seem like a positive 
candidate to preside over the Rosenberg case? (2) how his 
private and government legal experiences qualified him for
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the lead part in the Rosenberg case drama; and (3) how 
scholarly authors who have studied the Rosenberg trial 
reported Kaufman's performance as the presiding judge in 
the case. Particular emphases will be placed on those 
aspects that may have contributed, in one way or another, to 
his rendering the death sentences to the Rosenbergs.
Kaufman's Upbringing and Education
Irving Robert Kaufman was born on 24 June 1910 in New 
York City. He was reared in the city and attended public 
elementary and secondary schools. He was a good student and 
graduated from high school at age fifteen (Candee, 1953, 
p. 306; Lehman, 1953, p. 20). The Kaufman family lived 
modestly; Irving's father was a manufacturer of tobacco 
humidifiers (Lehman, p. 84). This pattern of life was to 
remain Kaufman's lifestyle until the present; he still lives 
a relatively modest life in New York.
Kaufman continued his education by entering Fordham 
University, a prestigious Catholic University (Wexley, 1955, 
pp. 249-50). He was the youngest freshman student and he 
graduated number one in his class in only three years. This 
rapid progress in his education is what Wexley calls "the 
foundation" of "Kaufman's whirlwind career" (p. 249).
Attending Fordham was not only a good way of getting a 
quality education but that choice also had social and 
political implications. Wexley points out some of the
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political advantages that could be gained from an education 
at Fordham by "a young Jewish boy."
. . .  at this early age, Kaufman seemed to know what he 
wanted, because for a politically ambitious young man 
there was a considerable advantage in attending . . . 
Fordham in a city dominated by the Tammany machine.
And for someone like Kaufman there was a double 
advantage, because with the vast population of Jewish 
and Catholic voters in New York, choice political posts 
were parceled out more or less in proportion - so many 
to Jews, so many to Catholics and, of course, a 
reasonable few to Protestants (p. 250).
It seems quite likely that Kaufman had astute advice from 
family friends concerning his choice to go to Fordham.
Kaufman excelled academically at Fordham and was also 
noted for his ability to "conform" (p. 250). Wexley takes 
special note of this trait in young Kaufman.
It is worth contemplating this curious phenomenon. As 
the solitary Jew in his class, there were basically two 
courses of conduct open to the young student. The 
natural one would have been to protect oneself with an 
armor, if not in a religious sense, certainly in a 
cultural, traditional sense. With this course, there 
would have been an increase of his feeling of oneness 
with the Jewish people and its history which was 
predominantly a struggle against oppression and 
bigotry. However, we see that he chose rather the more
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practical course - to ingratiate himself as one who was
"different" from the rest (p. 250).
This ability to get along and to be one of the group rather 
than being aloof and isolated may well have contributed to 
his selection to several important and sensitive positions 
in his career.
Attending Fordham also had the advantage of isolating 
Kaufman from liberal student groups which existed in the 
late 1920s. Some of these liberal student groups were later 
discovered to have had affiliations with other Communist or 
Socialist groups or to have had sympathies for Communist or 
Socialist causes. Other groups which were not shown to have 
had any direct connection with Communist or Socialist causes 
were labeled as "suspect" by the House on Un-American 
Activities Subcommittee. Many of those who had innocently 
belonged to these organizations in their youth found their 
American loyalty being questioned by McCarthy and his 
followers in the early 1950s. "Certainly no one can ever 
accuse him [Kaufman] of having been thus contaminated while 
at Fordham" (p. 251) . In pentadic terms, Kaufman acquired 
an appropriate past for his future role (Burke, 1945, 
p. 307).
Upon graduation from the undergraduate program, he 
began his law studies at Fordham's law school. Kaufman 
again excelled at his studies and finished his program in 
accelerated fashion. He completed law school in two years
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and was the class's top student. Kaufman's successful and 
rapid educational advancement and an apparent high personal 
value upon education may have contributed to his mentioning 
the Rosenbergs' having received a "free education" in his 
sentencing speech.
He was just twenty years old and could not take the New 
York bar exam until he was twenty-one. Kaufman imposed on a 
friend to help him with this problem. "Much distressed, he 
urged an attorney friend to petition the New York State 
Court of Appeals to waive the age requirement in his case" 
(p. 251). Chief Justice Cuthbert Pound told Kaufman's 
friend informally, "Tell the young man to slow down a bit.
A few months' wait will do him some good" (p. 251).
From his rapid and highly successful advancement 
through school, it can be inferred that Irving Kaufman was a 
keenly motivated and ambitious man. His ambitions began to 
take particular focus while he was in law school. He "spent 
much of his free time attending trials at the Federal Court­
house just across the way from . . . school." Kaufman 
proudly recalled that: "The first sight of black-robed 
judges stirred me and I resolved to become one" (p. 251). To 
become a judge, Kaufman would have to build a superior legal 
reputation. Australia's Chief Justice, Herbert V. Evatt, in 
a letter ten years earlier to President Franklin Roosevelt, 
outlined his views on the constituents of an exemplary legal 
career. Evatt identified such a career as including a 
social outlook, leadership power, knowledge of the Court's
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history and practice, and the confidence of the legal 
profession (Baker, 1969, p. 203). These qualities, Evatt 
asserted, were necessary in a judicial nominee. It seemed, 
then, that these were the qualities that Kaufman would have 
to acquire in order to be nominated to the bench. Kaufman 
began to look for his first legal position, one in which he 
could begin to build his legal career.
Kaufman felt very close to his family. The "strongest 
influence on his life," Kaufman is quoted as saying, was 
the "understanding, love, and wise guidance" he received 
from his parents (Candee, 1953, p. 306). This sense of 
family importance was to become clear in some of the judge's 
sentencing remarks. Irving Kaufman had three sons when he 
presided over the Rosenberg case. His close family life 
values apparently contributed to a focus upon the relation­
ship between Ethel and Julius Rosenberg and their two young 
sons at the sentencing. Kaufman specifically characterized 
the Rosenberg parents as having "abandoned" their children 
and having "placed them in danger" as a result of their 
illegal activities (Baird, 1952, p. 59). Kaufman's loving 
and positive upbringing, his highly successful education, 
and his political astuteness seemed to portend a bright 
career for the ambitious young lawyer.
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Kaufman's Professional Career 
Positions Held Prior to Becoming a Judge
At age twenty-one, Kaufman passed the New York State 
bar exam and was licensed to practice law (Wexley, p. 251). 
His first legal position was with the firm of a prominent 
New York lawyer, Louis Rosenberg (no relation to Julius 
Rosenberg). There, he became involved in cases in the New 
York State and Appellate courts (Candee, 1953, p. 306). 
Kaufman left the Rosenberg law firm after three years' 
experience.
Kaufman married his previous employer's daughter, whom 
he had met while working with her father. Wexley (1955, p.
252) comments that ". . . h e  made no overt move toward her 
[while employed with her father] lest somebody might think 
he was trying to get in with the boss." Kaufman, it seems, 
had developed a sense of propriety at an early age. As in 
many other areas, he showed an acute understanding of form, 
custom, and appropriateness.
He was offered the position of Special Assistant to the 
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New 
York. This was a prosecutorial position, giving the young 
attorney experience in both sides of courtroom practice.
In this position, Kaufman took part in "a number of well 
publicized prosecutions" (p. 306). This experience with 
publicity in legal matters may well have prepared Kaufman 
for his task as presiding judge in the Rosenberg case which
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received more publicity than any other in Kaufman's long 
career. Within a year at this position, he was given a 
"permanent appointment" as an Assistant United States 
Attorney. Here, Irving Kaufman participated in cases that 
"established novel principles of law" (p. 306) . Irving 
Kaufman's "firm adherence to minutest detail gained him 
prominence" in his work ("Judge former," 1953, p. 9). After 
four years' experience in the prosecutor's office, Kaufman 
returned to private practice in New York City with the 
prosperous and well known firm of Simpson, Brady, Noonan, 
and Kaufman (Candee, p. 306).
Upon his return to private practice, Kaufman had 
defense and prosecutorial experience in State and Appellate 
courts and had evidently done quite well in his work 
considering his acceptance as a partner with a well known 
and lucrative law firm. "Only five years later, before 
Kaufman was thirty-five years old, he was netting more than 
$100,000 annually" (Wexley, 1955, p. 252). Kaufman was, by 
most standards, a highly successful lawyer, but he was also 
ambitious.
In 1947, Kaufman "accepted an appointment as Special 
Assistant to Attorney General Tom Clark who was later to 
be appointed to the United States Supreme Court. There, 
Kaufman was able to gain familiarity with federal law, 
federal cases, and lawyers for the federal government. In 
1948, "Kaufman was made a Government appeal agent" for the
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Selective Service, and through his work in that capacity, 
was awarded a medal for his service (Candee, 1953, p. 306).
Kaufman was a member of the city court committee, the 
committee on criminal courts and procedures, and the 
committee on courts of superior jurisdiction. It is quite 
possible that those committee duties provided Kaufman with 
insights into the appeals process and aided him in his later 
handling of the Rosenberg case in which none of his rulings 
on procedural or substantive matters were overturned. "He 
was also chairman of a bar association subcommittee which 
made recommendations on proposed new Federal criminal rules 
to the Justice Department and to Congress" (p. 306-307).
By this time he had reached a position of considerable 
power in the political machine headed by James Farley.
This particular role was that of "confidential coordinator 
of Federal patronage" (Wexley, p. 252). In this position 
he was part of the nominating process for several key 
federal positions including federal judgeships. Kaufman 
undoubtedly made some prudent and useful friendships while 
in that position.
Kaufman had practiced courtroom law in both the defense 
and prosecutor roles; he had held sensitive, appointive 
positions at the State and Federal levels; and he had gained 
respect and power in political circles all by the age of 
forty. In addition, he had "amassed a personal fortune" (p.
253). But Kaufman believed that the "capstone of a lawyer's 
career was being a judge" (p. 253).
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Kaufman's noteworthy experience in both the prosecut­
orial and defense aspects of the law likely was a positive 
factor in his being considered as a judicial candidate. His 
work with highly influential officials such as Edward P. F. 
Eagan, chairman of the New York Athletic Commission; James 
Farley, later to be named Postmaster General; and Tom Clark, 
who became an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme 
Court probably gave Kaufman an advantage in the selection 
process for judicial candidates. His political visibility 
and recognition surely must have been a positive factor in 
his quest for a judicial appointment.
Kaufman's educational success, his professional 
diligence, and his willingness to assume and perform low 
paying and sensitive government duties rather than being 
satisfied with a high paying, more routine private practice 
showed characteristics that most likely were appealing in a 
judicial candidate. Irving Kaufman's willing and eager 
government work may have led many to believe that he was one 
who would be pro-government as a jurist. The values he had 
publicly shown in his work could lead one to infer that he 
was a sensitive, honest, and hard working man. Oliver Pilat 
(1953, p. 37) characterizes Kaufman's "personal habits" as 
"ruled by an iron discipline." This is another trait many 
people might have believed was requisite for a successful 
judicial nominee.
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Judicial Experience Before the Rosenberg Case
Irving Kaufman was appointed to the bench by President 
Harry S Truman and he took the j-udicial oath of office in 
the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York on 1 November 1949 at the age of thirty-nine.
He was the youngest judge ever appointed to the federal 
bench (Root, 1963, p. 130).
Retired federal judge, Delbert Metzger (1953), wrote: 
"A judge . . . comes to be the product of his environment, 
his education, his experience, and yes, his prejudices"
(p. 21). The judge's evaluation appears consistent with 
this study. Metzger seems to recognize the importance of 
the environment (scene) on a judge (agent). He also cites 
the relationship between education and experience and a 
judge's decision-making as part of the makeup of a jurist. 
As the judge points out, both the external environment, the 
scene, and one's personal makeup, the basic fiber of the 
agent, greatly influence the act that is rendered. As the 
agent must be in keeping with the scene, the act and its 
purpose must be congruent with the social conditions of the 
situation as well (Burke, 1945, pp. 6-7). The court to 
which Irving Kaufman was assigned was one of the United 
States' busiest (Lehman, 1953, p. 84). A judge had to be 
energetic, quick, and self-assured to be successful.
Lawyers and judges who came in contact with Judge 
Kaufman "learned in time that he was a master of law and
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courtroom procedure, a brisk, attentive jurist who made his 
decisions with vigor" (p. 84). Kaufman was known as an 
"active" jurist (Wexley, 1955, p. 251). He did not 
passively preside over a trial but overtly took part in each 
case.
Kaufman was a "devout Jew" (Lehman, 1953, p. 20) but 
his publicly acclaimed experiences at Fordham gave those who 
might have worried that religion would unduly bias his 
decisions reason not to be so concerned. Judge Kaufman, 
although he was comparatively young, began his career as an 
excellently trained, thoroughly experienced, well thought 
of, and highly motivated judge. Kaufman was "recommended 
for the post [as judge] by all the New York bar associations 
and by the State, Federal, and American bar associations" 
(Candee, 1953, p. 307).
Kaufman's initial judicial decision involved an appeal 
by "eleven Communist leaders" to broaden bail jurisdiction 
pending their Smith Act conviction appeals (Candee, p. 307) . 
Kaufman denied the defendants' appeals. This was the first 
in a series of trials and proceedings (judicial decisions 
made without a trial taking place) involving Communists that 
Judge Kaufman was involved with.
Judge Kaufman presided over the trial of Abraham 
Brothman and Miriam Moskowitz. Brothman was accused of 
and convicted for obstruction of justice and Moskowitz was 
accused of and convicted for conspiring with Brothman to 
obstruct justice. These charges were brought in connection
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with Elizabeth Bentley's courtroom testimony relevant to 
espionage in 1947. Irving Saypol, the prosecutor in the 
Rosenberg case, was the prosecutor in the Brothman-Moscowitz 
case. Elizabeth Bentley and Harry Gold, who testified at 
the Rosenberg trial, testified against Brothman and 
Moscowitz (Radosh & Milton, 1983, pp. 153-55). The press, 
which frequently headlined the Rosenberg case as one 
involving "spies" or "treason," even though they were tried 
and convicted of conspiracy charges, had engaged in similar 
headline practices during the Brothman-Moscowitz trial. The 
defendants at that trial were accused and convicted of 
obstruction of justice and related conspiracy charges but 
the press seemed to ignore the actual charges in favor of 
more marketable and sensational headlines. The New York 
Daily News had a banner, "Gold prepares to testify against 2 
in atom spy ring" (1950, November 8, p. 1). On the same 
page was another headline, "Bail cancelled for 2 on trial in 
atom plot." The New York Herald Tribune of 8 November 1950 
announced on its front page, "Two go on trial in atom spy 
case, lose bail . . ." (Schneir & Schneir, 1965, p. 90). 
These headlines were typical of those in major U.S. 
newspapers. Such knowing, repeated misrepresenting of the 
charges in a case may be cause, in today's judicial 
practice, for a mistrial or for a change of venue. This was 
not, it appears, common legal practice in 1950. The matter 
of the press' misrepresenting the charges was not among the
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54 substantive issues raised on appeal in the Rosenberg case 
and no reports have been found that suggest that these 
issues were the basis for an appeal in the Brothman- 
Moscowitz case (108 FS 798). No record has been found that 
suggests Judge Kaufman attempted to chastise or overtly 
correct the press accounts of either the Brothman-Moscowitz 
trial or the Rosenberg, et al. trial. In the sentencing of 
Abraham Brothman and Miriam Moscowitz after their 
convictions, Judge Kaufman, who had stated during the trial that 
the secrecy of documents presented at the trial was "not an 
issue," "now commented that the obstruction of justice, serious 
by itself, was laid in the background of espionage" (Schneir & 
Schneir, 1965, p. 105). Referring to the imposition of sentence 
as "almost a God-like function," Judge Kaufman stated at the 
Brothman-Moscowitz sentencing:
. . . regret that the law under which these defendants 
are to be sentenced is so limited and so restricted 
that I can only pass the sentence which I am going to 
pass, for I consider their offense in this case to be 
of such gross magnitude, [sic] I have no sympathy or 
mercy for these defendants in my heart, none whatsoever 
(p. 105).
Lehnman (1953) claims that Judge Kaufman was assigned 
the Rosenberg case as a result of the court's "routine 
rotation" of cases (p. 84). In none of the many books 
written on the Rosenberg case is such a random selection of 
the presiding judge mentioned. Several factors make the
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contention that this case was assigned in a totally random 
manner somewhat difficult to believe. These factors 
include: (1) the expected notoriety of the Rosenberg case; 
(2) Judge Kaufman's recent experience in related cases 
involving Communist defendants; (3) his recent appointment 
to the court; and (4) his successful working relationship 
with prosecutor Saypol in cases involving Communist 
defendants. It is difficult to believe that the government 
and the Chief Judge of the court would relegate a matter of 
such enormous legal prominence and importance to chance. 
Judge Irving R. Kaufman assumed the role as presiding judge 
in the Rosenberg case having recent courtroom experience 
with some of the witnesses who would testify against the 
Rosenbergs. Some authors have expressed reservations 
concerning the judicial propriety of a judge accepting a 
case in which he has prior contact with witnesses in other 
cases (Goldstein, 1975; Meeropol & Meeropol, 1975; Schneir, 
1983; Wexley, 1955). The canons of law would require a 
judge to excuse himself if there were to be a bench trial 
but not in the case where a jury would evaluate the test­
imony of the witnesses. Judge Kaufman had, on at least two 
occasions, expressed very pro-government sentiments in 
rulings involving Communist defendants. It appeared that 
the government had a talented, experienced, and pro­
government judge to supervise the Rosenberg trial.
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Kaufman's Performance in the Rosenberg Case
In the survey of books written about the Rosenberg 
case, Irving Kaufman's performance as presiding judge in the 
Rosenberg case has been characterized in ways consistent 
with critics' evaluations of the indictments, the trial, and 
the sentences imposed. There are some who took the stand 
that there was a government conspiracy against the 
Rosenbergs (Goldstein, 1975; Meeropol & Meeropol, 1975; 
Schneir, 1983; Wexley, 1955). These authors contend that 
Kaufman's jurist role was a planned part of the conspiracy 
against Ethel and Julius Rosenberg. They accuse the judge 
of behaviors during the trial that adversely affected the 
trial's progress and ultimately its outcome (Goldstein, pp. 
20-21; Meeropol & Meeropol, pp. 79, 182; Schneir, pp. 133, 
143-44, 148-51; Wexley, pp. 221-26, 328-29, 499-501,
538-40). The Rosenbergs' defense attorneys, in numerous 
appeals to appellate courts, made numerous formal references 
to specific judicial behavior in an attempt to secure a 
favorable opinion by an appellate court affirming that Judge 
Kaufman had adversely affected the fairness of their 
clients' trial and to secure a judgment that would vacate 
the verdict and sentence. After repeated attempts to elicit 
such rulings from the courts of review, it was. the unanimous 
judgment by all appellate panels involved in the issue that 
there were insufficient grounds for such appeals (Rosenberg, 
et al. v. United States 344 U.S. 850; 344 U.S. 889; 345 U.S.
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965; 345 U.S. 989; 345 U.S. 1003; 346 U.S. 273; United 
States v. Rosenberg 10 FRD 521; 108 FS 798; 109 FS 108; 195 
F 2nd 583; 200 F 2nd 666; Rosenberg, et al. v. Denno 346 
U.S. 1152). None of the reviewing panels found any palpable 
errors in the judicial discretions Kaufman exercised during 
the trial or in the sentencing of the Rosenbergs (Root,
1963, p. 290). Jerome Frank, Judge of the United States 
Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit, wrote in his opinion in the 
Rosenberg appeal of 25 February 1952:
. . . Defendants, however, tell us that the trial judge 
behaved himself so improperly as to deprive them of a 
fair trial. Defendants' counsel . . . said-that the 
judge's alleged fault had been "inadvertant," and that 
the judge had "been extremely courteous to us and 
afforded us lawyers every privilege that a lawyer 
should expect in a case." . . . Counsel for the 
Rosenbergs, summing up for the jury, stated that "we 
feel the trial has been conducted . . . with that 
dignity and that decorum that befits an American 
trial." These remarks, by a highly competent and 
experienced lawyer, are not compatible with the 
complaints now made. We think the judge stayed well 
inside the discretion allowed him (195 F 2nd 583).
Judge Kaufman was seen by many as a merciful agent in that 
his role and the style in which he played it was honored by 
his peers. His behavior was really a "tribal symbol" of how 
an honorable trial should be conducted under difficult
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conditions (Bailey, 1984). Sylvester Ryan, Judge of the 
United States District Court of New York, wrote in his 10 
December 1952 opinion: "I find no evidence to support the 
claim that the trial proceeded under conditions which 
deprived the petitioners of the opportunity for a fair trial 
before an impartial jury" (108 FS 798) .
It must be pointed out that the positive remarks about 
Judge Kaufman's judicial conduct made by the defense lawyers 
at the time of the closing remarks were likely made in an 
effort to win a more lenient sentence for their clients in 
the event that they were found guilty by the jury. This 
strategy by the defense attorneys had, it turned out, a 
double edge, for in the appellate petitions where the 
defense wanted to claim that the judge had not behaved in 
exemplary manner, the appeals panels suggested that their 
claims were hypocritical and thus had less weight.
One account of the case, The Rosenberg File, by Radosh 
and Milton (1983) claims to have taken a "neutral stance" on 
the issue of judicial conduct and to have examined the 
Rosenberg case objectively and comprehensively (p. x). This 
is the stance the authors take at the start of their book. 
However, by the end of the volume, the authors admitted they 
were initially strong believers in the conspiracy theory and 
that as the result of research, they had become believers in 
the position that justice had been properly carried out (pp. 
450-54). The authors come to the conclusion that Kaufman
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obeyed the letter of the law but that he too frequently 
exercised his judicial discretions to the advantage of the 
prosecution's case (p. xiii).
Fineberg (1953), Nizer (1973), Pilat (1952), and Root 
(1963) take more pronounced pro-government stances in their 
books on Kaufman's handling of the Rosenberg case. Nizer 
argues that a judge needs to be fairer to the jury than 
to the litigants since it is they, the jury, who must gain 
necessary insight in order to render a just verdict. Nizer 
contends that this is what Kaufman strove to accomplish with 
his rulings (Nizer, pp. 161-67). Nizer also found the fact 
that no appeals panel had found significant error even 
though the case had gone through more judicial review than 
any other case in history compelling. Nizer (pp. 221-223) 
and Radosh and Milton (p. 287) stress that Judge Kaufman was 
meticulous in his courtroom preparation. They suggest that 
his preparation was greatly responsible for the lack of 
reversals on appeal. Jurors also evaluated the judge's 
performance in court. "As for Judge Kaufman's conduct of 
the trial, most of the jurors . . . had nothing but praise" 
(Radosh & Milton, p. 273).
Admirers and detractors alike seem to focus on Judge 
Kaufman's active role in the trial. Alexander Bloch had 
made a motion for a mistrial at the conclusion of the trial 
stating: "Kaufman's frequent interruptions to interrogate 
witnesses personally had virtually made it impossible for 
the defendants to receive a fair trial" (p. 267). The
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appellate courts did not concur with that interpretation of 
Kaufman's active role as a jurist (195 F 2nd 583; 108 FS 
798; 109 FS 108; 200 F 2nd 666).. Retired United States 
Supreme Court Associate Justice, Potter Stewart, commented 
on judges being active in a trial. He argued on the PBS 
television series, The Constitution; That Delicate Balance, 
that a trial judge's task is not limited to acting as a 
referee, but includes guiding and pushing, when necessary, 
those involved towards truth and justice. Justice Stewart 
also claimed the more difficult the case, the greater will 
be the the role of the trial judge. It would seem, by 
Justice Stewart's arguments, that he would approve of, in 
principle, the active role taken by Judge Irving Kaufman in 
the Rosenberg trial.
Irving Kaufman, it would appear, took his role as a 
presiding judge and of imposing sentences very seriously.
He also seems to have been a man of passion and humanity 
despite some of his harsh sentences meted out to various 
defendants. Following are some of the judge's specific 
behaviors that exemplify the traits of passion and humanity.
After the jury in the Rosenberg case reached its 
verdict, Kaufman set aside a full week for deliberation and 
study before rendering his decision on the sentence for the 
Rosenbergs (Root, 1963, p. 216). Kaufman studied the court 
transcript and "probed the issues of the case" (Lehman,
1953, p. 84). There were "three chief considerations" in
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deciding the sentences to be imposed. Lehman cites an 
unspecified "later opinion" of Kaufman's as the source of 
three reasons (p. 84). They were: (1) The law itself 
embodied in the 1917 Espionage Act (50 U.S.C. 31-32). The 
law gave the judge the following discretion: a sentence of 
not more than 30 years in prison [a person so sentenced 
could be paroled in ten years under 1951 practice] or death 
(50 U.S.C. 32); (2) The "magnitude of the crime" (Lehman, p. 
84). This consideration was, in great part, a matter of 
personal interpretation by the judge; (3) The "interest of 
the parties to the trial." The parties to the trial were 
the defendants and the United States. The "United States" 
as it was explicitly and implicitly referred to by the judge 
in his sentencing speech were the people of America and the 
institution of government in the U.S. (Baird, 1952). Judge 
Kaufman's reflections on the fairness to all parties to the 
case are shown by the following passage: "A judge must be 
merciful to the individual, given any reason for mercy. He 
is also bound to protect the large, sometimes vague and 
always vital rights of society. What sentence would be just 
and also provide the maximum deterrent effect against such 
crimes in the future?" (p. 84). Kaufman is reported to have 
gone to his synagogue several times during his week of 
deliberations. His temple visits illustrate his exquisite 
sense of form. America believes in the forensic struggle of 
the courts, the piety of formal religion, and the gestures 
of mercy. Kaufman thus represented the ideals of American
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justice. The agent was embodied by the great institution. 
The judge was said to be "still deliberating and bent over 
the transcript after his family .went to sleep" (p. 84). It 
appears the judge deliberated many long hours and from the 
many descriptions of his courtroom appearance on the morning 
of sentencing, was very tired and solemn looking. His 
deliberations apparently were exhausting.
Mrs. Tesse Greenglass, the mother of David Greenglass 
and Ethel Rosenberg, requested permission to see the judge 
on the day prior to the scheduled sentencing. "An older 
judge, hearing of his intention, stopped him in the court­
house elevator and put an arm around Kaufman's shoulder. 
'Don't do it, Irving,' he said; 'You're just putting your­
self through a wringer" Kaufman replied, "She's entitled to 
see me" (p. 84). Kaufman met with Mrs. Greenglass in his 
private chambers where she reportedly pleaded for the lives 
of her two children. On Christmas eve, 1952, Kaufman met 
with Julius Rosenberg's family in his chambers. They, too, 
pleaded for their child's life (p. 86).
Rabbi Emanuel Rackman, a man who fiercely opposed the 
Rosenberg death sentences although he believed the two 
to be guilty of the offenses for which they were tried, was 
asked by Kaufman to meet with him and did so. Rackman had 
this to say about Kaufman after his meeting: "I had the 
feeling that Judge Kaufman had really suffered" (p. 86). He 
characterized Kaufman's mood as sombre and his burden great
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in search for a just answer. The rabbi said that he may not 
agree with the judge's decisions, but he knew that the 
decision was reached in good faith.
Judge Irving Kaufman endured many angry and vicious 
letters, phone calls, and media attacks. He received a 
number of death threats and on at least two occasions bombs 
were discovered near his home and his office. His home and 
office were constantly under security protection after these 
discoveries. Security for the judge was maintained long 
after the executions in fear that his life was still in 
danger. Kaufman seemed philosophical relevant to these 
intrusions on his life. He said, "There's never been 
pressure like this in our courts. It's more than that; it's 
closer to terror. But the courts must withstand such things 
or we would close the doors to justice and government"
(p. 91).
The judge made a last minute change in the Rosenberg 
executions on their last day. They had been set to die in 
the electric chair late in the evening on 19 June 1953. In 
deference to the Jewish Sabbath, Kaufman moved the time of 
the executions to an hour before sundown, the beginning of 
the sabbath. This was done even though neither Ethel nor 
Julius Rosenberg openly practiced an active faith. This act 
demonstrated that the judge had a sense of sensitivity for 
the Jewish community's needs.
Judge Irving Kaufman has been portrayed by a vocal 
minority as a jurist who entered into a conspiracy against
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the Rosenbergs as part of a larger conspiracy by the U.S. 
government against the Left. Many of the Left who believed 
this accusation maintained that -there was insufficient bases 
for believing the Rosenbergs guilty of the offenses they 
were convicted for. After the trial, most Americans 
believed the judge acted properly in the Rosenberg case and 
that there was no conspiracy at all. The appellate courts 
vindicated claims that were made concerning improper court­
room conduct by the judge. Later in his career, Judge 
Kaufman's work was recognized and he was nominated to the 
United States Court of Appeals and subsequently he was 
selected by his peers as the chief Judge until his retire­
ment from the bench in the summer of 1987. Judge Kaufman 
has exhibited behaviors usually associated with a dedicated, 
hard working, and compassionate man. President Ronald 
Reagan awarded Judge Kaufman the Medal of Freedom upon his 
retirement as a respected jurist.
Conclusion
Kaufman's preparation for his career began with the 
loving upbringing by his parents. Irving, as a child, had 
received wise guidance and he was aided in making decisions 
consistent with positive career development. Irving was an 
exemplary student in all levels of his schooling. He 
exhibited personal traits of hard work, propriety, and 
ambition. Kaufman excelled at his varied legal positions
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and earned his appointment to the bench. He assumed the 
duties of presiding judge in the Rosenberg case as a well 
prepared jurist and handled the job in a way that was not 
reversed on a single issue at the appellate level.
Those who saw the death sentence imposed on the 
Rosenbergs (act) as a logical and acceptable culmination of 
the use of the U.S. Justice Department (agency) to find a 
symbolic way to cleanse the climate of fear, anxiety, and 
betrayal (scene), likely saw Judge Kaufman as an appropriate 
agent. On the other hand, those who objected to the scene 
being defined as betrayal, the U.S. Justice Department being 
used to cleanse America of some of her most pressing 
symbolic problems, or the act of death sentences probably 
identified Judge Kaufman as a conspiratorial agent.
This study has argued that the the scene is dominant 
over the other pentadic elements, act, agency, and agent.
The agent's record is one demonstrating a cooperative relat­
ionship with the agency and one perceived be in agreement 
with the government's wishes vis-a-vis the sentence. The 
next chapter argues that various parties to the Rosenberg 
case, namely, the judge, the government, and the defendants 
themselves, had competing explanations of the sentences that 
were imposed. The reasons given for the death sentences are 
the purposes.
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The Purpose
The purpose, as posited by Burke (1945, p. xv), is an 
answer to the question "why." "Purpose is belief in certain 
values as necessary to community survival. . . . Values, 
ends, purposes may be described either as pasts or futures. 
Man lives under immanent symbols, the symbols of promise of 
things to come" (Duncan, 1962, p. 434). The varied purposes 
offered for the Rosenberg death sentences reflected values 
that were underlying these reasons. "Even rationalists 
assume an 'ideal' act to be an ultimate social good. None 
of these ideal ends can be proved, but their immanence 
invests action with meanings because they organize the act 
in a present" (p. 434) . Opposing partisans invoked their 
ideals of the past believing they would help shape the 
present and the future, The past "helps us to act in a 
present" (p. 434). The purpose becomes a justification 
for the act. Acts which do not achieve national consensus 
require an explanation. Such explanations usually address 
the actors' legitimacy and offer their followers a sense of 
symbolic identity (Preez, 1980, pp. 86-87). Hamlin and 
Nichols (1973) refer to the purpose as "any phrase that
163
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refers to the function fulfilled by an agency, agent, scene, 
or act" (p. 98). These "phrases" may be formed during the 
event or may come after the event is played out. In the 
Rosenberg case, there are many questions that an inquiry of 
"why" might address. Previous chapters in this study have 
addressed some of these questions: (1) the scene and why it 
was defined as it was, as betrayal; (2) the agency and why 
it, rather than other means, was chosen in an attempt to 
cleanse the nation of its many symbolic problems; (3) the 
act and why it was anticipated by the Department of Justice 
to be successful in changing American political perceptions 
and public opinion and (4) the agent and why he, among many 
other eligible judges, was chosen to manage and control the 
trial and to ultimately impose the sentences. This chapter 
examines the question "why" as it explains the reasons 
behind the death sentences. Why were the death sentences 
imposed upon Ethel and Julius Rosenberg? The answer may 
tell us a great deal about America's conception of itself as 
a community of destiny in 1951.
The reasons why given actions take place are sometimes 
unfocused in the actor's consciousness and the reasons are 
not always understood by observers either (Luft, 1970,
(p. 11). Actions and their antecedents frequently take 
focus long after events have transpired allowing critics the 
opportunity to place events in context. There are often 
many critics engaged in a large hermeneutic struggle over 
events and their meanings, but an official version usually
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comes to prevail. This frequently allows the consequences 
of such events to help shape the definition and importance 
of these actions (Grob & Billias, 1982c, viii). Such seems 
to have been the case with the Rosenberg affair. Many of 
the reasons for Rosenberg case events were not clearly 
explained by either the press or government spokesmen at the 
time of those activities. Several events in the case were 
not scrutinized until several years after the case's legal 
resolution. Some of the more thorough case examinations 
occurred after scholars were allowed information access by 
the U.S. government due to the Freedom of Information Act. 
These more enlightened views of the case did not begin until 
many years after the case was officially closed (Goldstein, 
1975; Meeropol & Meeropol, 1975; Nizer, 1973; Radosh & 
Milton, 1983; and Schneir & Schneir, 1983).
Very little in-depth writing was done concerning the 
Rosenberg case at the time it was unfolding. This was 
probably due, in part, to McCarthy era effects as well as 
to a paucity of scholarly information. Soon after the trial 
was over, the American public was presented with pro­
government versions of the Rosenberg case. There also were 
interpretations of the case that seemed to contradict many 
of the pro-government advocates' claims. Several newspapers 
and magazines were afforded access to cooperative government 
spokesmen who supplied journalists enough data to make a 
good case for the government (Johnson, 1951a, b, c, d;
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Kilgallen, 1952; Lehman, 1953; Pilat, 1953). There were 
some Socialists and Communists who tried to promote versions 
sympathetic to their cause in verbal form (Radosh & Milton, 
1983, pp. 326-30), in scholarly journals (Dawidowicz, 1952; 
Glynn, 1955), and in magazines of a traditional Left 
orientation (The Daily Worker, National Guardian, Jewish 
Life), but the average American rarely had contact with 
these channels of communication. It was not until after the 
official U.S. government declassification of much of the 
material relevant to the Rosenberg case that truly incisive 
examinations of the various alleged purposes were undertaken. 
The personal justifications of many who actually made vital 
decisions in the case are, for the most part, lost. Defense 
lawyers, Alexander Bloch and Emanuel Bloch; prosecution team 
members, Roy Cohen and Irving Saypol; and Rosenberg trial 
witnesses, Elizabeth Bentley and Harry Gold, are deceased.
The presiding judge in the case is still alive but he has 
chosen not to discuss the case and he has not made his notes 
available to scholars. David and Ruth Greenglass and Morton 
Sobell have not provided scholars with any new written or 
oral materials that might shed new light upon the events 
that led to the death sentences imposed upon Ethel and 
Julius Rosenberg.
In order to avoid unnecessary categorization, groups 
and individuals who were pro-Rosenberg and/or anti-govern­
ment in their perspectives will be referred to as "anti­
establishment;" and groups and individuals who were anti-
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Rosenberg and/or pro-government in their perspective will be 
referred to as "pro-establishment." Since almost all the 
literature on the Rosenberg case omits any reference to 
critics who claimed to be neutral on the subject of the 
Rosenberg sentence and since the criticism of the sentence 
seems to occur in a dichotomy with elements differing only 
in degree, this polar nomenclature seems appropriate for 
this segment of the study.
This chapter examines how scholars have argued relevant 
to a justification of the Rosenberg death sentences. The 
discussion is divided into three segments: (1) a survey of 
claims offered for consideration by those labeled as "anti­
establishment"; especially arguments put forth favoring the 
"conspiracy" hypothesis which argues the Rosenbergs were 
government plot victims; (2) a review of arguments forwarded 
by those labeled as pro-establishment; and (3) an analysis 
of recent Rosenberg case investigations undertaken after the 
release of heretofore unavailable information. These most 
recent studies tend to take a less polar view of the events 
that led to the death sentences. This study takes the 
position that some of this more recent Rosenberg case 
scholarship lends itself to a better understanding of the 
reasons for events in the Rosenberg case.
Anti-Establishment Interpretations of Purpose
The stances taken by those who argued the position that
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the government was wrong in the sentencing of the Rosenbergs 
varied widely. The most extreme supporters of the anti­
establishment case offered a scenario that suggested a well 
planned plot against Ethel and Julius Rosenberg. According 
to these supporters, the Rosenbergs were not only innocent 
of any wrongdoing, but they were "a humble and obscure 
couple whose souls were as pure as their executioners were 
vile" (Radosh & Milton, 1983, pp. 420-21). Radosh and 
Milton also cite an undated Daily Worker article describing 
the Rosenberg executions as "a brutal act of fascist 
violence." These same authors also quote Gus Hall, the head 
of the American Communist Party [in the 1950s] as naming the 
Rosenbergs "the sacred couple" (p. 421). From these 
writings concerning the executions, it seems clear that the 
sentiments raised by these extremely anti-government 
proponents also apply to the sentence itself. Those who 
have advocated an extreme pro-Rosenberg interpretation of 
reality have generally not separated the sentencing and the 
execution as distinctly as some critics who have taken a 
less extreme position.
The Rosenberg sons have staunchly insisted their parents 
were victims of a conspiracy designed to convict Ethel and 
Julius Rosenberg on purely political grounds. They charge 
that "the government had moved against their parents in 
order to discredit radicalism and shore up support for the 
Cold War" (Meeropol & Meeropol, 1975). Alvin Goldstein, in 
his book, The Unquiet Death of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg,
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echoed the Meeropols' sentiments. Goldstein asserts that 
the whole case was a U.S. government political maneuver 
against the Left. The Goldstein book introduction, written 
by Nat Hentoff, argued: "The government, knowing the 
Rosenbergs were innocent, proceeded with the trial in order 
to reassure a worried public that it was being protected 
against spies and saboteurs and to repress dissent" (pp. 
1-4). The Rosenberg case was, according to Hentoff, "a 
grimly classic illustration of governmental cover-up, a 
pattern of governmental deception . . . "  (p. 4).
Walter and Miriam Schneir also voiced the opinion in 
their book, Invitation To An Inquest (1953, 1983), that the 
Rosenbergs were totally innocent of all wrongdoing. The 
Meeropols stated in their book, We Are Your Sons (1975, 
1986) , that the Schneirs had written the most complete and 
authoritative book about their parents' ordeals (pp. iii). 
Shapiro (1984) cites negative jounalistic criticism of the 
Schneirs' work:
George Will wrote that The Rosenberg File [Radosh & 
Milton, 1983] had demolished all attempts to prove the 
Rosenbergs' innocent and had obliterated the Schneirs' 
Invitation To An Inquest. The American Spectator 
claimed The Rosenberg File had reduced the Schneirs to 
"performing seals in defending the implausible." "No 
honest person. . Glazer wrote, "could any longer 
believe that the Rosenbergs had been framed by the
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American Government" (p. 13).
The Schneirs contend that "the decision to execute the 
Rosenbergs was made at the very highest levels of government 
and with full knowledge of all the facts [my emphasis]" 
(Rabinowitz, 1967, p. 72). If someone had all the facts and 
had full knowledge of the Rosenberg affair, it seems 
incredible that some probing investigative journalist has 
not uncovered these facts or that some bureaucrat who was in 
the government at the time would not have sought to gain 
attention by revealing these facts.
One line of argument offered in an effort to discredit 
the Rosenberg death sentences was that Judge Kaufman had 
determined the sentences before the trial. Excerpts from 
Gordon Deans's diary were offered as evidence of the judge's 
premature decision: "He talked to the judge . . . the judge 
agreed to impose the death sentence if the evidence warrants 
it" (Meeropol & Meeropol, 1985, p. 368). This diary excerpt 
from a minor Justice Department official did not provide 
clear evidence that the reference to "the judge" actually 
refers to Kaufman. There seems ample reason to believe that 
the judge may have been screened by the Justice Department 
prior to the trial in relation to his predisposition to the 
death penalty. This brief diary quote has been amplified 
and interpreted by Rosenberg defenders as having definitive 
meaning and possessing indictable character. This matter 
was raised in appeal and was not determined to have merit in 
court. The Meeropols openly admit in the second edition of
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their book that their own lawyer severely criticized this 
line of reasoning. Morton Sobell, a co-defendant in the 
Rosenberg trial, is quoted as having warned of the folly of 
such statements (pp. 369-70). Michael Meeropol publicly 
called Judge Kaufman a "murderer" and brags in his book that 
he "sidestepped the question" when a reporter asked him to 
verify his statement the next day (p. 369). It would seem 
that if Meeropol made such a statement in total seriousness, 
he would have the courage and show the honesty to admit it. 
If, on the other hand, the statement was made flippantly, 
his audience surely has justifiable reason to question the 
sincerity of his other claims.
Another assertion that the Meeropols (1986) make is 
"for the most part, the media has been extremely reluctant 
to go digging around to either confirm or refute the 
implications" of their version of events that occurred in 
the early 1950s (p. 384). This position taken by the 
Meeropols becomes very tenuous when compared side-by-side 
with the active press probings in the John F. Kennedy,
Robert F. Kennedy, and Martin Luther King, Jr. assassina­
tions; the energetic media scrutiny of the Mei Lai massacre 
in Viet Nam; and the thorough examination of reporters in 
the Watergate affair. To imply that the press "for the most 
part" is unwilling to pursue a very promising story and is 
lazy does not appear to conform with most Americans' beliefs 
about the media.
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These were the most extreme arguments forwarded in an 
effort to explain why the Rosenberg death sentences were 
imposed. There were other anti-establishment positions 
taken that seemed much more reasonable and which, if they 
had formed the consensus of dissenting opinion, possibly 
could have inspired some healthy debate over several issues 
germane to the Rosenberg case. Extremist positions voiced 
by the Meeropols, the Schneirs, Goldstein, and others could 
have frightened some people who may have had some serious 
doubts about the case. This fear could have inhibited them 
from expressing their uncertainties. The fear of guilt by 
association was probably strong (King, 1987, p. 28).
Some of the less strident, more reasonable claims made 
on behalf of the Rosenbergs questioned the death sentences 
more than they addressed the Rosenbergs' guilt. Much of the 
moderate anti-establishment rhetoric tended to be ignored 
due, in part, to many wild claims made by the extremists.
The most frequent objection raised by the moderate 
anti-establishment spokesmen was that much of the evidence 
presented against the Rosenbergs was false. Schneir and 
Schneir (1965) raise this issue often. They maintain that 
Harry Gold's credibility was questionable. They cite his 
earlier testimony in the Brothman case as an example of why 
he should not have been believed in the Rosenberg trial (pp. 
135-38). "At the [Rosenberg] trial he was not cross- 
examined and counsel for the Rosenbergs told the jury 'he 
told the truth'" (Rabinowitz, 1967, p. 70). The prosecution
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offered in evidence a photostatic copy of the Hilton Hotel 
registration card in support of the allegation that Harry 
Gold had been to see David Greenglass on a specified day 
The defense claimed after the trial that the card was a 
fake and that there was F.B.I. complicity in the forgery. 
(Schneir & Schneir, pp. 114-15). "The defense raised no 
objections and expressly conceded the authenticity of the 
card" (Rabinowitz, p. 71). Radosh and Milton (1983),
Schneir & Schneir (1965), and Wexley (1955) cite various 
other instances where the Rosenbergs' attorneys (1) tendered 
ostensibly unwise concessions to the prosecution, (2) failed 
to thoroughly investigate various matters, and (3) made 
harmful blunders on behalf of their clients. Since the 
matter of incompetent counsel was never brought to the 
attention of an appellate panel either by the defendants or 
by amicus curiae, no determination of counsel's competence 
was ever made in judicial review. It appears unfair to 
criticize the jury for its verdict or the judge for his 
sentence based upon the poor judgments of defense counsel.
Moderate anti-establishment advocates explained the 
Rosenberg fates from an essentially symbolic interactionist 
perspective. They argued that the couple's actions had been 
assimilated to the prevailing symbology of post-war demon- 
ology. The moderates, too, recognized that reality can be 
symbolically created and they sought to present alternative 
symbols that would be accepted and understood by the public.
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The moderates tended to see the extremists as accepting the 
Rosenberg case as reality; a situation unalterable except 
by protest. Weinstein (1972) saw the Rosenberg case in 
symbolic terms. He describes the case as follows:
Almost from the moment the "facts" emerged in [the] 
case [it] congealed, first into partisan accounts and 
then into minor mythologies, in which [the case] became 
the subject-matter for a simple morality tale. . . . 
Julius and Ethel Rosenberg . . . achieved, in their own 
time, the status of icons in the demonologies and 
hagiographies of the opposing camp (p. 165).
For the ardent supporters of the Rosenbergs as well as for 
the strong supporters of the government's actions, the 
Rosenberg case took on an almost religious fervor, an act of 
faith rather than an examination of facts and needs. At the 
trial, "prosecutor Irving Saypol and Judge Irving Kaufman 
clearly indicated their beliefs in the demonic nature of 
this alleged espionage" (p. 170). Statements attributed to 
the Rosenbergs and their offenses such as "monstrous crime," 
"your actions 'dwarfed' the crime of murder," ". . . a  
diabolical conspiracy to destroy a God-fearing nation", and 
the description of the Rosenbergs as "monstrous spies" are 
examples of statements made by the prosecutor and the judge. 
These certainly fit the demonology criterion asserted by 
Weinstein. Other symbolic representations of the Rosenbergs 
were presented. Leslie Fiedler and Robert Warshow, two anti­
communist intellectuals claim the Rosenbergs "became icons
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of deceit" (p. 171). Father Charles Rice also saw the case 
as highly symbolic and it seems he saw the scene in much the 
same way as this study has defined it. Father Rice claims 
that "we were looking for scapegoats" and that people saw 
the Rosenbergs as betrayers" (Parrish, 1977, p. 806).
The anti-establishment moderates seemed concerned that 
the system of justice had not remained totally isolated from 
the scene. They appeared to believe in the mythology that 
"justice is blind" and to demand that the lawyers and judge 
refrain from connecting the Rosenberg case to the world 
around them. This idealistic viewpoint tends to ignore two 
basic facts: (1) lawyers and judges are men and women them­
selves who live within the society they serve; and (2) the
American system of justice "is not separate from the people;
1
it is for the people that justice functions."
In hindsight, it is likely that some of the decisions 
made by the Rosenbergs' attorneys were not always in their 
clients' best interests. However, the Rosenbergs themselves 
acted in ways that were equally or more detrimental to their 
case. There were instances in which the mainstream media 
appeared to act irresponsibly. There were also instances 
where flagrant errors of judgement seemed to be made by 
the Left press. There appeared to be a definite domination 
on the case by the scene. The rules of evidence, venue 
decisions and appellate reviews are designed to mitigate 
many of the intrusions of the scene upon the courtroom. The
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moderates seemed to be attempting to gain extra safeguards 
within the system for the Rosenbergs while the extremists 
seemed to be damning the entire system. The public may have 
become alarmed over some extremist positions and reflex- 
ively ignored the moderates' positions for fear that such 
positions could be seen as an invitation to the extremists 
to continue more attacks.
Retired U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice William 0. 
Douglas (1980) wrote in his book a very incriminating view 
of Emanuel Bloch's role in the Rosenberg defense:
Bloch filed a brief against vacating my stay though 
even then he did not rest on the key point made by Fyke 
Farmer. My own impression was that Bloch never raised 
the point because the Communist consensus of that day 
was that it was best for the cause that the Rosenbergs 
pay the extreme price. That is a harsh thought, but it 
must be remembered that Stalin was still in power (pp. 
79-80) .
Radosh and Milton (1983) argue that "Douglas . . . would 
have been the last to frivolously accuse anyone of being a 
dupe of Stalin" (p. 407). Radosh and Milton further claim 
that they give credence to "the belief that Emanuel Bloch 
preferred to see his clients dead rather than have them 
saved" (p. 407). These representations of Bloch certainly 
question whether the Rosenbergs truly received a thorough, 
honest defense. These questions do raise possible general 
doubts about the death sentence, but not about Kaufman's
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carrying out his judicial duties in this 1951 case. It is 
not the presiding judge's duty to determine a sentence 
based upon an evaluation of the defendants' defense; it is 
his duty to base the sentence upon the severity of the crime 
and the needs of the society he has sworn to protect. It is 
the duty of the appellate panels to determine if relief due 
to counsel's skills or decorum is appropriate.
Not all of the anti-establishment appeals were germane 
to the case. Wexley (1955) made ad hominem attacks on 
Judge Kaufman in an effort to sway his audience. Wexley 
comments on the judge's frequent use of patriotic symbols 
in his sentencing speech. Wexley then argues that "There 
is no mention in any of the biographical material of any 
civilian contribution to the war effort by this highly 
successful young attorney who prospered so greatly in his 
private practice during the war years" (p. 252). Wexley 
also asserts "in view of Kaufman's attitude of superpatriot­
ism during his sentencing of the Rosenbergs, one cannot help 
suspecting his motives somewhat" (p. 252n). Kaufman's 
patriotism is easily defended by citing his award of the 
Selective Service Medal for civilian government work. Ad 
hominem attacks such as these often have the effect of 
solidifying support for the person attacked.
In addition to the partisan positions taken by the 
anti-establishment supporters, there also were vocal pro­
establishment position presented.
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Pro-Establishment Interpretations of Purpose
Agreement with the government's case, ranging from un­
qualified acceptance by some to -minimal acceptance by 
others, gave rise to a variety of purported reasons for the 
imposition of the Rosenberg death sentences. Fewer pro­
establishment scholars appear to have taken public stances 
on the Rosenberg case, especially in the print media. This 
disparity may have been caused, in part, by a presumption of 
the government's case. Another reasonable explanation for 
the less frequent press arguments forwarded by the pro­
establishment proponents is that they likely had easier, 
more frequent, and broader access to other channels of 
public contact. The anti-establishment advocates were in 
the minority and therefore had to counter the presumption of 
the government's positions.
There were a few in the pro-establishment circle that 
took the position that there was no doubt at all as to the 
correctness of the sentence ("It Could Never Happen," 1953, 
pp. 32-33). Here it was stated, "No doubt the Rosenbergs 
spied" (p. 32). The sentence was reviewed many times by the 
appellate courts, the U.S. Supreme Court, and by two U.S. 
Presidents. None of these reviews suggested any serious 
doubts as to the verdict or the sentence (pp. 32-33). Louis 
Nizer, a respected trial lawyer, "remained convinced of the 
Rosenbergs' treachery and [found] nothing to question in 
either the trial or the subsequent legal efforts to overturn
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the convictions" (Parrish, 1977, p. 806). Nizer personally 
"deplored the death sentences but found the evidence against 
the Rosenbergs overwhelming" (p.. 806) . Beir and Sand 
(1954) , Fiedler (1955), Nizer (1973), and Serino (1954) all 
concurred that every legal safeguard available was afforded 
the Rosenbergs and that Judge Kaufman's sentence came as a 
result of the judge's understanding of the trial testimony 
and his judgment of the appropriate sanction for the 
offenses the Rosenbergs were found guilty of.
The editors of the Columbia Law Review (1954) argue 
that the death sentence must "shock the sensibilities of 
men" Weems v United States, 217 U.S. 349, 375 (1910) or 
"offend a principle of justice rooted in the tradition of 
conscience of our people" Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 
(1947). These tests, according to the Columbia Law Review, 
were applied and found to be applicable in the Rosenberg 
case (p. 240, 240n).
Weinstein (1972) argues, "Certainly the government's 
charges against the pair, whom it considered 'arch­
traitors,' could not have been more overwhelming" (p. 170). 
Rabinowitz (1967) and Zinn (1980) seemed to see the jury's 
verdict as just and, as Weinstein did, they failed to 
make any evaluation of the sentencing. Those who strongly 
agreed with the sentence tended to view the sentence as a 
"natural" extension of the verdict. Those who expressed 
reservations concerning the sentence tended to interpret the
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omitted support for the sentence as implicit non-support.
Some Rosenberg affair scholars have focused exclusively 
upon the sentencing, not addressing the issue of the trial 
at all. It may be, in these instances, that these scholars 
accept, or at least do not refute, the verdict in the case. 
One of the most frequent objections to the death sentence 
for Ethel and Julius Rosenberg found in the literature is 
that others got off with far less stringent sentences. In 
It Could Never Happen In Russia, the argument is made: "The 
difference between the Rosenbergs and the other offenders 
was that the others testified for the state, told their 
stories in open court, and helped to corral other spies who 
might be loose. The Rosenbergs, denying that they knew 
anything to tell, turned down every offer for a mitigation 
of their sentence" (p. 32).
Radosh and Milton (1983), Root (1963), Schneir and 
Schneir (1983), and Wexley (1955) discuss the government's 
offer of sentence reduction if the Rosenbergs would confess 
their deeds and supply government agents the names of other 
spies. Radosh and Milton maintain that the government had 
agents inside the walls of the execution house up to the 
actual executions (pp. 416-17).
One argument concerning the offers allegedly made to 
the Rosenbergs vis-a-vis commutation of their sentence was 
that the government was willing to be "generous" in response 
to their confessions and help (Radosh & Milton, 1983, pp. 
285-90). Another interpretation of the government's posi­
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tion is that they really did not intend to execute Ethel and 
Julius Rosenberg but government officials believed that such 
a severe sentence would scare them into confessing and into 
supplying needed information about other spies. Radosh and 
Milton contend that the agents' remaining there until the 
executions took place suggests that they expected one or 
both of the Rosenbergs to confess (pp. 416-17).
Leslie Fiedler (1953), the famous literary critic, 
claims that the Rosenberg sentences and their executions 
were "a parody of matyrdom, too absurd to be truly tragic, 
too grim to be the joke it is always threatening to become" 
(p. 45). Fiedler seems to take the position that the 
Rosenbergs forced the government's and Kaufman's decisions, 
wanting to die as martyrs rather than to live as confessed 
spies (pp. 27-32).
There was a range of scholarly opinions by pro-estab­
lishment advocates relevant to the Rosenbergs' sentencing. 
The clash of views on the jury's verdict seemed minimal. 
Scholarly opinion did not seem to mirror general public 
sentiment - "the public [generally] agreed with the 
imposition of the death penalty" (Columbia Law Review, 1954, 
p. 240). The diversity of opposing opinions regarding the 
sentencing produced an environment consistent with the 
argument posited by Shapiro (1984). He argues: We have been 
taught "that individuals, when confronted with irrefutable 
evidence that their beliefs are wrong, will often become
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even more convinced of their truth. Especially is this true 
when, as in the Rosenberg controversy, you are dealing with 
a surrogate religion" (p. 15). Festinger, Rieken, and 
Schacter (1964), writing about a religious sect analysis, 
take a similar view:
Suppose an individual believes something with his whole 
heart: suppose further that he has a commitment to this 
belief, that he has taken irrevocable action because of 
it; finally, suppose he is presented with evidence, 
unequivocal and undeniable evidence, that his belief is 
wrong: what will happen? The individual will frequently 
emerge not only unshaken, but even more convinced of 
the truth of his beliefs than ever before. Indeed, he 
may even show a new fervor about convincing and 
converting other people to his view (p. 3) .
This perspective might explain why various Rosenberg case 
arguments gained converts. It may also help explain why 
some of the arguments have not died with the passage of 
time. Most of the audience for the 1980s arguments were 
either too young to be participants in the 1950s or they 
were not yet born. Vested interests in the original claims 
lie with a distinct minority. The data revealed as a result 
of the Freedom of Information Act edict; the distance 
between the Rosenberg affair and its corresponding rhetoric 
(Martin, 1982, p. 14); and, until very recently, the dearth 
of American espionage cases have given current scholars a 
different perspective from which to examine the Rosenberg
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case. This new perspective appears to be less strident, 
less defensive, and more conciliatory.
Recent Interpretations of Purpose
Many early Rosenberg defense detractors have "relent­
lessly argued for the justice of the sentence, the enormity 
of the offense, and the rectitude of the prosecution's 
conduct in the case," while many early Rosenberg "defenders 
have ceaselessly argued their innocence and the barbarity 
of their execution" (Shapiro, 1984, p. 3). Beginning in 
1978 and continuing in the years immediately following, tens 
of thousands of documents relevant to the Rosenberg case 
were released by the A.E.C., C.I.A., F.B.I., Judge Jerome 
Frank's literary executor, the Justice Department's prosec­
utorial offices, and various U.S. military agencies. Two 
predominantly pro-Rosenberg books written before the govern­
ment's sweeping information release were republished 
(Meeropol & Meeropol, 1975, 1986; Schneir & Schneir, 1965, 
1983). These books showed little or no change in their 
focus, direction, or tone. The few additional claims and 
strengthening of positions that were apparent in these two 
books seemed to be the product of highly selective portions 
of the newly released government documents. It appears that 
the authors were addressing their appeals to an audience 
already familiar with and in agreement with their stance.
Two other scholars, who, previous to the government's
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new information disclosures, were strong advocates of many 
of the anti-establishment positions, collaborated in the 
authorship of a new book, The Rosenberg File (1983) . These 
two historians, Ronald Radosh and Joyce Milton, conclude, 
after their very comprehensive analysis of the Rosenberg 
case, that "Julius, and probably Ethel Rosenberg, had 
committed treason and that the Rosenberg defenders had 
harmed the Left by their moral insensitivity, political 
hypocricy, and intellectual doublethink" (Shapiro, 1984, 
p. 10). The Radosh and Milton book is not, however, a pro­
prosecution document. It takes a surprisingly balanced view 
of the case. The authors persuasively present several anti­
government arguments. Radosh and Milton argue that (1) the 
information passed on to the Soviets was of "marginal 
value;" (2) that Ethel Rosenberg was prosecuted mainly as 
leverage to get her husband to talk; and (3) that Judge 
Kaufman had decided on the death sentences before the jury's 
verdict. They also maintain that (1) the Rosenberg crimes 
"didn't warrant the death penalty;" (2) Kaufman's and 
prosecutor Saypol's actions were "particularly reprehen­
sible;" and (3) that the Rosenbergs were "hapless scapegoats 
in a propaganda war" in which both sides claimed victory 
(Shapiro, p. 10).
This Rosenberg sentencing study finds the Radosh and 
Milton arguments, for the most part, to be the most 
believable, unbiased, and thorough of the comprehensive 
scholarly works on the Rosenberg case. This study disagrees
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with Radosh and Milton on two major issues. First, it seems 
that the Rosenbergs received a "fair" trial. "Fairness" is 
a highly abstract term. It is used here to represent "the 
best the system of justice can do at a given time based upon 
what the society it serves demands" (see note 1). Justice 
is not perfect; it is discharged with understood 
limitations. The Rosenberg case received more formal review 
than any other case in American history by some of the most 
respected jurists in the U.S. The reviewing panels 
consisted of judges from varying political and philosophical 
vantage points. The defense and amicus curiae arguments 
were found insufficient to merit an overturning of the 
jury's verdict. The legality of the sentence, however, was 
only formally addressed once, in the first appeal of the 
case. In subsequent appeals, it was ruled that the 
sentence could not be questioned unless there was a prece­
ding reservation regarding the verdict. The propriety of 
the sentences imposed on the Rosenbergs became a question 
for the U.S. President to affirm or reverse. Both Presi­
dents Truman and Eisenhower affirmed the sentence rendered 
by Judge Kaufman. The second disagreement with Radosh and 
Milton concerns the question of when the judge decided on 
his sentence. It appears that insufficient evidence exists 
to warrant arguing that the judge had "decided on the death 
sentence before the verdict." It seems clear that Kaufman 
had discussed the sentencing with various government offi­
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cials before the jury's verdict? but the extent of these 
conversations, the pupose of such exchanges, and whether or 
not the judge weighed other available outcomes are not yet 
known to the scholarly community. To reach such a conclu­
sion without more solid evidence to support it appears 
inconsistent with the many other well-documented conclusions 
made in the Radosh and Milton study.
Many contemporary Rosenberg case scholars agree with 
the preponderance of conclusions made in The Rosenberg File. 
Several of these scholars have praised the quality, depth, 
and fairness of the authors' scholarship (Brinkley, 1983; 
Brookheiser, 1983? Dershowitz, 1983? Goodman, 1983; Kempton, 
1983? the New Republic, 1983? Oshinsky, 1983? Weinstein, 
1983) .
Conclusion
Many recent authors have incorporated some of the 
arguments of the early moderate pro- and anti-establishment 
scholars into their works. Some of the current Rosenberg 
case scholarship tends to support positions that are based 
on evidence and reasoned inferences rather than on dogma and 
ideology. Much of this scholarship has benefited from 
recent government information releases. Recent studies 
relevant to the Rosenberg case have changed, in great part, 
from being partisan, defensive exercises to being probing 
searches for understanding. The early partisan work remains 
useful in that it provides current scholars a picture of the
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passions held by opposing rhetors of the early 1950s.
The purposes attributed to the Rosenberg sentences seem 
linked to several controversial matters. These include: (1) 
whether the Rosenbergs were guilty of the offenses they were 
charged with?; (2) did key witnesses in the trial tell the 
truth?; (3) had the Rosenbergs participated in aiding the 
Soviets' search for atomic secrets?; (4) did Judge Kaufman 
determine his sentence under government pressure and did he 
decide the sentence after the trial?; and (5) was the United 
States truly in need of a symbolic purging of the betrayal 
many sensed was besetting the nation? Since there are many 
explanations offered in response to these questions, there 
is a variety of reasons given for the sentencing of the 
Rosenbergs.
The purpose of the Rosenberg sentencing is a synergic 
product of all the other pentadic elements. The dominating 
scene (betrayal) demanded a response. The Justice Depart­
ment sought a symbolic representation of the betrayal in 
America that could be publicly purged, symbolically clean­
sing the nation of its problems. The means (agency) chosen 
was a trial and sentence (act) that would be presided over 
by Judge Irving R. Kaufman (agent). Each of the pentadic 
elements provided a piece of the mosaic that comprised the 
reason why the sentences were imposed.
The last chapter of this study examines the causes or 
motives for the Rosenberg sentences. There were competing
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motives but those of the government are those which have 
prevailed above all others. This concluding chapter also 
draws implications from the Rosenberg case and applies these 
to the current spy case scene.




These comments are based upon personal conversations 
with Bernard L. Goldstein, a former Chicago criminal trial 
lawyer for over thirty-five years. Mr. Goldstein was a 
strong supporter of the American Civil Liberties Union. He 
was a member of the American Bar Association, the Illinois 
Bar Association, and the Chicago Bar Association. Mr. 
Goldstein, a close friend of the author's family, often 
spoke of the need for the law to keep up with changing times 
and the need for the courts to "seek the truth" rather than 
perform a rule-bound "ritual". Bernard Goldstein had a 
private practice. This was, he often said, was so that the 
ethics of his practice could be his own and not those of a 
committee or a vaguely identified firm. He gave a sub­
stantial amount of his time and talent to pro bono work.
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Conclusion and Implications
Motives concern "what people are doing and why they are 
doing it" (Burke, 1945, p. xv). The Rosenberg case drama- 
tistic analysis permits the critic to see "what people were 
doing" in the form: who (agent) did what (act) under what 
conditions (scene) using what means (agency) for what ends 
(purpose)? The pentadic perspective clearly shows the scene 
to have been the dominant pentadic element; that is, the 
scenic dimension was the major driving force influencing 
choices that were made. Other pentadic elements were also 
influential in shaping how the Rosenberg case unfolded, but 
the scene was the overriding dimension. The names of these 
pentadic elements are what Burke calls motives. According 
to Burke (1950) , a motive is more an intuitive and philo­
sophical matter than a psychological or sociological one.
The name of the Rosenberg trial motive was "betrayal". In 
this sense, the symbolic encompassing of the scene served as 
a means of making sense out of the trial and as a rationale 
for the acts connected with it. Thus, the symbolic acts of 
the Rosenberg trial were generated and justified by the 
prior acts of naming. The public consensus was that the
190
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postwar scene was one of betrayal.
Jeremy Bentham (1824) and Kenneth Burke (1950) argue 
that at times, rhetors choose to mask references to motives. 
Burke agrees with Bentham when he argues: "That there are 
usually several motives in any particular act. But where 
there is such 'conjunct of motives,' the speaker may 
represent the lot by selecting one motive as significant 
and neglecting the others" (Burke, 1950, p. 99). Such 
"eulogistic covering' of an unmentionable motive was called 
"covering motives" (pp. 99-101). An example of eulogizing a 
motive in this way is the use of "industry" for the motive, 
desire for gain (p. 100).
Attention is called to "ways whereby 'vague general­
ities' can also be used as covering motives (p. 100-101). 
Significantly abstract masks can be used to cover the actual 
motive. An example of this masking of motives is the use of 
the term "order" to cloak the actual motive of "tyranny"
(p. 100).
Whether a motive is eulogized or vaguely generalized, 
the function is the same, to avoid specifying particular 
motives. Obscuring motives has been an acceptable and 
common practice at least since the time of Machiavelli.
This chapter argues that there are groups of covered or 
covering motives. These are the motives of Judge Kaufman, 
the U.S. government, and the Rosenbergs. Other groups and 
individuals surely had motives in the case; however, these
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motives did not seem to influence greatly what was done and 
why it was done. This chapter takes the position that there 
are Rosenberg case implications that can affect current 
events. Additional research is suggested by this study.
This research involves extensions to this study's method­
ology and a widening of the scope of the present study.
This chapter concludes with a note on the importance of this 
study.
Judge Kaufman's Motives
Judge Irving R. Kaufman was chosen to preside over the
Rosenberg case because of his perceived pro-government
political perspective and because it was assumed, by those
1
who had authority to determine judicial assignments, that 
he would pronounce an appropriate sentence should the 
defendants be convicted. Kaufman received his legal 
training at a long-established, prestigious law school where 
he excelled not only in case law but in legal philosophy as 
well. He must have been aware that he would be involved in 
a clash of values, for the Rosenberg case was a "symbolic 
manifestation of a conflict in values" (white, 1976, p. 82).
White argues that judicial "values" are, in part, a 
measure of the commonality between the jurist and the public 
he serves.
The legitimacy of judicial decisions rests on the 
public's willingness to accept the expertise and 
authority of the judicial office, which is itself based
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on the ability of judges to persuade by a process of 
reasoning in their opinions. Judicial reasons are in 
essence articulations of values; they persuade by 
appealing to shared beliefs whose existence may be only 
dimly perceived by the public at large. A judicial 
decision is "right" not by virtue of some transcendent 
quality of logic or reason, but because the values it 
affirms and appeals to are perceived as important and 
worthwhile by the general public (p. 82).
The U.S. federal judiciary was generally well thought of in 
the early 1950s (Gallop, 1985, p. 3). Judge Kaufman's 
expertise and authority likely were acceptable to the 
general public, giving his decisions public legitimacy.
There were common public values, not shared by the majority 
of the Left, since they defined the scene so differently. 
These values included the needs to: (1) rid America of its 
betrayers; (2) regain government control over national 
security; and (3) suppress any Soviet influence in America. 
These public values were likely shared by Judge Kaufman.
This perceived value sharing by the public and the judge 
enhanced the likelihood that his decisions would be seen 
as "right".
Judge Kaufman wrote that he was concerned that his 
sentencing decision be in concert with (1) the nature of the 
offense; (2) the defendants' needs as they were the parents 
of two young children; and (3) present and future American
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societal needs (Lehman, 1951, p. 84). In his sentencing 
speech, the judge clearly stated that national honor and 
safety required that the "ultimate penalty" be imposed on 
the Kosenbergs (Baird, 1952, p. 59). One major covering 
motive that can be inferred from Judge Kaufman's sentencing 
speech is punishment, punishment for "crimes worse than 
murder" (p. 58). A second covering motive that can be 
gleaned from the sentencing speech is that of a warning to 
other spies that the government was not going to tolerate 
their behavior (pp. 58-59).
A third covering motive explaining why Judge Kaufman 
imposed death sentences on the Rosenbergs is justice. The 
judge seemed to invoke the term justice in a way suggesting 
that the death sentences were equitable for the crimes the 
Rosenbergs committed. A jurist cannot completely segregate 
himself from the society he represents in court. Franklin 
(1969) believes Kaufman sided with public sentiment in his 
sentencing of the Rosenbergs.
The case of the Rosenbergs is one of the causes 
celebres of the century. Public opinion in America was 
implacably against them and demanded their execution, 
while a world-wide campaign clamored for their lives 
to be spared. This campaign, as may be imagined, was 
whipped up by Communists and left-wing movements and 
turned into an anti-American crusade. It caused deep 
resentment in America, and probably as much as anything 
was responsible for the Rosenbergs finally going to the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
195
electric chair (pp. 191-192) .
The covering motives of "punishment" and "warning," 
probably eulogized the more unspeakable motives of "revenge" • 
and "intimidation". The death sentences were a way that 
Americans could symbolically get back at the Soviets, the 
American Left, and our allies who many Americans believed 
gave their spies lenient sentences. The people whom the 
Soviets attracted to spy on their behalf were believed to be 
rather weak and insecure. Intimidation, it was believed, 
would reduce the likelihood of their future work. The third 
publicly offered motive of "justice" probably was a vague 
generalizing of the motive, "giving the public what it 
wanted".
The Government's Motives
The most dominant government motives in support of the 
death penalties for the Rosenbergs were to: (1) regain the 
power and control over national security and welfare that 
some of the American public perceived had been lost; (2) 
blame the Rosenbergs for many of the problems America had 
experienced; (3) secure necessary information sufficient to 
locate and convict other U.S. spies; and (4) allay some 
citizens' fears that the Soviets were making political and 
ideological inroads in America. Government leaders could 
not directly impose the death penalties but they were able 
to influence the process that produced the Rosenbergs' death
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sentences.
Among the ways that government leaders influenced the 
sentences were: (1) selecting a pro-government presiding 
judge; (2) selecting an experienced, anti- Communist 
prosecutor to lead the government's case: (3) supplying the 
press with as much information favorable to the government's 
case as was available; and (4) arranging, before the jury 
rendered its verdict, secret meetings between the judge and 
Justice Department officials to discuss possible Rosenberg 
sentences.
It is likely that the Justice Department was frustrated 
in late 1950. It had uncovered evidence of three U.S. spy 
rings during World War II (Seth, 1974, p. 471). In 1950, 
all the major spy convictions had occurred in Canada and 
England. Several other known spies had fled to Russia. The 
U.S. government had in custody two spies, Harry Gold and 
David Greenglass, but the information that led to their 
arrests resulted from May's and Fuchs' confessions. May and 
Fuchs had bargained with the British government for reduced 
sentences and guarantees that they would not be extradited 
to other nations for further trials in exchange for their 
confessions. Both Gold and Greenglass were willing to talk 
and give the government further leads on other spies, Their 
confessions led to the Rosenbergs. With the Rosenbergs, the 
Justice Department recognized it had an opportunity to gain 
valuable information; but it also became clear that the 
Rosenbergs were not likely to talk willingly.
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Radosh and Milton (1983) claim that the securing of 
information was the primary government motive for seeking 
the Rosenberg death sentences.
The real reasons the federal prosecutors, the FBI, and 
the AEC wanted the Rosenberg case pursued to the limits 
of the law had little to do with the precise nature of 
the crime at hand. There was the expectation, first of 
all, that Julius Rosenberg could provide the names of 
other amateur spies in important positions —  though 
not necessarily connected to atomic research. And 
secondly, there was the very real desire to frighten 
other individuals who might potentially lend themselves 
to such activities in the future (p. 431).
The F.B.I. had secondhand evidence and significant 
suspicions concerning specific people who were believed 
active in espionage, but it needed corroboration in order to 
secure convictions in court. The government's hope for 
added information from the Rosenbergs remained active even 
at the death house. Radosh and Milton (1983) claim the 
government had good reason to want the Rosenbergs to talk: 
[An] FBI memorandum neatly summarized what the Bureau 
still hoped to gain if Julius made a last-minute 
confession. "If Rosenberg talks," the memo said, 
meaning Julius, not Ethel, "We can probably prosecute 
for espionage, William Perl and Michael Sisorovich, 
. . .  we can also possible secure wartime espionage
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indictments against Alfred Sarant and Loel Barr . . . 
we can possibly prosecute Ann Sidorovich at leact for 
conspiracy . . . (p. 417).
Americans felt betrayed. One response to betrayal is to 
find a scapegoat to blame. Blaming the Rosenbergs was a 
symbolic exorcism of problems from national leaders' daily 
concerns and providing these leaders with fresh agendas.
King (1976) argues, utilizing passages from Nietzche (1969) , 
that blame is a ritualistic way of casting away undesired 
problems:
The placing of blame is a genteel form of the ancient 
sacrifice. Resentment must be "diverted" outside the 
group just as the ancient priest, the diverter of the 
course of resentment" had to get "rid of this blasting- 
stuff in such a way" that it did not "blow up the herd 
and the herdsman." This was his "real feat" and 
"supreme utility" (p. 133).
High government officials likely believed that the 
Rosenbergs' arrests and convictions would make the American 
people more confident that their government was in control 
of national security. Such a conviction, it could be 
argued, showed that the Soviets had not infiltrated the 
government. With the Rosenberg convictions, the U.S. could 
do what the laws of Canada and Britain forbade: execute 
atomic spies. J. Edgar Hoover strongly favored executing 
Julius Rosenberg but not executing Ethel Rosenberg (Radosh & 
Milton, 1983, pp. 280-82). Hoover believed there likely
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would be too many negative symbolic repercussions pertaining 
to the issues of motherhood and the execution of a woman.
The covering motives for the U.S. government's support 
of the death sentences were: (1) power, demonstrating that 
the government had regained strength that some had thought 
it had lost; (2) blame, a means of shifting public focus 
away from unsolved problems facing America; and (3) 
security, a symbolic demonstration that the government could 
convict and punish Soviet spies; that the U.S. had not 
succumbed to Soviet influence.
The motive of "power" really masked the fact that the 
government couldn't do very much about most of the ongoing 
problems in America but that they needed to have a highly 
visible symbolic event that would give the illusion'that the 
government was in control. This perceived control, it was 
hoped, would give the government the legitimacy and backing 
it needed to begin modest programs of national stabil­
ization. The offered motive of "blame" really masked the 
act of scapegoating. The Rosenbergs became the symbolic 
focal point of all the ills in America. The covering motive 
of "security" really masked the need for the government to 
diffuse the debilitating statements made by Senator Joseph 
McCarthy. The Rosenberg sentences would be a refutation of 
what McCarthy had claimed.
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The Rosenbergs' Motives
Ethel and Julius Rosenberg did influence their own 
deatn sentences. It is quite unlikely that they set out 
from the very start to be sentenced to death, but it seems 
that several behaviors in their own "defense" and others' 
acts on their "behalf" were designed to encourage their 
death sentences. The Left, as an organized movement, did 
almost nothing to aid the Rosenbergs during their trial and 
little support was offered during the appeals process 
(Radosh & Milton, 1983, p. 453). It was only after the 
Rosenberg executions that numerous committees organized by 
the Left emerged and raised substantial sums of money to 
further investigate the case (Root, 1963, pp. 109, 235-38, 
286-87; Wexley, 1955, p. 209).
The lack of active Leftist support during the trial may 
have exacerbated an already tenuous courtroom defense, but 
it was not a significant cause for the imposed sentences.
Nor did the lack of support seem to have any real influence 
on the Rosenbergs' eventual executions. The reduction of 
their sentences was entirely in the Rosenbergs' control. 
Publicly known sentence reduction offers had been tendered 
by the government and these offers were well known to Ethel 
and Julius Rosenberg as reflected in letters they exchanges 
before their deaths (Rosenberg, 1954). Radosh and Milton 
argue that the Rosenbergs envisioned themselves as important 
to posterity by going to their deaths denying guilt:
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Although well aware that they could make a deal for 
their lives, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg chose to face 
death rather than betray their ideals and implicate 
their associates in espionage . . . The Rosenbergs were 
not admirable people: the portrait that emerges from 
their letters and other sources is one of rigid, self- 
righteous ideologues motivated by contempt for their 
countrymen and, reveling in the knowledge that they 
were earning for themselves a place in history (p.
452) .
Suspicions regarding the eagerness with which some 
claimed to want to save the Rosenbergs are not just retro­
spective ideas. Albert Einstein came to mistrust the 
claims and motives of the Left. The famed physicist had, at 
one time, been actively involved in the National Committee 
to Secure Justice campaign to seek help for the Rosenbergs. 
Einstein later had "growing doubts about the motives of the 
Rosenberg defense" and these doubts "led him to conclude 
that the Communists did not want the Rosenbergs to be saved" 
(p. 391). He soon after ceased affiliation with the 
Committee.
Radosh and Milton further claim Mr. Block, the 
Rosenbergs' attorney, seemed indisposed to get a new trial 
for his clients. They argue that Bloch overtly frustrated 
attempts by another lawyer, Fyke Farmer, to help in the role 
of friend of the court. During the appeals period, Emanuel 
Bloch is reported to have thwarted Farmer's attempts to
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secure a new Rosenberg trial. "This was the last thing that 
either Bloch or the Rosenbergs wanted . . . recognizing the 
practical dangers inherent in a new trial, which might well 
place in jeopardy accomplices who had so far escaped 
prosecution" (Radosh & Milton, p. 395).
Many of the frequent letters exchanged in the Sing Sing 
prison death house between Ethel and Julius Rosenberg have 
been posthumously published (Rosenberg, 1954) and reproduced 
by their sons (Meeropol & Meeropol, 1975, 1986). These 
letters tend to show the Rosenberg couple as self-created 
martyrs. "To say that the Rosenbergs had become secular 
martyrs of the American Communist Party is no rhetorical 
exaggeration" (Radosh & Milton, p. 420).
The Rosenberg case brought forth loud, strident, and 
highly partisan rhetoric from individuals and groups 
representing polar political positions. Most arguments on 
important issues provide useful results when the argument 
has ended. The Rosenberg case argument has not yet ended 
but much of the viciousness of past contentions has now 
subsided. There are some lessons to be learned from the 
Rosenberg case even in its unfinished state:
If the Rosenberg case has an ultimate moral, it is 
precisely to point up the dangers of adhering to an 
unexamined political myth. Julius and Ethel Rosenberg 
and their accomplices were so captive to their blind 
adulation of Stalinist Russia that they failed to
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perceive the true implications of their espionage, much 
less to comprehend how their actions would discredit 
the Left in the eyes of their fellow Americans. The 
Rosenbergs' accusers, on the other hand, were oblivious 
to the fact that the danger to national security from 
ideologically motivated amateur spies —  already a 
vanishing breed by the time of the trial —  was far 
less than the damage that would be done by allowing 
American justice to appear to serve as a handmaiden to 
Cold War politics. Partisans on both sides were 
convinced that they held a monopoly on truth and that 
the end justified the means (pp. 453-54).
Various authors have claimed that the Rosenbergs had several 
noble motives for allowing their defense to be so weak and 
for not cooperating with the government to reduce their 
sentences or to escape the electric chair once the sentences 
were imposed. Goldstein (1975), Meeropol and Meeropol 
(1975, 1986), Schneir and Schneir (1965, 1983), and Wexley 
(1955) all assert that the Rosenbergs believed that their 
loyalty, dedication to their cause, and protection of other 
spies were more important than their own lives. The 
Rosenbergs and their supporters allowed these motives to be 
covered up since they would undoubtedly would not have 
gained the Rosenbergs any sympathy or support. The Left 
chose to allow the motives to be covered by the term 
"scapegoating". Leftist rhetors tried, with the use of this 
term, to avoid all implications of guilt, claiming that all
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the arrest and trial testimony and investigations were part 
of the scapegoating process and therefore ought be ignored 
by the public.
The competition between offered motives has consis­
tently favored the judge and the government. Recent case 
investigations have shown the government's position to be 
far less than exemplary. The Rosenbergs' supporters have 
been shown to have had some valid bases for questions and 
objections (Schneir & Schneir (1965, 1983; Wexley, 1955). 
However, the root questions of the Rosenbergs' guilt and the 
sentences' legality have withstood lengthy and probing 
scrutiny (Columbia Law Review, 1954; Radosh & Milton, 1983). 
The government's and the judge's views have triumphed and 
victorious views shadow all others. As King (1976) has so 
ably put it, "[The victor's] vision of the world seems the
only vision. Other views of life may be perspectives, but
his view of life is reality" (p. 127).
Implications of the Rosenberg Case
The events that occurred in the Rosenberg case have 
current implications. The 1980s have witnessed a rise in 
U.S. espionage cases involving American citizens. This 
section of the study argues that there are significant ways 
in which the early 1950s and the late 1980s are similar.
Four 1950s public issues seem to have reemerged in the 
late 1980s. These issues are: (1) the high percentage of
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Americans who favor the death penalty: 68% in 1951 and 72% 
in 1985 (Gallop, 1985, p. 4); (2) the high American regard 
expressed for the federal courts (Gallop, 1987, p. 3; 1986, 
p. 3; 1985, p. 3); (3) press and public officials' revel­
ations of increasing U.S. danger due to accelerated Soviet 
spying activities in the U.S.; and (4) a rise in Soviet spy 
arrests and trials (stories relevant to these issues 
appeared regularly in the New York Times, Newsweek, and Time 
in both time periods) . One major public perception that 
seems to have changed significantly since the early 1950s is 
the trust and high positive regard held for the federal 
investigative agencies like the C.I.A. and the F.B.I.
These issues all have current import and relate to 
Rosenberg case critics' arguments. These issues have not 
been fully resolved and they therefore could present similar 
problems for late 1980s America as they did in the Rosenberg 
case era. Each of these issues is discussed more fully 
below.
The Current Rise in Spy Case Arrests
One major thrust in Judge Kaufman's sentencing speech 
was that there was a "message" being sent to would-be spies 
that their spying behavior would not be tolerated and that 
the government was able to find them and punish them. The 
dearth of U.S. treason and espionage cases for almost 
twenty-five years seemed to lend credence to the claim that 
Kaufman's harsh sentences in the 1950s actually had fright-
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ened the Soviets and others from carrying out major U.S. 
spying activities. No major American spy cases have been 
publicly acknowledged in the U.S. until recently when
2
several serious espionage activities have been disclosed.
The first major U.S. spy case publicly acknowledged 
since the Rosenberg case was the Christopher Boyce and A. 
Dalton Lee trial (these defendants were popularly known as 
"the Falcon and the Snowman"). These two young men stole 
U.S. military plans from the TRW company and sold them to 
the Soviets in Mexico. Boyce and Lee received 40 year 
prison sentences for their crimes (Brower, 1987, p. 132).
The Boyce-Lee case broke a twenty-four year hiatus in U.S. 
domestic spying. This first case was followed by the 1978 
William Kampiles case in which a C.I.A. officer spied for 
the Soviets. He, too, received a 40 year prison sentence 
for his offenses. In the 1984-1985 period, one termed "the 
year of the spy" (Gee, 1985, p. 24), there were ten arrests, 
trials, and convictions of Americans for spying activities 
in the U.S. These cases included: (1) Richard W. Miller, a 
former F.B.I. agent who sold counter-intelligence data to 
the Soviets. His sentence was two life terms plus 50 years 
in prison; (2) Thomas Patrick Cavenaugh, an aircraft 
engineer who attempted to sell Stealth Aircraft, secrets to 
the Soviets. For his crimes, he received a sentence of 99 
years; (3) John Walker, who received two life sentences plus 
ten years in jail; John's son, Michael Walker, who received
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a 30 year sentence; and John's brother, Arthur Walker, who 
also received a 30 year sentence; and John's close friend, 
Jerry Whitworth, all former naval personnel who, as a team, 
sold naval crypto and sub technology to the Soviets; and (4) 
Ronald Pelton, a National Security Agency officer who gave 
the Soviets N.S.A. intercepts of K.G.B. data, for which he 
received a life sentence. All of these spies were convicted 
of helping the Soviet Union which seems to have been the 
major beneficiary of most U.S. spying. Larry Wu-tai Chin, a 
C.I.A. intelligence officer, and Anne Henderson-Pollard were 
each convicted of aiding the People's Republic of China in 
unspecified ways. Mr. Chin died before he could be tried 
and Mrs. Pollard received a five year jail sentence.
Jonathan Jay Pollard was convicted of releasing U.S. 
surveillance data relevant to Middle-East nations to the 
Israelis. Mr. Pollard received a life sentence for his 
spying (Brower, 1987, pp. 131-34).
The U.S. government has had reason to suspect that more 
espionage problems may be present in their ranks. The U.S. 
intelligence community has been "working feverishly —  in 
search of spies inside the C.I.A. itself" (Miller, 1985).
The January 1987 Reader's Digest reports that 80 Soviet 
spies were expelled from the U.S. Embassy in Washington; 
Soviet consulates in Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, 
and Washington; and from the United nations (pp. 47-52).
The past decade has seen a dramatic increase in U.S. 
spy cases and the American people have become concerned
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
208
about this change. Although there have been highly visible 
and well publicized efforts to improve relations between 
the U.S. and the Soviet Union, spying between the two 
nations appears to be on the increase.
Spying seems to many a most heinous crime when your own
country is the one spied upon but the same act is usually
seen as necessary for protection and defense when it is
your nation doing the spying (Knightly, 1986, p. 3). Some
Americans believe spying in peace-time is unnecessary. When
peace-time spying appears to rise in frequency, there is
often a suspicion that peace is very fragile. "The threat
3
of war becomes more immediate and real."
The threat of war tends to trigger various powerful 
emotions such as worry and fear. Citizens in a worried and 
frightened mood tend to forcefully demand severe punishment 
for those they believe have caused their anxieties. An 
apprehended spy in a national climate of concern is more 
likely in danger of severe punishment than the same spy 
would be if the prevailing climate were more serene. The 
early 1950s climate was a major focus of contention 5 .i 
Rosenberg sentence debates. If the present U.S. sense of 
relative security were to percipitously worsen, any spies 
convicted may be in more danger of execution. Brower (1987) 
claims that many recent spies have done much worse deeds 
than the Rosenbergs (p. 132). This is an arguable position, 
but the fact that there have been a large number of spy
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cases resulting in non-capital sentences seems to validate, 
at least to some degree, that the scene dictates the 
sanction. If this is true, it seems we need to take 
greater care in defining the scene and in pre-determining 
the sanctions for crimes before the emotion of the trial so 
as not to repeat the Rosenberg case history.
Public Death Penalty Support
Recent public reaction to spying activity has been 
quite harsh according to the Harris Survey (1986). A vast 
majority of people polled "would advocate in the case of 
spies . . . giving mandatory death sentences to anyone 
caught selling or giving secrets to a foreign country" (pp. 
1-2) .
American legal decisions have lagged behind recent 
social changes and current public opinion (White, 1976). 
However, such a lag is not infinite. The system of justice 
does eventually catch up when changes or opinions become 
institutionalized or become consistent over time. The 
courts tend to follow patterns of societal change. The 
death penalty was favored by most Americans in the early 
1950s as it seems to be in the 1980s (Gallop, 1987, p. 3? 
1986, p. 3; 1986, p. 3). Immediately after the Rosenbergs' 
arrests, a demand was made by some in the press that they be 
executed if they were found guilty; this occurred before the 
trial began (New York Post, 1951a, p. 1). The Schneirs 
(1965, p. 119) also argue that the scene favored the death
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penalty before the case was opened for trial. Such a 
climate, where the death penalty is sanctioned by the courts 
and is strongly favored by the people, likely promotes 
increased capital sentences. The American legal system 
needs to be vigilant to assure that popular sentiment does 
not unduly influence sound legal decision-making (White, 
1976, pp. 33-34) .
Continued High Regard for the Federal Courts
The Gallup polls reflect positive public opinion toward 
the federal courts in both the early 1950s and the late 
1980s (Gallup, 1987, pp. 1-3). One major line of argument 
registered by opponents of the Rosenberg sentences was the 
U.S. Supreme Court refusal to review the case's trial 
history. This refusal was based solely on technical reasons 
(Columbia Law Review, 1954, pp. 223-234). Those technical­
ities acted to keep the issue clouded rather than serving to 
clearly answer objections. Prominent Harvard University 
constitutional law professor, Arthur Miller, claimed 
recently that the courts are meant to treat people as 
individuals, not as a monolith. He also argued that rules
of procedure need to assure individuals are protected, not
4
protecting the system from challenge. Miller, it appears, 
would object to the system's rules inhibiting the Supreme 
Court from examining the trial record of those appellants 
facing execution. Care needs to be taken not to rely upon
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rules and procedures rather than on a search for the truth, 
especially in cases involving another's life.
Decreased Trust of the C.I.A. and the F.B.I.
In 1949, 73% of Americans polled reported that they 
trusted and held in high regard the F.B.I.? in 1970, a 
similar measure of public confidence was taken and the 
result was that 71% of the people polled reported that they 
trusted the F.B.I. (Gallup, 1972, pp. 843, 2259). Several 
recent C.I.A. and F.B.I. scandals have likely reduced public 
confidence in these agencies. The Harris public opinion 
summary (1986) argues that 86% of the people surveyed would 
favor "an investigation of the F.B.I. and other intelligence 
agencies to find out why they have bee so slow to find and 
to crack down on spies" (p. 1). The fact that many spies 
appear to have worked undetected for long periods of time 
and were not caught until recently "has both taxed the 
patience of the American people and also has led them to 
question the thoroughness and effectiveness of [the] F.B.I. 
and other anti-espionage activity" (pp. 1-2).
Suggestions for Future Research
This Rosenberg case study which focused on the motives 
for the death sentences suggests several other avenues for 
further research. The most closely related research seems 
to be analyses of the Rosenberg appeals and executions.
Such analyses could focus upon the extent to which, like the
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Rosenberg sentences, the rejected appeals and eventual 
executions were scene driven. A more rigorous investigation 
might seek to determine whether there were causal 
relationships involved in the sentence-appeals-execution 
series of events.
Another arena of research suggested by this study is 
whether or not other post-World War II spy cases, both 
domestic and foreign, were as scenically dominated as was 
the Rosenberg case. The results of such a study could be 
vital to defense and prosecuting lawyers, judges, appellate 
panels, and to legal philosophers as well.
Examinations of highly publicized legal cases other 
than spy trials to see if they, too, are scenically driven 
could provide the legal profession insight as to how 
effectively the justice system is protected from outside 
influence and whether or not there needs to be further 
safeguards put into the system. Cases involving terrorism, 
mass murders, war crimes, and securities violations appear 
to offer a researcher quantities of data upon which to work.
Many other legal matters that are not as notorious as 
those listed above seem, at first glance, to be potentially 
scene driven. These include: divorce, spouse or child 
abuse, chemical dependency, bankruptcy, and corporate 
takeovers. Such events invite research into apparent 
predictable patterns, especially those that could be 
predicted by communication patterns. Such predictions, if
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they were possible, would allow interventions into these 
problems.
Events outside the legal quarter are also fertile 
sources of scenic research. Such events as: suicide, school 
drop-outs, international armed aggression, and marital 
infidelity may be shown to be scenically influenced. Such 
findings would surely interest the social scientists.
In the study of events that are act, agent, agency, or 
purpose driven rather than scene driven, it would be useful 
to know whether the dominating pentadic element is due to a 
weak or unique scene or due to a particularly active 
pentadic element other than the scene, or due to both these 
conditions. Perhaps, in events that are not scenically 
driven, a pattern would emerge.
Final Reflections
There are many facets of the Rosenberg case scene that 
are similar to those of the late 1980s. There are several 
exigencies of the 1950s that are not present in the 1980s 
era; however, the possibility exists that the current scene 
could be fraught with similar danger and betrayal as was the 
Rosenberg case scene given unforseen circumstances. U.S. 
Justice Department officials and other American opinion 
leaders need to be conscious of the many problems faced as a 
result of the Rosenberg case so that repetition of these 
difficulties can be minimized.




The Chief Judge, who commonly is the senior member of 
the court; the U.S. Attorney General; the U.S. Solicitor 
General; and the Directors of the C.I.A. and the F.B.I. can 
have significant influence in trial case assignments. While 
the Chief Judge is the only one who had direct influence in 
the Rosenberg case assignment, the others were likely 
influential. Such influence could be exerted by the timing 
of other cases, pre-trial publicity, and by professional 
pleading with the Chief Judge.
2
This assertion is based upon the lack of cited 
espionage/treason cases in the Reader's Guide to Periodical 
Literature and the Department of State Bulletin both of 
which seem to regularly report such cases.
3
This concept was discussed on the CBS TV show, 60 
Minutes with Mike Wallace as moderator in the Fall of 1987.
4
Based on an interview on the ABC TV show Nightline 
with Ted Koppel as moderator in February 1988.
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